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Why does mediation, as a form of international conflict 
management, succeed or fail? This question, central to the field 
of mediation research since its inception, is the raison d'etre 
of this thesis. 
The assignments emanating from this question are thus: firstly, 
and most importantly, to discover those factors and conditions 
within the mediation relationship which are the central 
determinants of mediation success or failure; secondly, to reach 
an understanding of how to define and classify the concepts of 
success and failure; thirdly, to devise a framework which will 
give a sense of order to the milieu of actors, issues, 
perceptions and behaviour present in a conflict/ mediation case; 
and fourthly, to discover a research method which will allow the 
integration of a theoretical foundation with a rigorous empirical 
approach. 
Initially, attention is given to understanding mediation, its 
necessity, and the different methods available for analysing it 
as a phenomenon of social science research. This done, the focus 
shifts to the "dependent variable" of the thesis, namely 
mediation outcome, and how (a) success and failure can be defined 
and classified, and (b) how an outcome can be understood as the 
end result of a framework of four variables which represent the 
mediation relationship. 
ii 
Once constructed, this framework provides the grounding for the 
construction of fifteen hypotheses, drawn from the theoretical 
literature, which link certain factors and conditions in the 
framework to mediation success or failure. These hypotheses are 
then examined for validity, using a correlates of mediation data-
set, constructed through the systematic empirical method from 
actual cases of international mediation. The analysis is 
initially bivariate, but then moves to a more complex 
multivariate approach. 
It is found that there are many significant influences upon 
mediation outcome, but that the central determinant of whether 
mediation succeeds or fails is the interrelationship between 
three factors: the complexity of the dispute, the relationship 
between the disputants prior to the conflict, and the environment 
where the mediation takes place. These findings are reintegrated 
into the theoretical understanding of mediation, and the thesis 
concludes with some of the practical lessons for mediators 
provided by the analysis of the study. 
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Chapter One: 
Understanding Mediation and Mediation Research 
Introduction 
This thesis has the aim of discovering, amongst the multitude of 
influences which represent the mediation relationship, those 
factors and conditions which are central to determining whether 
mediation succeeds or fails. When we can recognise these, we can 
begin to not only explain why a particular mediation reaches the 
outcome it does, but also to predict with some accuracy whether 
mediation will succeed or fail. However, before these details can 
be elicited, there is the imperative to build a foundation of 
understanding, concerning mediation, its role in international 
conflict, and how it can be analysed as a field in social science 
research. Once this has been achieved, and the objects and 
methods of this study established, attention can be concentrated 
on mediation outcome, and the influences it is dependent upon. 
International Conflict, and the Need for a Response 
International conflict, defined as an organised and identifiable 
dispute between two distinct states, and involving the use of 
armed force, remains a fact of our existence as we move toward 
the close of the Twentieth Century. Contemporary records indicate 
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there have been over 650 international disputes between 1945 and 
1986. 1 Since the latter date many more conflicts have occurred in 
the international system. While the incidence of conflict tends 
to be concentrated in the "trouble-spots" of the Middle East, 
Africa and South-East Asia, this is not exclusively so. 
International conflict is a global ph~nomenon existing in, and 
threatening, all the regions of the world. 
If we accept that such conflict is a fact of our lives, albeit 
undesirably so, and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable 
future, interest turns to the response humankind should 
formulate. Beyond the unrealistic expectation of removing the 
cause of these disputes, the answer lies in discovering a way to 
minimise their negative effects. 
Faced with a conflict situation, a party can choose one of three 
options: using violence in the hope of prevailing over their 
opponent; avoiding or ignoring the conflict in the hope it will 
disappear; or seeking to manage the dispute in a peaceful manner 
(Pruitt and Rubin 1986: 25). As our concern is to minimise 
negative effects we can dismiss the first option; international 
conflicts are a costly and destructive force, not simply in terms 
of fatalities, but also in the disruption they cause to domestic 
and international affairs. similarly, it is not realistic to 
expect an international dispute to go away through pretending it 
does not exist. This leaves the search for a peaceful means to 
manage disputes as the only viable response to the high global 
incidence of international conflict. 
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It is from this stimuli that the exploration of mediation as a 
means of non-violent conflict management gains impetus. Research 
on mediation is undertaken to further theoretical and practical 
understanding of the subject, with the belief that a deeper 
understanding of mediation will ultimately result in more 
effective ways of minimising the costs of international conflict. 
Despite the importance of mediation as a means to manage disputes 
in a non-violent manner at all levels of conflict from 
interpersonal to international, in social science research 
mediation is still in its infancy. While a burgeoning body of 
literature is dedicated to the theory and practice of mediation, 
in many ways the field has stalled at the conceptual stage. We 
are still some way from being able to construct a theory of 
mediation. Even the formulation of simple "if-then" relationships 
cannot be made with any real certainty. It is symptomatic of this 
reality that much of the ongoing research on mediation is 
concerned not only with furthering knowledge of the mechanics of 
mediation, but also with setting the parameters of the field. How 
do we perceive mediation? Is it an abstract theoretical concept, 
an ad-hoc legal substitute, an extension of bilateral 
negotiation, or a panacea for international conflict? The obvious 
starting point to resolve this uncertainty is to construct a more 
rigorous definition of what is meant by the term mediation. 
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Defining Mediation 
Initially it is useful to place mediation in its wider context 
and recognise it as a form of conflict management. All conflicts, 
despite manifest differences, have in common a capacity to be 
managed in three different ways. The first requires that one 
party is victorious over the other and imposes defeat, relying 
on violence and coercion to terminate the dispute. The second 
option concerns the parties themselves negotiating an agreement 
to manage their own conflict, while the final option involves the 
assistance of a third party. It is in this area of third party 
involvement that mediation is found. 
Once within the domain of third-party involvement, there are 
further distinctions that are necessary. Mediation is concerned 
with dispute termination through peaceful means. The disputant 
parties are entering a forum where non-violent relationships will 
be used to manage their conflict. 
Similarly, mediation should not be confused with the practices 
of arbitration or adjudication. Mediation is a non-binding 
relationship between the parties and mediator, where the third 
party is not present to enforce a settlement or to pass judgement 
as to who is right or wrong, winner or loser. By definition, a 
mediator cannot command the adversaries to accept anything, but 
will rather help them to manage their dispute through changing, 
influencing or modifying the conflict environment (Bercovitch 
1986:156). 
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The basic modification that mediation makes to a conflict occurs 
simply through the mediator's presence. From being a dyadic 
relationship between two disputing entities, the relationship is 
transformed into a triad as the mediator becomes a third party 
in the conflict scenario. In this sense mediation should be 
understood as an extension of bilateral negotiation rather than 
an isolated process. 
The above elements form the basic charter of mediation as a 
subject for research. Consequently, the definition follows that 
mediation is: the process by which a third party assists parties 
in a conflict to manage their dispute in a non-violent manner, 
with the goal of achieving a peaceful and non-binding outcome. 
This definition forms the foundation for our understanding of 
mediation, and is the touchstone for the research that comprises 
the rest of this study. 
Approaches to Mediation Research 
Research undertaken in the field of mediation is pursued along 
several different dimensions. From the foundation laid from 
theoretical discussion comes other research techniques for 
building an understanding of mediation. The aim of progressive 
mediation research is to get away from an unsatisfactory emphasis 
on historical description of individual mediation cases, and to 
move the field into the level of the conceptual. Zinnes writes 
that this concern is characterised by: 
a willingness to move from the unique to the 
general and consider classes of events and types of 
entities; and ... a commitment to search for patterns 
of association between these classes (1976:2). 
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The concern moves from providing accounts of unique historical 
events, to an interest in relationships between classes of 
events. The means by which this is achieved is through a cycle 
of theory development and hypothesis construction, testing of 
these notions, modifying for the results, and recycling the 
information to build knowledge. 
Much of the literature on mediation gives the impression that its 
theoretical base has emerged independently of any forbears. For 
example, Burton favours the idea that mediation should be 
classified as a completely separate phenomenon to negotiation. 
He argues that negotiation only exists when there is no third 
party presence whatsoever (1972b:152). However, the argument of 
this study as stated here, and assumed throughout, is that 
mediation is essentially an extension of bilateral negotiation. 
While the mediator is not a disputant party in the conflict, part 
of the intermediary's arsenal of skills is the ability to bargain 
with the different parties, and to use negotiation skills to 
promote settlement. 
This concept of mediator behaviour was considered by Schelling 
(1960) in his influential study of conflict and negotiation. He 
argued that a mediator involved in the negotiation between two 
parties may be involved as a party in the bargaining and hence 
may have an incentive structure which differs from the other 
parties (1960:29). Gulliver takes this idea a step further and 
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argues that any conflict management involving a mediator is not 
some abstract or separate phenomena, but is simply triadic 
negotiation. He writes: 
.•• clearly the mediator exercises influence in some 
degree, whether he remains largely passive or 
virtually controls the exchange of information and the 
learning process. He himself interacts with each party 
and with both togeth,er, and they may communicate to 
and through him. He becomes a party in the 
negotiations. He becomes a negotiator and as such, he 
inevitably brings with him, deliberately or not, 
certain ideas, knowledge, and assumptions, as well as 
certain interests and concerns of his own and those of 
other people whom he represents (1979:213). 
Mediation researchers should not lose sight of the fact that much 
of their terminology, research agenda, and theoretical heritage 
descends from the literature of negotiation. 2 
From the ground-breaking work of Young (1967, 1972), there has 
been a continuing body of research which has explored the 
theoretical parameters of mediation. Some of the studies which 
have explored the general theory of mediation, (rather than just 
specific aspects) include the work of Bercovitch (1984); Kressel 
and Pruitt (1985); Moore (1986); and Wall (1981). An interesting 
aspect of the mediation movement has been the way in which theory 
has constantly lagged behind practice, as mediators continue to 
manage conflicts, especially in the areas of international 
relations and labour-management relations (Pruitt and Kressel 
1989:2). This has led to a body of theoretical literature with 
a prescriptive slant, aimed at the practitioner, rather than the 
theorist. Examples of this include Kessler (1978), and Underhill 
( 1981) • 
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It is from the foundation of theoretical studies such as the 
above examples that mediation research is built. Ott writes that 
while theoretical discussions of the practice of mediation 
provide "an indispensable first step" to building a theory of 
mediation: 
••• its utility is limited by the general absence of 
empirical studies and a systematic discussion of the 
obstacles to successful mediation. These are required 
if we are to begin to construct if ... then propositions 
concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
effective mediation (1972:596). 
There are four major paths through which this required empirical 
research is undertaken: case-study/ historical, observational/ 
interview, experimental, and systematic empirical. 
His~orical Approaches 
The initial step from purely theoretical studies in mediation is 
to use the descriptive facts of a particular mediation case-study 
to illustrate the elements of a theoretical model. One example 
of this is the study by Ott {1972) of the "quasi-war" between 
Malaysia and Indonesia, and the Sabah dispute between Malaysia 
and the Philippines. Another good example is provided by Touval 
and Zartman {1985b), who dedicate the contents of an edited 
volume to a collection of mediation case-studies. These include 
examinations of the Algerian mediation of the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis {Sick 1985), The Algiers Accord between Iran and Iraq 
(Lieb 1985) , and the Soviet mediation of the Inda-Pakistani 
Conflict (Thornton 1985). The use of the case-study for mediation 
research can also be found in the work of Harbottle (1980); 
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Touval ( 1982) ; Touval and Zartman ( 1985a, 1989) ; and Stein 
(1985}. 
Because a case-study seeks to combine theory and practice it can 
be considered a useful "step up" from purely theoretical or 
de~criptive research. Theoretical precepts are given relevance 
with real world illustration, to which the theory gives structure 
and aids understanding. 
However, the difficulty with case-studies lies in the balance 
between the theory and the case. If too much emphasis is placed 
on the theory it is easy to get the impression that the case is 
being used in a selective manner, and only when it suits the 
theoretical framework. Conversely, if the study concentrates on 
the details of the individual case at the expense of the 
theoretical framework, the line between description and analysis 
becomes increasingly blurred. At best a case-study is a tool to 
illustrate, but certainly it cannot prove or even strongly 
reinforce theoretical notions. Because the case-study uses only 
one (or sometimes two if the method is comparative) empirical 
example, it is still founded in the mentality that places the 
uniqueness of events above the broader trends and generalisations 
necessary for meaningful theory construction. 
The Interview or Observational Approach 
A second technique used to research mediation entails the use of 
interviews and questionnaires, through which information about 
the trends of actual mediation cases is obtained. Typically this 
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sort of research has had an emphasis on interviewing practising 
mediators, and as such has been centred on their behaviour. For 
example Sheppard, Blumenfeld and Jones (1989) questioned how a 
potential mediator decides which conflict scenarios can be 
mediated as opposed to arbitrated or given autocratic ruling, 
while other studies have examined whi,ch strategies and tactics 
are used by the mediator, how they are chosen, and how successful 
they are (Carnevale and Pegnetter 1985; Wall and Rude 1989). 
The advantage which is argued to exist with this type of research 
is that by concentrating on the practitioners of mediation and 
their actual experiences, we can obtain significant quantities 
of detailed information from a genuine data base. Consequently, 
we can begin to talk about empirical trends, rather than simply 
individual cases. 
The difficulty with such information is that it relies on the 
perception of the individuals who are interviewed for its 
empirical base. It is unlikely that across a wide sample of 
interviewees, the perception of what constitutes different 
factors or concepts in the mediation scenario will remain 
constant. This problem is heightened by the way that the majority 
of studies which use the observational approach concentrate on 
the mediators, rather than including the disputant parties in 
their sample. Obviously this situation biases the information in 
that it comes from only one third of the actors who are part of 
the mediation triad. To rectify this and obtain an accurate 
sample, it would be necessary to interview all disputant parties, 
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which would add further cost and time to an already expensive 
research technique. In any case problems of accuracy, honesty, 
and perception remain, especially given that all answers supplied 
will be calculated with the benefit of hindsight. 
The Experimental Approach 
The third sub-field in mediation research is exploration using 
laboratory experimentation. Through controlled experiments using 
likely scenarios, researchers can discover the manner in which 
disputants and third parties will behave in given circumstances. 
For example La Tour, Houlden, Walker and Thibault (1976) used the 
parties in dispute as their experimental base to discover the 
determinants of preference for modes of conflict resolution. 
Other experiments such as carried out by Bartunek, Benton and 
Keys (1975); and Rubin (1980), have made the mediator the 
subject, and studied the effect of mediator role behaviour in 
mediation situations. 
An experimental method of research has the advantage of being 
able to use a large sample from which to gain empirical trends, 
without the high cost involved of interviewing or researching 
participants of genuine mediation cases. It also allows complete 
control of focus for the researcher, who can concentrate on 
specific aspects of the mediation process. 
However, the capacity to manipulate the inputs to gain a specific 
output is also where this research method becomes unstuck. The 
entire approach is founded on artificiality; by using simulation 
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and created scenarios, the applicability of conclusions to real-
world mediation practice is undermined. For example, in the 
studies by Bartunek, Benton 
Houlden, Walker and Thibaut 
and Keys ( 19 7 5) , and La Tour, 
(1976), the sample used for the 
experiments were male undergraduate students; a group hardly 
representative of parties in an international, labour/management 
or divorce conflict. These individuals were given assigned roles, 
and also given a limited range of answers or outputs. Indeed, 
even the fact that the sample knows it is involved in an 
experiment will influence their performance of the 
roles. Ultimately, while the information produced 
assigned 
by such 
motivational studies is interesting, we should be wary of 
accepting the conclusions as representing anything other than the 
results of a controlled experiment. 
The Systematic Empirical Approach 
A fourth avenue of mediation research is to use a systematic 
empirical approach (or systematic history as it is sometimes 
referred to), based on the aggregation of archival sources to 
provide a data base from which hypotheses can be tested. As it 
is this method which will be employed in this study, it requires 
a more detailed examination. 
The foundation of the systematic empirical approach is in the 
building of a comparative list of mediation cases. Each mediation 
case is systematically coded, with behavioural and contextual 
details of the actors, conflict, and mediation recorded. This 
inventory of mediation practice is subsequently employed as a 
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correlation tool to test the validity of hypotheses pertaining 
to the practice of mediation, in order to validate or nullify 
principles suggested in the literature. Perhaps its closest 
relative in mediation research is the case-study; the difference 
being that the emphasis is on gaining empirical significance 
through studying numerous cases. 
In the realm of high-incidence correlative studies in the broader 
context of international conflict, perhaps the most famous 
example of the systematic-history approach is the on-going 
Correlates of War (COW) project inspired and led by J. David 
Singer. This project, which seeks to code all international 
conflict in the modern era (post-1816), began through Singer's 
realisation that traditional research methods in the field were 
inadequate as they"··· did not measure up to the requirements 
of scientific research" (Singer, cited in Houweling and Sciccama 
1988:57). Since its inception, this project has formed the basis 
of literally hundreds of studies and published works. 
Turning to the specific study of conflict management, the 
systematic coding of history was initially pursued in a general 
sense to discover empirical trends in international conflicts. 
For example Northedge and Donelan (1971) built a taxonomy of 50 
international conflicts since the Second World War. With this 
data they explored such variables as origins and nature of 
disputes and how they developed and were resolved, including the 
incidence of various forms of conflict management. Similarly 
Holsti (1966), using a data base of 77 international wars from 
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the end of the First World War until 1965, studied the incidence 
of various procedures used for settlement, and the behaviour and 
outcome these procedures precipitated. (Holsti updated this study 
in 1983, using a data set comprised of 94 conflicts). Levine 
(197i) provides a third example of a systematic approach to 
history which studies the general incidence of conflict, and the 
manner in which it was managed. 
For our interest here, the conclusion that these studies produce 
is important; namely that mediation is a widely used, and hence 
very significant means of resolving international conflict 
peacefully. However, all these studies have only viewed mediation 
with regard to incidence in comparison with other methods, and 
outcomes, of conflict management. The systematic empirical method 
can also be employed to discover relationships between variables 
within the domain of mediation itself. 
The work of Butterworth (1976) represents data which is 
applicable both to the relative frequency of mediation, and to 
a limited degree, the frequency of some intra-mediation 
variables. For example, Bercovitch uses Butterworth's data to 
explore the frequency of third parties' various intervention 
techniques in international conflicts between 1945 and 1974 
(Bercovitch 1986:158). 
The examination by Frei (1976), of the factors in a mediation 
scenario which contribute to the success or failure of 
international mediation represents the first example of this 
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method being employed exclusively for research on intra-mediation 
variables. Frei's work suffers from a small number of cases 
(n=65) which detracts from the significance of his findings, and 
a tenuous definition of success, which defines a mediation as a 
success simply if the parties accept the off er of a mediator and 
mediation within fiv.e days of it being made (1976:69). 
Nevertheless, by placing the success or failure of mediation as 
the dependent variable, and testing how various factors impact 
on the nature of the outcome, Frei demonstrates the potential of 
this method for examining how a mediation outcome is produced. 
Following Frei, Hiltrop {1985), and Jones {1988), have 
demonstrated the diversity of the systematic empirical approach 
by respectively studying mediation in labour-management, and 
divorce disputes. Returning to the field of international 
conflict, the studies by Bercovitch (1986, 1989) and Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille {1991), show the continued employment of 
systematic history as a tool for meaningful mediation research. 
The systematic empirical approach represents only one of the 
approaches in contemporary mediation research, yet it has unique 
attractions as a means of building substantive knowledge. Through 
its harnessing of a significant empirical base, its findings 
enjoy a more general application than those of case studies. 
Likewise it possesses an advantage over the experimental approach 
in its foundation in actual, rather than contrived, mediation 
cases. While the use of interview-based studies does represent 
a method of research which escapes the simplification necessary 
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in the systematic empirical approach, the time, resources and 
access involved in building a significant universe using this 
method would be prohibitive. 
It would be fallacious to assume that there are no criticisms of 
the systematic empirical approach as a method of res,earch. 
Essentially, the quality of the conclusions will depend upon the 
quality of the data used to obtain them. Criticisms typically 
levelled at this approach argue that the data categories are too 
simplified, that the coding relies on the perception of the 
researcher and the source from which information is drawn, and 
that complex questions are often operationalised in a manner 
which is too rudimentary to reflect the true intricacy of the 
problem. 
While these criticisms do have validity in some examples of 
systematic empirical research, it would be wrong to tar all 
studies with the same brush. The data employed for this study 
(described more explicitly below), attempts to present a balance 
between not over-simplifying categories, while at the same time 
limiting the proliferation of options in order to locate distinct 
trends and classes of factors and conditions. In this way it 
minimises the chances for over-simplification, or distortions in 
operationalisation. Similarly, most of the information is based 
upon nominal data, which tends to preclude many of the problems 
associated with perceptual bias in the coding of information. 
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It is obvious that no research method is perfect, and that no one 
technique will ever undermine the necessity for a dedicated and 
rigorous approach. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated above, 
it is argued here that the systematic empirical approach does 
pres~nt a superior technique for mediation research, and one 
which will serve well in the search for the factors and 
conditions which determine whether mediation fails or succeeds. 
The Object and Method of This Study 
The wider focus of this study is the theory and practice of 
mediation as a tool for the non-violent management of 
international conflicts. Of all the questions that confront the 
mediation researcher, none are as important, or as often asked, 
as why mediation succeeds or fails as a method of conflict 
management. Referring to negotiation, with a statement equally 
applicable to mediation, Underdal argues: 
The ultimate aim of negotiation analysis is to predict 
or explain the outcome. Thus, outcome is generally 
considered the ultimate "dependent variable" in 
negotiation theory (1989:1). 
Put most broadly, the purpose of this paper is to understand the 
outcomes of international mediation. More specifically, the aim 
is to uncover, from within the multitude of variables and 
influences which represent the mediation relationship, those 
factors and conditions which are most influential in determining 
what the outcome of a mediation will be. Through simple 
observation we know that a mediation can either fail, or it can 
achieve some level of success, be it partial or complete. Through 
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combining the resources of a theoretical framework and an 
empirical method {supplied by the systematic empirical approach) , 
we can move from simply describing events towards realising 
Underdal's ultimate aim: to understand, and to explain, why and 
how international mediation succeeds or fails. 
This current study will concentrate exclusively on the place of 
mediation in international relations, and will examine 396 
mediation cases which have occurred since the conclusion of the 
Second World War in 1945. The data used for the empirical 
component of this study is the result of an ongoing correlates 
of mediation project, which seeks to systematically record the 
contextual and mediation details of the universe of mediation 
cases which have occurred since 1945. Earlier versions of this 
·data-set have been used as the basis for several published 
studies, for example Bercovitch {1986,1989), and Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille {1991). However, since the publication of 
these studies, the original data has been refined and expanded 
by this author, with new variables added and a more comprehensive 
and rigorous approach to the definition and measurement of the 
variables adopted, as well as a considerable increase in the 
number of recorded conflicts and mediation cases. This data-set 
is unique in the field of international conflict management; 
through its systematic and rigorous examination of every 
international conflict that has occurred since the Second World 
War, it represents an innovative response to the weaknesses 
presented by approaches to studying mediation which are normative 
or descriptive in nature. 
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The contextual and mediation details of each conflict and 
mediation case which make up the data are compiled from a range 
of archival sources, primarily Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
and The Index to The New York Times. From these sources each 
mediation case in the data-set is coded into 35 variables; 
recording details of dispute nature, party characteristics, 
mediator identity, and mediation characteristics (see Appendix 
One); as well as the outcome of the mediation episode(s) that 
occurred. This format allows for a mediation outcome to be 
understood in the light of the various conditions and influences 
which created it, and for this relationship to be empirically 
examined. 
A correlative study between different variables and mediation 
outcome is consistent with previous examples of the systematic 
empirical method being used in mediation research (for example 
Frei 1976; Bercovitch 1986, 1989), and will consequently allow 
for comparisons to be made. The initial tests will be exclusively 
bivariate, meaning that different factors will be tested for 
their individual significance to the nature of the mediation 
outcome. 3 
Beyond bivariate analysis, in recognition of the fact that the 
mediation relationship is a complex interplay between different 
factors, this study will also examine interactional relationships 
between the different variables and factors, and the significance 
of these relationships on mediation outcome. Rather than simply 
concentrating on how one particular factor or variable influences 
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the nature of the outcome, the way this factor or variable 
influences other factors will be assessed, in order to determine 
the manner in which this interaction contributes to the overall 
outcome. 
This multiyariate analysis will be undertaken in Chapter Six, and 
will follow on from the bivariate tests carried out in Chapter 
Five. Prior to this, Chapters Three and Four will construct the 
theoretical framework, and the different hypotheses which the 
empirical analysis will test. This leaves the content of Chapter 
Two, in which two methodological issues crucial to the success 
of this study are addressed: (a) how to define and evaluate 
mediation outcomes, and (b) the development of a framework to 
represent the different factors which delineate the mediation 
relationship, and hence influence the nature of the outcome. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of research on mediation is to improve 
mediation ... to increase the probability of success 
when using this method in conflict resolution (Frei 
1976:82). 
There is more at stake here than going through the motions of 
academic research. As Frei's quote reminds us, the purpose of 
mediation research is to improve our understanding of mediation, 
and hence its effectiveness as a tool for the peacemaker. As a 
result, this thesis has the perspective of both review and 
prescription. Mediation has been studied as a sub-field in social 
21 
science for many years now, and it is relevant to take stock of 
what has been achieved by the research to date. 
Where prescription is concerned we must remember that mediation 
is a highly complex social relationship which requires the third 
party to have an impressive array of skills. I.n any performance, 
ability can always be heightened, the art of mediation can be 
learned, developed and improved (Bercovitch 1986:165). This is 
where we get the imperative for a prescriptive slant; mediation 
is still in many ways a fledgling field of research, with ongoing 
development and integration required. Despite this, mediation 
continues to be practised as a means of conflict management in 
disputes all over the world. Developing a deeper knowledge of 
mediation is more than an interesting academic exercise, it 
should be recognised as having direct relevance to a conflict-
ridden international system. 
The ultimate aim for the mediation researcher in international 
conflict is the construction of a theory of mediation, which will 
explain how mediation produces a certain outcome. The word theory 
does not mean we can construct a series of laws as pursued by 
researchers in the physical sciences. To echo Northedge and 
Donelan: 
we remain unconvinced that human behaviour, 
individual or collective, lends itself to precisely 
the same kind of intellectual treatment as, say, the 
inanimate world {1971:9). 
The complexity of human behaviour, and the multitude of 
influences it is subject to, make it impossible to predict with 
complete assurance. Nevertheless, it is necessary to undertake 
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mediation research in a scientific spirit, recognising the need 
to move from the unique to the general, and to be rigorous in 
method, so as to draw as theoretically conclusive a picture as 
possible. Ultimately this will allow the construction of more 
viable "if-then" predictions, giving enhanced descriptive power 
as to the progress, and likely outcome of different mediation 
instances. This is still some distance off, yet this thesis is 




1. This figure of approximately 650 conflicts was obtained 
from an updated version of the Correlates of War project, led by 
J. David Small. For up-to-date information on this project, and 
its results, see Cioffi~Revilla (1990); Small (1990). 
2. For examples of mediation theorists who do recognise the 
close relationship between negotiation and mediation, see 
Merrills (1991), Touval (1982), Touval and Zartman (1985a), and 
Bercovitch (1986). 
3. The typology for this thesis will be to adopt a 
nomenclature of variables and factors. Chapter Two develops an 
understanding of the mediation relationship into four different 
variables. Within each of these four variables are a number of 
factors which describe indi victual aspects of the particular 
variable. These are developed in Chapters Three and Four. 
Chapter Two: 




International mediation, consistent with the conflict which 
necessitates its practice, is a complex milieu of actors, 
perceptions, issues and behaviour which to the casual observer 
will have little discernable pattern or order. However for the 
mediation researcher it is imperative to be able to understand 
and analyse the mediation relationship, identifying the factors 
which determine the nature of the outcome. Further to this, there 
is a need to classify each outcome in a systematic fashion, in 
order to evaluate those which can be described as being 
successes, failures, or some point in between. What is needed is 
a framework which will allow both the process and the outcome of 
mediation to be understood, evaluated and classified. 
This chapter will examine these two problems: (a) of classifying 
outcomes, and (b) of devising a framework which will allow us to 
understand how an outcome is produced out of the variety of 
influences which constitute the mediation relationship. The first 
section of this chapter will critically examine in detail 
different approaches to classifying outcome, and will devise the 
schema which will be used for the remainder of this study. The 
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second section will stem from this discussion, and will install 
a framework to simplify the complexity of the mediation 
relationship into a series of variables whose combined influence 
creates the mediation outcome. 
Classifying Mediation Outcomes 
The task of classifying mediation outcomes is complicated by the 
fact that there is more than one perspective from which 
evaluations can be made. In any mediation case there will be two 
or more disputants, and at least one mediator. Each of these 
actors will have their own opinion of the events that transpire, 
and of what the exact nature of the outcome is. Because of this, 
we can say that research which uses the information supplied by 
these individuals to evaluate outcome is adopting a subjective 
perspective of the mediation process. 
In addition to subjective evaluations of mediation are objective 
perspectives which evaluate process and outcome in a systematic 
manner, analysing mediation according to behavioral criteria. 
This perspective examines participants' actions and statements 
in order to evaluate and classify mediation, rather than 
perceptions and opinions. Subjective and objective perspectives 
of mediation differ both in their definition of what a successful 
mediation is, and the framework they use to evaluate the 
mediation process and outcome. 
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Subjective Evaluations of Mediation Outcome 
Defining Success and Faiiure 
Despite any number of different opinions, subjective evaluations 
of mediation share a common definition of what constitutes a 
successful outcome. Complete success occurs when the mediation 
brings about the resolution of the conflict. Resolution is an 
absolute concept, whereby all aspects of the conflict, perceptual 
and behavioural, cease to produce contention. For this to be 
achieved the disputant parties must undergo a reconstruction of 
their perceptions of the conflict and each other, and be 
reconciled in a solution which recognises and satisfies their 
values and interests (Bercovitch 1984: 34; Touval and Zartman 
1989: 135). 
From this basis we can devise various levels of success. For 
example, partial success includes (in decreasing order of 
achievement) , partial resolution of the issues, agreement to 
disagree peacefully, recognition of the central problem, plans 
to continue non-violent conflict management, an end to violent 
behaviour, and so on. The end to this continuum is the complete 
failure of mediation, which is defined as the continuation or 
escalation of the conflict on both perceptual and behavioural 
levels. 
However, simply defining success and failure from a subjective 
perspective does not explain how different actors will reach an 
evaluation of a particular mediation outcome. The process by 
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which this is achieved is the subject of the following 
discussion. 
Evalua~ing Success and Failure 
Subjective evaluations of mediation outcome are made by actors 
assessing the details of the .case according to a set of criteria, 
and on the basis of these, formulating their opinions. Several 
theorists have suggested the form that this criteria will take, 
and generally there is agreement between them as to its nature. 
Integrating the work of Sheppard (1984), Susskind and Cruikshank 
(1987), and Underdal (1989), suggests that outcomes are 
classified through individuals evaluating: (a) the fairness or 
justice of a mediation outcome1 , (b) its efficiency, (c) its 
effectiveness and stability (which can be classified as an 
outcomes feasibility), and, (d) their overall satisfaction with 
the outcome. 
However, there is a further dimension to this framework. The 
traditional emphasis on calculations of success and failure in 
conflict management centred on the final distribution of 
resources2 between the protagonists as the material for 
evaluation. Going beyond this, there is a growing body of social-
psychological literature which suggests that parties in a 
conflict will define the success or failure of a conflict 
management attempt by evaluating both the distribution of 
resources provided by the outcome, and the process that was used 
to achieve that outcome (Fogler 1977:108). How do individuals 
evaluate the procedural aspects of a process such as mediation? 
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Sheppard explains that the same criteria that are used to 
evaluate outcome will also be used to judge the process 
(1984:166). The initial emphasis amongst theorists has been on 
calculations of procedural, as distinct from distributive, 
justice (for example see Thibault and Walker 1975). However, 
Sheppard writes that concentrating on only one criterion means 
that understanding will be limited to "just a portion of the 
conflict picture" (1984:166). Thus we can determine that 
subjective accounts of mediation will be reached through 
evaluating the justice, efficiency, feasibility, and satisfaction 
provided by both the procedural and distributive aspects of the 
mediation outcome. Obviously the emphasis will be somewhat 
different when calculating the procedural as distinct from the 
distributive aspects of each criteria. By examining each of the 
/f) 
criter~ in turn, we can determine how this variation will be 
manifested. 
Fairness 
Disputant parties will judge the fairness of a mediation outcome 
according to the degree to which it meets their expectations of 
what they are entitled to receive through the distribution of 
resources available. This raises the question of how do parties 
formulate their expectations? Deutsch writes that conceptions of 
entitlement are developed through five kinds of influence: 
(1) the ideologies and myths about justice that are 
dominant and officially supported in his society, (2) 
his amount of exposure to ideologies and myths that 
conflict with those that are officially supported and 
are supportive of larger claims for him, (3) 
experienced changes in his satisfactions-
dissatisf actions, (4) his knowledge of what others who 
are viewed as comparable to him are getting, and (5) 
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his bargaining power (1985:52). 
From these influences the disputant parties will reach their 
calculation as to the degree of fairness of an outcome, and will 
make a decision as to the success of the mediation in terms of 
this criterion. 
The mediator will make a slightly different evaluation from this. 
Because the mediator does not normally receive a share of the 
resources at stake from a mediation outcome, he or she will be 
less concerned than the actors in conflict about his or her own 
position relative to the other parties. Concerning justice, the 
mediator's opinion is not typically centred on protecting 
personal interests, but rather on viewing the outcome according 
to certain objective principles. Deutsch suggests that there are 
three such principles that a mediator's evaluation of an outcome 
may include; namely equality, equity, and need (Deutsch 1985:5). 
In reality, the evaluation the mediator makes will combine 
elements of all three of these values. However it is interesting 
to note Deutsch's suggestion that: 
In cooperative relations in which the fostering or 
maintenance of enjoyable social relations is a primary 
emphasis, equality will be the dominant principle of 
distributive justice (1985:41). 
Because, broadly speaking, mediation is concerned with the 
fostering. of "enjoyable social relations" between parties in 
conflict, this point is worth considering further. Equality does 
not mean that all parties will be treated identically without 
regard for circumstance. This can be identified as pseudo-
egalitarianism (Deutsch 1985: 42) . Rather, where mediation is 
concerned, it would entail that both the procedure used, and the 
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distribution of resources, ref le ct' certain intrinsic values which 
are impossible to divide according to the principles of equity 
and need. For example, a successful outcome would ensure that all 
parties are recognised and respected in the mediation procedure, 
and that the distribution of resources reflect the input and 
agreement of all the parties involved. In conclusion, we can say 
that from the perspective of the mediator, a fair or just outcome 
would especially reflect the principle of equality between all 
the parties involved. 
Beyond the outline described above, it is difficult to draw 
concrete observations as to how the actors involved in mediation 
will evaluate fairness (Lissak and Sheppard 1983:46). Susskind 
and Cruikshank write that: 
.•• there is no single indicator of substantive 
fairness that all parties to a public dispute are 
likely to accept. In our fieldwork, therefore, we 
avoid ironclad determinations of "fairness" ( 1987: 24) . 
With regard to the fairness of the procedure, Thibault and Walker 
suggest one dominant principle about how procedural justice will 
be evaluated subjectively. They argue that for justice to be 
served, the parties themselves should have maximum control over 
the procedures used to determine the outcome (1975:2). While 
mediation, by definition, is a cooperative procedure which 
entails substantive input by the parties, variations will still 
occur as to the degree of flexibility in a mediation procedure. 
Susskind and Cruikshank argue that: 
A dispute resolution process most open to 
continuous modification by the disputants 
is, we would argue, the approach most likely 
to be conceived as fair (1987:21). 
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Placing process control in the hands of the parties and ensuring 
flexibility, will also engender the indi victual rights of the 
parties, and alleviate each party's fear of being coerced into 
an outcome by a non-neutral third party; two concerns identified 
by Sheppard as being important in a party's calculation of 
procedural fairness (1984:169). 
Efficiency 
The efficiency of a mediation outcome and process is concerned 
with the length of time taken to achieve an agreement, and the 
cost to all those involved (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987:26). 
Because conflict is concerned with the parties' resources, it is 
in their interests that the outcome of a mediation reflects the 
most efficient use of these. Often the mediator will be supplying 
the mediation environment and the various resources needed such 
as transportation, a forum, communication, and accommodation of 
the parties' needs. The actors in conflict will be giving time, 
effort and resources to the mediation and their concern is to 
maximise the benefit to them from this input. 
Evaluating efficiency is especially related to procedural 
concerns for the actors involved in mediation. For the parties 
there is likely to be a cost/ benefit analysis taken of the 
ongoing mediation. If they calculate that there is no integrative 
potential in the conflict, or that they are going to be left in 
a worse position than their original situation prior to the 
mediation, it is unlikely the episode will continue (Underdal 
1989:3). Integrative potential is represented by susskind and 
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Cruikshank as the incidence of possible "elegant trades," which 
are defined as opportunities for exchanges "that would have 
benefited everyone without penalizing anyone" (1987:26). 
Supporting the idea of cost/benefit analysis by the actors, 
Sheppard writes that the parties will be concerned with the 
questions of personal cost, timeliness and speed pf the process, 
and how disruptive it is to other events of importance to them, 
both within and without the conflict scenario (1984:169). 
Feasibilit:y 
The third criteria used to evaluate mediation outcomes is a 
combination of two criterion suggested by separate theorists. 
Sheppard uses the term "effectiveness, " which he describes as 
being related to the level and permanence of the solution 
reached, and the impact on the wider environment ( 1984: 169) . 
Using effectiveness as a criterion is consistent with Susskind 
and Cruikshank's (1987), and Underdal's (1989) usage of a 
stability measurement. Stability refers to whether or not the 
solution to the conflict is a realistic one, and whether or not 
it will last. With both these terms the concern is the interface 
between level of settlement and its durability. A successful 
outcome is one which achieves the most effective solution and 
lasts for the longest amount of time. This can be identified with 
the search for a feasible outcome. While generally it would be 
expected that effectiveness and stability would reinforce each 
other, Susskind and Cruikshank warn that this may not always be 
the case. They write: 
At times, disputants are lured into making unrealistic 
promises by the unexpected spirit of harmony that 
develops as an agreement appears within reach 
(1987:31-2). 
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The parties' perception of the success or failure of the 
procedure in terms of feasibility refers to their judgement as 
to how implementable the mediation procedure is, and to what 
degree it uncovers the fundamental underlying issues in the 
conflict (Sheppard 1984:169). In order for the parties to be able 
to make this evaluation effectively, susskind and Cruikshank 
suggest the attribute of "prospective hindsight" is needed, which 
is the ability to use relevant experience to predict the 
feasibility of an agreement over time (1987:28). 
With specific regard for stability, it is important for the 
parties that the mediation provides an environment in which to 
promote balanced relations, with realistic timetables so that 
neither party feels sufficiently alienated to unilaterally 
withdraw from the negotiating table (Susskind and Cruikshank 
1987:31; Underdal 1989:3). A final aspect of the feasibility of 
the process, is that a truly feasible mediation will provide the 
opportunity for re-negotiation. Parties should be able to readily 
reenter a mediation, knowing that the process is available to 
overcome any setbacks in the original agreement (Susskind and 
Cruikshank 1987:33). 
Participant Satisfaction 
Participant satisfaction represents something of a concluding 
value in subjective evaluations of process and outcome. Parties 
and mediators will be satisfied with a solution which they 
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perceive to be just, efficient and feasible, and will 
consequently be committed to following its principles (Sheppard 
1984: 169). A process and outcome which satisfies the participants 
will be defined by them as being successful. Adopting this notion 
fulfils the idea of a continuum from success to failure, with 
different degrees of partial success defined by partial 
satisfaction with all criteria, or perhaps full satisfaction with 
some, and dissatisfaction with others. 
A Critique of Subjective Evaluations of Outcome 
For the mediation theorist, subjective evaluations of outcome 
have a number of serious flaws. The most obvious of these is 
the different opinions that may exist within subjective 
evaluations of outcome. To this point the discussion has assumed 
some homogeneity among the actors involved in mediation. In 
reality, it is unlikely that this would reflect the true 
situation. In terms of the participating actors, one conflict 
party might perceive the conflict had been resolved and the 
mediation successful. However, the perception of the other party 
might be entirely different. Then there is the perspective of the 
mediator who might see the mediation as a 
success or failure contrary to the opinion of one or both of the 
parties. 
This situation represents a serious problem to the mediation 
researcher. Whose opinion is to be trusted, or treated as more 
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valid? Indeed it is even conceivable that the researcher may 
disagree with the opinion of the parties and mediator as to what 
the nature of the outcome is. While susskind and Cruikshank argue 
that: 
· ••. it is more important that an agreement be perceived 
as fair by the parties involved than by an independent 
analyst who applies an abstract decision rule ••• (1987:25) 
The mediation researcher with the aid of a wider perspective or 
hindsight may find him or herself in disagreement. 
The second problem with subjective evaluations of mediation is 
the nature of the relationship between procedural and 
distributive aspects of the outcome. Obviously the two concepts 
are related to each other. For example, a fair and efficient 
process is likely to lead to a fair and efficient outcome (Lind, 
Kurtz, Musante, Thibault and Walker 1980: 652; susskind and 
Cruikshank 1987: 26). However, this relationship is not 
guaranteed. Fogler writes that: 
judgements of procedure and distribution are 
independent to the extent that it can be demonstrated 
people will say an unjust procedure has generated a 
just outcome and vice versa (1977:109). 
Therefore, both aspects of outcome must be considered, as both 
will operate individually, and in relationship to each other, to 
determine the parties perception of the success or failure of the 
mediation. This leaves a grey area as to which will have the 
greater significance in a particular mediation episode .. 
The third problem of using subjective evaluations of outcome in 
mediation research arises when this approach is operationalised 
into large-scale or numerically significant projects. The 
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resources required to interview representatives of the parties, 
and the mediators, from several hundred mediation cases is 
obviously beyond the scope of most research projects. This is 
assuming the researcher can gain access to the individuals who 
can, and want to, supply the information. Similarly, even if this 
information can be gained, there are questions as to how valid 
it will be. Such approaches rely on a superlative knowledge of 
the conflict and the mediation by whoever is classifying the 
outcome. It implies that the parties have full understanding of 
their own perceptions, and will not change their attitudes and 
opinions without being externally prompted. 
A further problem we are confronted with when examining 
subjective perspectives, is the question of time frame. When 
should the measurement of opinion be taken? The benefit of a few 
days, months or even years of hindsight might render irrelevant, 
classifications made by either parties or observers in the heat 
of the moment. To overcome this problem a time frame should be 
established, with all classifications made at similar intervals 
after the mediation has concluded. But this does not rectify the 
fact that perceptions change, as does the opinion of history. The 
choice is between updating endlessly in the interests of 
accuracy, or entrenching a classification once and for.all, and 
risking obsolescence. 
The final problem is one which questions the usefulness of 
equating a resolved conflict with successful mediation. The 
question is, how likely is it that an international conflict can 
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be fully resolved through single, or even multiple mediation 
cases? Is adopting the "resolution as success" definition putting 
successful mediation purely into the realms of the theoretical? 
This problem is illustrated by the rise and then decline from 
favorir of the so-called "Problem-solving" approach to conflict 
management. This approach sought to resolve, rather than merely 
halt, conflicts by understanding and expressing the underlying 
perceptions, concerns, and fears of the actors in conflict. While 
it enjoyed some popularity (for example see Burton (1972], Doob 
and Foltz (1973], Kelman and Cohen [1976], and Doob [1976]), its 
current status is perhaps best embodied in Doob's (1987) article, 
titled "Adieu to Problem Solving." 
This series of problems, both specific and general, with 
subjective evaluations of mediation outcomes forces us to make 
a choice, namely to either accept subjective evaluations in spite 
of their inherent difficulties, or discover a new basis from 
which to systematically classify mediation success and failure. 
The conclusion of this study is that while containing desirable 
elements, subjective perspectives are unworkable for this study, 
given its foundation in a systematic, empirical approach. Because 
of this, we must turn our attention to discovering a means by 
which to evaluate mediation objectively. 
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Toward an Objective Evaluation of Outcome 
Defining Success and Failure 
How can we define a mediation process and outcome in a more 
objective manner, and in a way that does not fall victim to the 
influences of perception, opinion, or unobtainable detail? The 
answer lies in discovering an objective measure to evaluate 
outcome. 
Such an approach will measure the success or failure of an 
outcome by focusing on the behavioural impact of the mediation. 
It turns away from questions of perception and resolution, and 
classifies outcomes from the concrete events of each case. Rather 
than resolution, a fully successful mediation from an objective 
perspective occurs when following the mediation, the dispute 
reaches settlement. 
Distinguishing between resolution and settlement as definitions 
of success is consistent with the approach of several theorists. 
(For example see Touval and Zartman ( 1989: 135], Underdal ( 1989: 1-
2], Young (1969:35]). Bercovitch states: 
A conflict is settled when one party decides to accept 
a loss, a compromise or a binding decision. A conflict 
is resolved when it reflects both parties values and 
interests and satisfies them both (1984:34). 
Through examining the behaviour of the parties at the termination 
of the mediation, it can be determined whether the episode was 
a success or a failure. A successful mediation occurs when all 
the disputants accept a settlement agreement. Failure occurs when 
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the end of the mediation sees the resumption or escalation of 
hostilities. 
These two points represent the two ends of a success/ failure 
continuum from an objective perspective. From this basis it is 
possible to fill the void between them with some notions of what 
constitutes a less than fully successful outcome. Often a 
mediation may make substantial progress, but still falls short 
of reaching full settlement. The parties may agree on the 
settlement of some of the different issues being contested, or 
they may agree to meet at a specified later time to negotiate 
further details of a peace agreement. When this behaviour is 
exhibited, we can say that the mediation has been partially 
successful. 
Continuing further down the continuum towards failure, a second 
point representing a temporary halt in the hostilities is 
included. If a mediation achieves the agreement of a ceasefire, 
the parties withdraw from overt conflict for either a specified 
or unspecified period. Often the mediator will use this interval 
to try to move toward further talks, and to lay the foundation 
for a settlement at a later time. While ceasefire cannot be 
considered as successful as partial settlement, it nevertheless 
is a considerable improvement on complete failure, and represents 
a useful intermediate step on the success/failure continuum. 
In comparison to subjective evaluations, measuring success from 
an objective perspective is a relatively straight-forward task. 
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Because definitions of success and failure rely simply on the 
perception by observers of parties' actions, classifying the 
outcome of a mediation as full success, partial success, limited 
success, or failure is readily achieved. This overcomes the 
problems of contradictory perspectives, changing perceptions over 
time, and .the need for superlative knowledge, and places the 
definition of full success within the realms of achievable 
outcomes. Significantly, it is also a perspective which will 
allow large-scale, systematic empirical research of the type 
employed in this study. 
While an objectively based classification of outcome allows us 
to avoid concerns of actor's perceptions and transcends the 
value-laden concepts of justice, fairness, feasibility and 
satisfaction, the need still remains to devise a framework to 
evaluate the process by which this outcome is achieved. With a 
subjective evaluation the road to an outcome is measured in terms 
of the actors' perceptions and understanding; now our concern is 
with behaviour, and a framework is needed which can structure the 
interaction of the parties and the mediator in the conflict/ 
mediation relationship. The answer to this problem is to evaluate 
the mediation process as a set of variables whose combined 
influence determines the nature of the outcome. 
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A Framework for Understanding the Determinants of Mediation 
Outcome 
Touval (1982) identifies two variables which determine mediation 
outcome: the circumstances of the mediator's intervention 
(including issues, environment and timing), and the mediator's 
attributes and qualities (1982:7-19). This typology is useful, 
as it provides an introduction to the important variables, namely 
the circumstances of the conflict, and the identity and nature 
of the third party intervention. Its flaw is that it is one-
dimensional in its time frame, placing the moment of "the 
mediator's intervention" as the initiation of the model. What is 
apparent is that there are aspects of the conflict, and the 
disputant parties, which are determined prior to the mediation 
being initiated, and which will have a significant influence on 
the eventual outcome. 
The typology by Frei (1976) demonstrates the way in which 
variables can be divided to allow for pre-mediation, or 
"conflict" variables. His list comprises three such variables, 
namely: the identity and characteristics of the conflicting 
parties; the interrelations among the parties; the 
characteristics of the conflict; and two mediation variables: the 
identity and characteristics of the mediator; and the 
relationship between mediator and parties to the conflict. 
Of these variables, two lack conviction as separate entities. 
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"The interrelationship between the parties" and the "relationship 
between the mediators and the parties to the conflict" are used 
by Frei primarily to measure demographic relativity; calculating 
differences in power, position and prestige between the disputant 
parties, and between the parties and the mediator. Because 
conflict, and mediation, represent relationships between at least 
two parties, such demographic relativity will occur by 
definition, through simply using the variables already in place 
to assess the identity and characteristics of the parties and the 
mediator. Their only relevance to the study of the conflict and 
mediation comes when they are considered in relationship to each 
other. 
However, it would be wrong to believe that all the relationships 
between the parties and the mediator are based on contextual or 
demographic variables. There is also the manner in which the 
actors interact. To account for this a separate variable is 
necessary. The relationship between the parties prior to the 
mediation will be assessed by the variable which describes the 
characteristics of the conflict, so the concern is to measure how 
the mediator and parties relate once the mediation is in 
progress. This variable can be described as mediation strategy, 
which is primarily the measures and tactics employed by the 
mediator in the mediation process, and which subsequently 
determines the nature of the parties/ mediator interaction. 
Bercovitch (1986), includes a discussion of the factor of 
mediation strategy in his examination of the identity and 
characteristics of the mediator. However, mediation strategy is 
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a process variable as opposed to the contextual nature of the 
identity and characteristics of the mediator, and thus should be 
treated as a separate entity. Similarly, we should not restrict 
our understanding of this variable as referring exclusively to 
the mediator's behaviour I a treatment adopted by Bercovitch 
(1991). Rather, other .factors which are part of the mediation 
process and contribute to how the mediation proceeds should be 
included. Particularly relevant is the environment, or location ,, 
of the mediation. 
What is derived from this discussion are four variables whose 
combined influence will determine mediation outcome. They are: 
the nature of the dispute; the identity and characteristics of 
the parties; the identity and characteristics of the mediator; 
and mediation strategy. The relationship between these variables 
and mediation outcome is schematically represented in Figure 2.1 
below. 
Figure 2.1: The Variables Influencing Mediation outcome 
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Using an approach based on the behaviour of the participants in 
.a mediation simplifies the difficult problem of attributing 
causality. The causality problem refers to the question of 
whether the mediation caused the outcome of the conflict. While 
this may have the appearance of being an unnecessary burden to 
concern ourselves with, it certainly should not be ignored. 
Consider that if in a given conflict, there is· a sudden de-
escalation in hostilities, and a warming of relations between 
the disputants. Can these events be attributed to a mediation 
which has just been completed, or could they more adequately be 
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explained by other variables such as the length of the conflict, 
the sustainability of the costs for the regimes, or internal 
political concerns? There is a danger that if we become 
completely enamoured with studying mediation, we forget that the 
mediation may be only one factor of many in the conflict scenario 
contributing to the end of hostilities. With subjective 
approaches, which account for the motivations and perceptions of 
the disputant parties and the mediator, the problem of 
determining causality is crucially important. At a motivational 
or conceptual level, it is tenuous to attribute causality with 
certainty to any social phenomena. However, because an objective 
approach must operate at the level of behaviour, it is a valid 
and consistent measure to make the necessary simplifications. As 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates, the outcome of the mediation (and hence 
the conflict situation) is assumed to be contingent upon the 
influences of the variables which represent the mediation 
relationship. We must assume that if there is a change in the 
nature of the conflict, for example the achievement of a partial 
or full settlement, and this occurs following a mediation 
episode, then it was the mediation that was responsible for 
precipitating that change. 
It would be misleading to claim that an objective approach can 
be recommended as a panacea for the various problems surrounding 
the definition and evaluation of mediation outcomes. The 
weaknesses of this approach are obvious. It represents a less 
ambitious and more superficial approach to classifying outcomes. 
Because no attempt is made to investigate the perceptions of the 
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involved actors and the observers, it is impossible to determine 
when the conflict is fully resolved in the different actors' 
perceptions. Ultimately, the decision to use an approach based 
on behaviour should be understood as a reluctant yet necessary 
decision, based on the need to operationalise a complex field of 
r~search. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has approached the task of defining the parameters 
of mediation outcome classification with both a methodological 
and theoretical interest. The consequent conclusion is that the 
answers to these interests are not congruent. With the freedom 
to theorise, it is possible to reach a comprehensive set of 
criteria from which parties and observers of a mediation episode 
will evaluate and define success and failure. However, when the 
demands of empirical research are added, the ambitions of theory 
must give way to the constraints of time and resources. This 
study relies on being able to classify the outcome of a large 
number of mediation cases using archival material. As was 
discussed when examining the use of interviews and questionnaires 
in mediation research in the previous chapter, collecting enough 
information from the different subjective sources to gain the 
same empirical base is impossible for the resources of this 
study. 
This does not mean that we should view a consideration of 
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subjective perspectives of mediation evaluation as a wasted 
effort. Not only is it a valuable theoretical exercise, but it 
is crucial to have a detailed understanding of different schools 
of thought concerning the complex question of defining outcome. 
Only · through gaining knowledge of these perspectives, is it 
possible to place an objective pei::specti ve in its relevant 
context. It is important to remember that the use of an objective 
approach, which defines settlement as success, is no license to 
become so engrossed with behaviour as to forget the relevance of 
parties' and observers' perceptions of justice, efficiency, and 
feasibility, and how it is satisfaction with these that results 
in the phenomenon of conflict resolution. 
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Endnotes 
1. In this discussion, the concepts of fairness and justice 
are defined as being congruent. 
2. "Resources" is taken to mean both tangible and non-
tangible resources in this discussion. Examples of the former are 
territory and money; examples of the latter are recognition and 
control. 
Chapter Three: 
The Nature of the Dispute, and the 
Identity and Characteristics of the Parties 
Introduction 
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Following the discussion of the previous chapter it is now 
possible to analyse and evaluate the outcome of a mediation. It 
has been established how to recognise and classify a successful, 
partially successful, or failed mediation. Furthermore, we now 
understand the outcome of mediation as being determined through 
the influence of four broad variables: the nature of the dispute, 
the identity and characteristics of the parties, the identity and 
characteristics of the mediator, and mediation strategy. 
Having accomplished this, the task now is to look within each of 
these four variables, in order to identify the different factors 
which exist within each of them, and to theoretically explore the 
impact each of these factors has on mediation outcome. Chapter 
Three will not discuss the theoretical dimensions of all four of 
the variables which represent the mediation relationship. As the 
discussion of typologies in the previous chapter described, there 
is a basic division between those variables which describe the 
conflict, and those which are specific to the mediation episode. 
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Consequently, this chapter will examine the factors within the 
variables of the nature of the dispute and the identity and 
characteristics of the parties, while Chapter Four will 
concentrate on the identity and characteristics of the mediator, 
and mediation strategy. The di vision of the mediation 
relationship into conflict and mediation variables for the 
bivariate analysis is represented below in Figure 3.1. 
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The nature of the discussion in Chapters Three and Four will be 
exclusively bivariate in orientation. This means that each factor 
is assessed independently, for its individual impact on whether 
mediation succeeds or fails. The mediation literature abounds 
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with notions linking different factors in the mediation 
relationship to a failed or successful outcome. The task of 
Chapters Three and Four is to review these notions, and to 
construct hypotheses linking how each factor may lead to a 
particular outcome. 
The Nature of the Dispute 
Introduction 
The nature of the dispute is a variable which precedes even the 
consideration of conflict management, describing the various 
factors that are evaluated to create a dispute scenario. These 
factors include the demographic or contextual details of the 
conflict such as fatalities and duration, and also the more 
conceptual questions of issue nature and timing. In general these 
factors can be placed into two clusters: the issues of the 
conflict, and the conflict features. 
The Issues of the Conflict 
The issues of the conflict refer to the basic cause of the 
conflict, including what is at stake, and what is being contended 
by the disputants. Our discussion begins with the widely accepted 
proposition that the more important an issue is to a party, the 
less likely it is that a mediation will succeed (Touval 1982:8). 
The logic in this is that if a party is unwilling to compromise, 
the conflict becomes zero-sum in nature, and allows no room for 
latitude in the mediation process (Burton 1972:159). That 
mediation will be unlikely to succeed in such a situation seems 
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rather obvious, to the point of being a truism, given that 
mediation will typically hinge on at least a willingness to 
listen to an opponents point of view. In any case, it does not 
take us very far, and it is more rewarding to aim toward an 
understanding of exactly which issues will (or will not) be more 
amenable to successful mediation. 
The nature of the issue has been strongly associated with 
mediation outcome, and many theorists have pursued this 
connection in their research. Generally their propositions divide 
the issue field into four: issues of territory (sometimes 
referred to as sovereignty), ideology, security, and 
independence. However, despite being a subject of widespread 
attention, there is little specific information that can be 
derived from the literature if a hierarchy of issues is sought, 
ranked according to their likelihood of being successfully 
mediated. Young (1967:46) and Ott (1972:599) both note the 
difficulty of successfully mediating issues of security. Touval 
(1982:8) claims territorial issues are very difficult to resolve, 
while Bercovitch (1986:162), Kelman (cited in Frei 1976:79), and 
Ott (1972:599) agree that ideology is an extremely difficult 
issue to deal with. Finally, Bercovitch argues that independence 
disputes will be more difficult to mediate than security disputes 
(1986:162). 
In the face of these comments, the initial impression must be 
that there are no "soft options" in terms of issues being 
suitable to successful mediation. Young reminds us that: 
Another difficulty involves the crucial importance and 
high level of the stakes involved in a severe 
international crisis. Crises in this context may very 
well have a significant bearing on the national 
survival of the states involved as functioning units 
(Young 1967:46}. 
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Thus .little progress is made from the initial proposition that 
the suitability of an issue for mediation depends primarily on 
the degree of importance the parties in a dispute place upon it. 
Nevertheless it would be wrong to dismiss the question of nature 
of issue as either indeterminable or too difficult. 
Looking further at the question of issues, we can divide the 
spectrum into two basic classes; those fought over tangible 
issues such as territory or security, and those fought over 
intangible concepts such as ideology or independence. With 
tangible issues, there is room for compromise or creative 
solutions. Territory issues may be solved through division or 
sharing of the area at stake. Security concerns may be overcome 
through creating demilitarised zones, installing early-warning 
systems to prevent surprise attack, or enhancing communication 
facilities. However, such measures are unavailable with 
intangible .issues, which are typically zero-sum conflicts in 
nature. Issues such as ideology or independence cannot be 
compromised or divided, often they are clouded with emotional 
responses and historical baggage which make creative solutions 
virtually impossible. It is because of these facts that we can 
expect there to be some variation in the success of mediation 
according to the nature of the issue, with security and territory 
conflicts mediated more successfully than independence or 
ideology disputes. 
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This suspicion is confirmed when we turn to the results of 
previous empirical research. By tabulating the success level 
attained through the mediation of the different issues, 
Bercovitch (supported by the results of Butterworth (1976], and 
Frei (1976]) is able to substantiate his claim that: 
Ideology disputes and.independence disputes are less 
amenable to mediation than security disputes (in 60% 
of which mediation had some success) and sovereignty 
disputes (mediation had some success in 52% of cases) 
(1986:162). 
Through considering how certain issues can be mediated, and 
turning to empirical analysis we can begin to understand which 
types of issues will be more successfully mediated than others. 
While exceptions to these conclusions may exist, they do provide 
the foundation for the first part of Hypothesis One. 
However, before constructing the first hypothesis, there is one 
further area where analysis on the issue dimension can be 
pursued. Basic knowledge of international conflict tells us that 
it is unusual for a conflict to be fought over a single issue 
only. As well as considering the type of issue in dispute, it is 
useful to examine how the complexity. of the issues will affect 
the outcome of mediation. Young asserts that it is crucial for 
the mediator to understand and simplify the complexity of the 
mediation relationship in order to promote the chance for a 
successful outcome (1967:87-88). While we cannot examine all the 
perceptions, history and details of a conflict which may give 
rise to complexity, one simple measurement of conflict complexity 
is to examine the number of issues. Indeed Moore asserts that the 
number of issues involved will be a factor which influences both 
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how easily, and how rapidly, mediation proceeds {1986:172). When 
there are several issues in the dispute, the mediation 
relationship will be more confusing, and the search for 
alternatives more complex. Similarly, the parties will have more 
reasons for animosity toward each other and will be less inclined 
to compromise. Finally the mediator's task will be more 
difficult, having to understand, and simplify, the different 
issues and positions on them. The second part of Hypothesis One 
examines the relationship between dispute complexity and 
mediation outcome. 
Hypothesis One: 
Hl. A.Security disputes will be most amenable to 
successful mediation, followed by territory, then 
ideology, and finally independence. 
Hl. B.The more issues in a dispute, the less chance 
of mediation being successful. 
The Conflict Features 
The term "conflict features," refers to the descriptive factors 
of the dispute: the number of fatalities, the intensity of the 
conflict, and the dynamic, or phase the dispute has reached. As 
with the area of conflict principles, the literature abounds with 
notions linking these factors to mediation outcome. The task here 
is to unravel these notions to determine how each factor should 
be measured, and to determine what value for each can be 
positively associated with mediation success. 
Predicting the termination of a dispute through observation of 
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fatalities is a study which predates the emergence of mediation 
researcher's interest. Klingberg, in his study of battle and 
population losses by nations in conflict found that: 
There is some evidence that nations in modern times 
will tend to surrender before they have suffered 
population losses greater than 3 or 4 per cent (1966:168). 
Thi~ makes intuitive sense; parties faced with a highly lethal 
conflict with a large social cost will seek alternative means to 
violence for settling their dispute. Studying mediation cases, 
Bercovitch found that disputes with a low fatality count (100-
500) were 63 per cent more likely to be mediated successfully 
than conflicts with high fatalities (defined as over 10 000) 
(1986:162). 
The problem with dealing in the number of fatalities is that it 
can give a distorted picture of the actual dispute. Extremely 
high casualties sustained over a period of a few weeks will have 
a different motivational impact on a party than the losses 
sustained gradually over a protracted period of time. However, 
concentrating simply on time does not get us beyond the 
simplicity of measuring only casualties. Frei writes that: 
••• the "age" of a conflict as such does not say much 
about its susceptibility to mediation; more important 
is the age combined with the intensity of the conflict 
{1976:76). 
While Frei makes a distinction between intensity and age, this 
has the impact of making intensity either a somewhat .undefined, 
abstract concept, or equates it simply with fatalities again. 
What is needed is a more sophisticated measurement for intensity. 
Through combining the factors of dispute age and number of 
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fatalities, we can create a useful definition of conflict 
intensity through which to examine the relationship between 
levels of intensity and successful outcome. Frei provides a 
summary of the variation of ideas presented in the literature on 
this ·subject. He notes that Bar-Adon (1971), Burton (1968), 
Jackson ( 1972) , and Young ( 1968) , all make the association 
between high dispute intensity and positive mediation process and 
outcome (Frei 1976: 77). These authors consider that intense 
conflicts provide more conspicuous solutions, and generally give 
the parties an appreciation of the high costs involved in 
perpetuating their dispute. 
However, Frei also discusses the fact that other theorists have 
contradicted the view of high intensity equating with suitability 
to mediation. Burton {1969) considers the rationale of a party's 
entrapment to a course of violent action, Landsberger (1955) and 
Nicholson (1970) present the argument that the more intense a 
conflict, the less the passage of necessary information, while 
Kerr (1954) and Modelski (1964) suggest that the higher the costs 
the parties have to pay, the higher the polarisation (Frei 
1976: 77). Here then we have the opposite suggested; high conflict 
intensity may actually worsen the chance of successful mediation. 
Moving away from Frei's discussion, the contradictory opinions 
remain. Ott (1972:616) and Wall (1981:177) argue that if the 
parties are aware of very high costs accruing from an intense 
dispute, they will move toward conflict management. 
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However, Kresse! and Pruitt {1985), and Bercovitch (1986) counter 
this by arguing that the empirical evidence shows that mediators' 
efforts to manage particularly destructive disputes are typically 
unsuccessful. Bercovitch argues that: 
Protracted and intense international disputes are not 
particularly amenable to mediation or other forms of 
third party intervention {1986:162). 
Is there a means by which the disagreement between the theorists 
can be understood? One comment that can be made is that in 
intense conflicts, parties may agree more readily to come to the 
mediation table, but once there may find it difficult or 
impossible to achieve any progress toward settlement. While this 
does not explain all the diverging ideas it is an idea which 
deserves further consideration. Parties may have more than just 
the simple resolution of the dispute on their mind; a mediation 
attempt in a particularly severe conflict will provide them with 
a public .relations exercise with the international community and 
their own internal constituency, which is likely to be expressing 
concern at a high level of fatalities. Similarly, the period of 
mediation may also provide the opportunity for time-out during 
which armed forces can regroup, strengthen themselves, and plan 
another move to achieve outright victory. This leads to the 
suggestion that parties in an intense conflict may agree to 
mediate readily, for various motives, but will be less likely to 
use the mediation to achieve peaceful settlement. From these 
points comes the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Two: 
H2. A. High intensity disputes will attract more 
mediation attempts than those with a low intensity. 
H2. B. Low intensity disputes will be mediated 
more successfully than high intensity disputes. 
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Closely associated with the consideration of which degree of 
conflict intensity is most suitable to successful mediation, is 
the consideration of the timing of the intervention. It is 
generally accepted among theorists that conflicts move through 
cycles or phases of escalation, stalemate and de-escalation (for 
example Kreisberg 1973, Pruitt and Rubin 1986). A conflict is a 
dynamic and constantly evolving phenomenon. The question 
concerning the mediation theorist is this: at what time in this 
dynamic process is the conflict most amenable to successful 
mediation?1 
There is universal agreement in the literature that "mediation 
should take place at a propitious moment" (Touval 1982: 8-9). 
Different theorists agree there will be a particular time in the 
conflict dynamic during which mediation will have the best chance 
of succeeding. Unfortunately, it is here that the agreement ends. 
We again see divergent views in the relevant literature over when 
that exact moment might be. 
A mediator may intervene early on in the conflict process, trying 
to prevent the emergence, or escalation of violence, and the 
general polarisation that typically will accompany such 
behaviour. Edmead argues that the progress of peaceful settlement 
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is facilitated by early intervention before the parties become 
entrapped into a course of violent action which sees the object 
of the conflict rise in value in their perceptions (Edmead 
1971:23). From a humanitarian perspective this argument is 
attractive; to terminate a conflict before it becomes too lethal 
will save much suffering. Unfortunately, there is strong evidence 
to suggest that mediation that is initiated early in the dispute 
will have little chance of succeeding. As has been discussed 
above, successful mediation relies on the parties responding to 
pressures arising from the nature of the dispute, and becoming 
committed to settling the dispute through peaceful means. 
What aspects of dispute nature will convince the parties to seek 
help in the peaceful management of their conflict? Several 
theorists have approached the question of predicting the 
termination of conflict, not concentrating specifically on 
mediation research, but rather on discovering what circumstances 
will convince the disputants that suing for peace is more 
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profitable than continuing to fight. 
The general conclusion that arises is that the disputants (often 
bilaterally, but if unilaterally, typically the potential loser) 
will take note of certain "symbolic clues" and move toward 
settlement {Coser 1961:350). These symbolic clues include: the 
fall of the capital city, the capture of a charismatic leader, 
the reaching of a natural boundary (Coser 1961); the failure of 
a final great offensive, a certain percentage of population loss 
(Klingberg 1966); and fluctuating political effectiveness and 
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economic production levels on the part of a regime (Organski and 
Kugler 1978). 
While none of these studies are completely persuasive in their 
argument or findings, for the purpose of this discussion we need 
only to draw a common thread from their explanation. What is 
clear is that all these indices rely on a period of overt 
conflict, in all likelihood for a protracted time. It seems that 
in a general sense, parties will begin to consider peaceful 
settlement seriously only after the conflict has been in progress 
for some time. 
Turning to the field of mediation research, we find several 
theorists willing to support this assertion. Northedge and 
Donelan write that mediation will only be effective after a 
period of conflict, and after each party has shown a willingness 
to consider a peaceful compromise (1971:309). Bercovitch writes: 
Mediation, it seems, is more effective when it 
follows, rather than precedes, some "test of strength" 
between the parties. A minimum duration (here defined 
as 12-36 months), a stalemate, or mutual exhaustion 
seem to be ideal phases in the dispute to initiate 
mediation (1986:161). 
However, it does not follow that the longer a conflict has been 
in existence, the more likely it will be that a mediation is 
successful. Long-term conflict may become habitual, and the 
parties will become entrapped in the dispute as they commit more 
and more resources to obtain victory. 
The usefulness of stalemates for causing parties to reevaluate 
their policies is noted by Touval and Zartman. They write that 
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hurting plateaus, and in some cases crises bounded by deadlines, 
are the two most useful situations for prompting successful 
mediation (1989:125). Parties are confronted with the idea that 
it is intolerable for them to continue the effort of conflict, 
and it is time for them to seek alternative means of solving 
their dispute, to cut their losses and get out. 
Hypothesis Three: 
H3. Mediation will be unlikely to succeed if 
initiated too early in the conflict (defined as up to 
24 months), or even prior to the advent of physical 
force. However, it is also unlikely that conflicts 
that have been in progress for a protracted period 
will be successfully mediated (for example, over 36 months).2 
Conclusion: the Nature of the Dispute 
In considering the importance of the nature of the conflict 












If we accept Ott's proposition as reasonable, then this variable 
should be considered as particularly significant among the 
determinants of outcome. Certainly the discussion to this point 
has indicated that the dispute nature will formulate the parties' 
conceptions of their options in the quest for attaining their 
goals, and through this determine their preference for conflict 
management. It is this point we move to discuss in the next 
section. 
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The Identity and Characteristics of the Parties 
Introduction 
Research on this variable is undertaken to understand which 
factors will lead the parties in a conflict to agree to a 
mediated settlement. In discussing these factors, two basic types 
can be identified. The first section looks at the importance of 
the identity and characteristic factors of an individual party, 
while the second considers the factors that arise when the 
parties' interrelationship is considered. 
The Individual Features of Disputant Parties 
As the previous discussion on dispute nature indicated, a party's 
understanding of how the conflict is proceeding is very 
important. Their recognition of population losses, economic 
sustainability, and territory lost or gained will be one way 
through which the decision will be made. Similarly, the pressures 
from
1
the plateaus and precipices of stalemate and crisis bounded 
by deadline which make up the conflict dynamic will influence 
their decision as to the wisdom of continuing violent behaviour. 
However, the recognition of dispute nature is only half of the 
equation. To complete the understanding we must determine why the 
parties will choose mediation, rather than direct negotiation, 
or, after a spell, to resume fighting. 
In the final analysis, this decision can be best understood as 
a cost/benefit calculation on the part of the disputant. When a 
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party perceives that they stand to achieve more from a mediated 
settlement than from fighting on, or from bilateral negotiation, 
they will be motivated towards mediation {Touval and Zartman 
1985a:34). The more they are convinced of the benefits of 
mediation, the higher their motivation to seek peaceful 
settlement and their receptivity to the process. Consequently it 
is more likely that mediation will succeed (Kressel and Pruitt 
1985:186; Bartunek, Benton and Keys 1975:554). 
Several theorists support this notion of a cost/benefit analysis 
on the part of the disputants. Bercovitch writes that parties who 
have an awareness of dissatisfaction with their own conflict 
management efforts, who face an uncomfortable, potentially 
escalating conflict situation, and who are aware of the 
limitations of resorting to military action, will be the most 
open to mediation ( 1984: 108) . In his case study of conflict 
between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia over the 
formation of the Federation of Malaysia and its claim to Sabah, 
Ott argues that the cost in terms of resources and allies to the 
Philippines and Indonesia was one of the important factors that 
contributed to peaceful settlement of this mediated dispute 
{1972:615). 
Beyond the importance of simply getting a particular party to the 
mediation table, it is also important to consider their attitude 
once they become involved in the mediation. Parties who have 
grudgingly acquiesced to mediation, or who are still openly 
hostile, will lessen the chance for successful mediation (Hiltrop 
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1989:258). Conversely, a party that is enthusiastic about the 
mediation process, willing to listen to the other party, discuss 
all aspects of the dispute, and displays a spirit of conciliation 
and mutual compromise, demonstrates a frame of mind conducive to 
the success of mediation (Brouillet 1988:172; Hiltrop 1989:258; 
Pechota 1971:3). The problem for the student of international 
mediation is that these attitudinal factors are very difficult 
to quantify, and can only be assessed through the assumption that 
the more desperate the situation for a party, the more committed 
that party will be to the mediation process, and hence more 
likely, whether genuinely or falsely, to display these positive 
traits. 
As well as a hostile reaction to the mediation process, there are 
several other factors which can work against a party's 
receptivity to mediation. The first of these is what Young refers 
to as the "emotional field of the crisis." He writes that 
conflict situations are notorious for their emotionality, and 
this can lead to irrational behaviour, distorted perceptions, and 
rigidity of position on behalf of the disputant parties 
(1967:33). Similarly, the effect of national loyalty and 
"ideological blinkers" may dictate total unwillingness to engage 
in conflict management with the other disputants (Young 1967:46). 
The final factor which will operate against a party's willingness 
to enter into mediation, and accept its outcome, is the desire 
to save face. This problem affects the chance of successful 
mediation at several levels. It may prevent the first steps 
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toward mediation because a party may be anxious to maintain a 
position of strength, and not give any appearance of making a 
concession {Young 1967:33-34). Similarly, it may be a problem 
once the mediation is under way, with proposals or suggestions 
from the other disputant rejected not because of substantive 
merit, but simply because they were made by the opposition {Young 
1972:58). Finally, a proposed outcome may be rejected by a party 
because it requires a compromise which may call into question a 
party's resolve, status or strength. This problem may be 
particularly acute if the party is feeling pressure internally 
as well as externally, and is anxious to maintain status in the 
face of its own constituency. 
As well as a party's commitment to the mediation process, there 
are other factors concerning the individual party, which go 
toward determining mediation outcome. One of these is how well 
defined the identity of a party is, or in other words, the state 
of its internal cohesion. The important principles for our 
discussion of this determinant are these: firstly, that to be 
successful, mediation must take place between adversaries with 
clearly defined entities; secondly, the representatives at the 
mediation table must be legitimate spokespeople for their 
respective parties {Bercovitch 1986:160). Frei writes that: 
.•. one might argue that the more clearly defined are 
the conflicting parties, the clearer are the 
addressees of mediative action {1976:70). 
This aspect of party identity introduces the importance of 
internal party cohesion. Kresse! and Pruitt conclude that the 
absence of severe internal discord is an important prerequisite 
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to mediation success (1989:405). Representatives must have the 
authority to make a decision on behalf of their party, they must 
have no strong internal opposition to distract attention away 
from their task, and they must be able to successfully sell all 
their constituents a settlement reached through the mediation 
process. It is from this basis that Touval and Zartman conclude 
that: 
Parties come to agreement best when their own 
preferred solution is blocked but when they themselves 
are strong, so they can make a compromise decision and 
defend it against internal opposition (1989:133). 
Hypothesis Four examines the relationship between the internal 
homogeneity of the parties and mediation outcome. 
Hypothesis Four: 
H4. Disputes between parties that experience little 
internal opposition, will be more amenable to 
successful mediation than those with strong internal 
opposition. 
This consideration of strength is only concerned with the 
position of the internal regime. Also of interest here is the 
strength of the party in terms of its relation to other actors 
in the international system. In this vein both Bercovitch 
(1986:160) and Frei (1976:72) support the proposition that small 
to medium powers, rather than superpowers, will reach a mediated 
settlement more readily. A party which depends on others for 
different forms of assistance will be more inclined to accept the 
offer of mediation, and once begun, will be more likely to 
conclude with a peaceful settlement. Conversely, very strong 
actors may be more convinced in their own ability to achieve 
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outright victory in the dispute. The fifth hypothesis links party 
capability or external strength to the incidence of mediation 
success. 
Hypothesis Five: 
· H5. The more powerful the disputant parties, the 
less likely it is the dispute will be successfully 
mediated. 
To this point, the discussion of party identity and 
characteristics has focused on factors relevant to individual 
parties: their power, their identity, their internal cohesion, 
and their commitment to the mediation process. However, there is 
a limit to how much this information can tell us. What happens 
if one party is very committed to the mediation process, yet the 
other is completely disinterested? How do you classify a party 
as a small medium or large power when the concept is so relative? 
It is considerations such as these which lead us to the next 
section of this discussion: the consideration of the 
interrelationship between the parties in a conflict, and how this 
pertains to mediation outcome. 
The Relative Position of the Disputant Parties 
The first consideration when we acknowledge the importance of 
relative factors, is the question of how many parties are 
involved in the conflict. It is suggested by several theorists 
that the number of parties, and hence the number of mediation 
participants, will be a determinant of whether the mediation is 
a success or failure. 
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Mack and Snyder hypothesize that mediation will be less 
successful the greater the number of parties involved (1957: 231). 
More recently, Zartman and Touval have written that in 
multilateral conflicts "there are serious impediments that hinder 
effective mediation" (1989:133). With more parties involved there 
is a need to accommodate more interests, and the higher the 
chance of conflicting ideals. similarly, a multi lateral mediation 
will be more complex with difficult interrelations, a more 
cumbersome process, and the less chance for a mutually acceptable 
compromise. 
An opposing argument holds that this very complexity and 
multitude of dimensions to the dispute adds up to an increasing 
scope for mediation. In this situation the intermediary will have 
an enhanced role due to the parties inability to deal with the 
complicated nature of the conflict (Young 1972: 55). However, 
Young is only arguing that the mediator will have an enhanced 
role, he makes no claim that multilateral conflict will be 
settled more readily. Thus Hypothesis Six. Will test the 
propositions of Mack and Snyder, and Zartman and Touval. 
Hypothesis Six: 
H6. Multilateral conflicts will be less successfully 
mediated than bilateral conflicts. 
Turning away from considerations of numbers of actors to the 
question of their relative power, there is widespread agreement 
in the literature. Bercovitch (1986:160); Frei (1976:72); Moore 
(1986:34); Ott (1972:599); and Young (1967:43-4) generally agree 
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that where there is basic parity in power between the parties in 
conflict, mediation has a better chance to succeed. 
There are two arguments behind this reasoning. The first is that 
in the case of one party being significantly stronger than its 
adversary, it is unlikely it wquld readily agree to capitulate 
or compromise with its weaker foe. The second reason is that when 
the parties are roughly equal in power, it enhances the 
mediator's position of influence over the parties, and makes it 
easier to move them toward settlement (Young 1967:44). 
The only dissenters to this argument are Legg and Morrison who 
argue that power parity means parties will not accept mediation 
because of the hope for "better times" in the future (cited in 
Frei 1976:72). Their lone voice is kept alive by the results of 
Frei's empirical tests which were unable to confirm either way 
on the question of relative power of the disputants {1976:73). 
However, Bercovitch's reinterpretation of Butterworth's (1976) 
data shows "strong empirical support" for the notion that 
mediation is most successful when involving parties with power 
parity (1986:160). Frei's inability to show a similar result can 
be explained by the small number of cases (n=5) he tested where 
the power difference was medium or large. A conclusive answer 
will be supplied through the results of testing the seventh 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Seven: 
H7. The more unequal in power the disputant parties, 
the less likely mediation will be successful. 
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The final factor that can be identified as pertaining to the 
disputants interrelationship is their relationship before the 
conflict began. In reviewing the suggestions in the literature, 
there is considerable support for the idea that the better, or 
closer the state of the parties previous relationship, the more 
amenable the conflict is to mediation. Where parties share a 
common reference group, and hence common norms, the more 
likelihood of a peaceful settlement being achieved (Hoijer 1925, 
cited in Frei 1976: 80). similarly, if the nations have an 
economic interdependence, the chance for mediation success is 
enhanced (Frei 1976: 73). When the parties have a better knowledge 
of each other, and have been 9n friendly terms, they will be more 
willing to become involved in an interactive process with them. 
This may also help to overcome what Young identifies as the 
problem of settlement being unobtainable: 
•.. not because [the parties) are unable to achieve 
consensus on the terms of an agreement, but because 
they do not trust each other to carry out the terms of 
the agreement faithfully over time (1972:58). 
From this discussion comes the eighth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Eight: 
H8. Disputes involving parties with a positive 
previous relationship will be more likely to be 
successfully mediated than disputes involving parties 
with a negative previous relationship. 
Obviously, if the parties have had negative relations or previous 
experience of disputes against each other, the opposite applies 
and settlement will be less readily achieved (Bercovitch 
1986: 161) • 
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Conclusion: the Identity and Characteristics of the Parties 
Writing on the importance of the disputant parties to the success 
of mediation, Bercovitch states that: 
•.. ultimately both the nature of a conflict and the 
outcomes achieved depends, first and foremost, upon 
the parties themselves, the issues in conflict and 
their motivation (1984:115). 
International politics in general and international conflict in 
particular represent the interactions of human beings; 
individuals who make decisions as to the behaviour of the parties 
they represent. For any mediation, no matter what the nature of 
the dispute or the impact of the mediator, the decision to settle 
a conflict ultimately rests with the parties themselves and their 
willingness to reach an agreement. They draw the bottom line, 
whether to fight on or sue for peace. Holsti writes that 
mediation is: 
based on the principle of voluntarism- both parties to 
a conflict must accept the role and functions of the 
third party- it is the protagonists themselves, 
through their responsiveness and willingness to be 
intervened who will ultimately determine the third 
party's success (1972:462). 
Thus the identity and characteristics of the parties in conflict 
takes on a prominent position in our understanding of successful 
mediation. 
Conclusion 
The general conclusion from this chapter is that both types of 
conflict variables; the nature of the dispute, and the identity 
and characteristics of the parties, are treated as very important 
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in the literature. What flows from this is that the variables 
have a highly interconnected nature. Kresse! and Pruitt, 
concluding on the current state of mediation research, write that 
one overall finding stands out: 
The worse the state of the parties' relationship with 
one another, the dimmer the prospects that mediation 
will be successful (1985:185). 
The perception of the parties, and the decisions that they make 
concerning the mediation, are the "bottom line" in the final 
outcome of a mediation. However these perceptions are formed by, 
among other things, the factors which compromise the nature of 
the dispute. While for the purposes of systematic research the 
approach is to separate the various variables and factors, it 
must be remembered that in reality they will often be impossible 
to delineate. 
The second conclusion which transpires in reviewing the 
literature is that there are often completely contradictory 
notions among theorists. This would appear to be symptomatic of 
the stage to which mediation research has evolved. While it is 
a field gaining increasing attention from theorists of 
international conflict, there is as yet no universally adopted 
schedule around which the research is being based. Until such 
time as one is adopted, we will continue to see fragmented 
pockets of research conducted through different techniques, and 
as a consequence, often offering contradictory results. 
Significant results from the empirical analysis of the preceding 




1. The timing of the mediation is a factor which could 
conceivably be treated as either a part of the nature of the 
dispute, or under the heading of the mediation strategy. That it 
is being treated as a conflict, rather than a mediation variable, 
is a reflection of the fact that the value of this factor (ie the 
time to mediate), is treated in the theoretical literature as 
being dependent upon the progress and situation of the conflict, 
rather than on the behaviour of the mediator. 
2. In order to specifically quantify duration, the general 
categories for the time between the beginning of the conflict and 
mediation initiation were divided into three groups: up to 24 
months, 24-36 months, and longer than 36 months. It is 
hypothesised that the middle period would be the one in which 
mediation was more likely to be successful. Naturally there is 
a degree of generalisation here, some conflicts may only last one 
day, others may have a duration of many years. These periods were 
simply chosen because, on average, they presented periods which 
reflected the message of the previous literature, and because 
they presented a way to operationalise a complex question. 
Chapter Four: 
The Identity and Characteristics of the 
Mediator, and Mediation Strategy. 
Introduction 
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The manner in which the identity and characteristics of the 
mediator and the mediation strategy contribute to. the outcome of 
a mediation completes the picture of bivariate analysis. While 
the previous chapter concentrated on the conflict variables of 
dispute nature and party identification, this chapter is 
concerned with the other two variables which represent our 
framework of the mediation relationship. The variables of 
mediator identity and mediation strategy are variables which are 
mediation specific, as they only have relevance to outcome once 
the mediation process has begun. 
As with the previous chapter, the aim is to generate hypotheses 
which link particular factors to a mediation outcome. These 
hypotheses are drawn from the literature's suggestions and 
findings on the place of mediator identity, characteristics, and 
strategy in the mediation relationship. 
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The Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator 
Introduction 
The identity and characteristics of the mediator is a variable 
which places the mediator as the central figure in the mediation 
case, and examines how he or she (and the organisation or state 
the mediator represents), through ability, assets, and 
representation, influences the nature of the outcome. Within this 
variable, there are two broad areas which will aid our 
understanding of mediator impact. The first of these covers the 
personal qualities of the mediator, with the second being the 
representational qualities he or she may have. 
Personal Qualities 
outlining the personal qualities a mediator needs in order to 
mediate successfully has enamoured most researchers in the field. 
Many of the suggestions are congruent, so to avoid repetition, 
this discussion will be derived from the qualities, rather than 
the authors who suggested them. 
A mediation is an interactive relationship, so to be effective 
a mediator must be au fait with the necessary knowledge of such 
social processes. For example, the mediator will need the 
procedural skills to direct the negotiations, to organise ideas, 
and to make pertinent suggestions (Bercovitch 1986: 163). In order 
to accomplish this the mediator must have excellent communication 
skills, and the ability to make the parties feel not only 
welcome, but also important and listened to. In addition to these 
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skills, there are further personality traits which will enhance 
the process of successful mediation. Amongst the intricate 
permutations of the conflict, with the protagonists cautious lest 
they give away too much ground or lose any advantage, the 
mediator needs patience and energy. Finally, it is suggested that 
a mediator should also have a timely sense of humour. This is not 
solely to make the process of mediation more enjoyable for those 
involved; there have been several studies undertaken which 
indicate that: 
the judicious use of third-party humour may 
actually facilitate movement toward settlement {Pruitt 
and Rubin 1986:177). 
Good humour may incite parties to be more persuadable, generous, 
and willing to trust the mediator. 
However, mediators must be more than well humoured, patient 
organisers. They also, need to be knowledgeable and intelligent; 
comprehending not only the psychological processes that result 
in the parties behaviour, but also having a deep understanding 
of the issues which are at stake in the conflict, and a general 
knowledge of politico-military affairs {Ott 1972: 599; Touval 
1982:8; Young 1967:87). Because mediation success in part relies 
on the mediator's ability to settle a dispute peacefully, he o.r 
she must be able to evaluate the situation, and understand how 
to motivate the parties within it. This requires that the 
mediator has a precise sense of timing, so as to be able to 
choose the exact moment to "penetrate the decision processes of 
the protagonists" (Young 1967:89). 
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For the purposes of research, all of these assets and attributes 
are simplified into one observation, namely that to have the best 
chance of inducing settlement, the mediator needs personal skill 
and experience in the playing of his or her role (Kresse! and 
Pruitt 1985:196). The dynamic of international conflict, and the 
responsibility it places on the m~diator, make mediation no place 
for the inexperienced, the uninitiated, or the unaware. Young 
writes: 
the importance of knowledge is only underlined by 
the extreme complexity of contemporary crises, a 
factor which tends frequently to increase the pressure 
of impulses to resort to coercive force and which 
certainly increases the delicacy and precision 
required for success in programs of persuasive 
intervention (1967:87-88). 
A mediator who has previous experience in dealing with this 
complexity will be most likely to produce a successful conclusion 
to mediation. Similarly, the mediator must be respected by all 
the parties, and be seen by them as experienced enough to be 
capable of settling their dispute (Ott 1972: 599). Hypothesis Nine 
examines the relationship between mediator experience and the 
outcome of the mediation, where mediator experience is defined 
in terms of how many conflicts he or she has been involved with 
as a mediator. 
Hypothesis Nine: 
H9. An experienced mediator will be more successful 
than an inexperienced mediator in settling disputes. 
Representational Qualities 
Beyond the impact of the mediator's individual personality, and 
ability in the art of mediation, there are other assets he or she 
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will bring to the mediation table. Representational qualities or 
attributes refer to the various factors which will affect 
mediation outcome, derived from the mediator's position in the 
international community, the constituency they represent, and the 
previous relationship between them and the disputant parties. 1 
Carnevale and Pegnetter, studying the importance of the 
relationship between the mediator and the disputant parties, 
write that it is extremely important that the parties have trust 
in the mediator. Indeed, in their research lack of trust by the 
parties was reported as the most significant reason for non-
settlement in mediation cases (1985:79). Echoing this, Princen 
writes that: 
trust is essential for mediator effectiveness 
because parties must be willing to accept the 
mediator's advice and suggestions and know they will 
be made with the parties' best interests in mind 
(1987:350). 
Because mediation is a voluntary process, parties who distrust 
the mediator are under little obligation to accept the advice or 
listen to the mediator's persuasion. Rather, lack of trust is a 
recipe for an unsuccessful mediation attempt. Conversely, parties 
who trust the mediator will be more open and flexible to what is 
undertaken, and will be less cautious and defensive, thus freeing 
up the path to settlement. 
An effective mediation process needs a degree of latitude for the 
actors involved to talk openly and frankly, and explore new 
ground in the search for a settlement. It is imperative in this 
interaction that the parties can relate to the mediator, can 
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understand the organisation of the proceedings, and can perceive 
the qualities of the intermediary. This is an extension of trust, 
where the parties understand and feel comfortable with the 
mediator. 
This d.esirable relationship is facilitated by the parties' · 
knowledge of the mediator, or more importantly, of the 
organisation or state the mediator represents. Such knowledge is 
gained from previous interactions between the protagonists and 
the actor fulfilling the role of intermediary, and will enhance 
the progress toward settlement. Where the parties do not know the 
mediator, cannot understand his or her position, or feel 
uncomfortable with his or her ability to mediate, settlement is 
unlikely. This problem also exists if one of the parties has a 
previous knowledge of the mediator, and the other does not. In 
the case of such inequality, Frei demonstrates that mediation 
will almost always fail (1976:80-81). Hence the previous, or pre-
mediation relationship between the parties and the mediator 
becomes significant as a determinant of mediation outcome. 
Hypothesis Ten examines this relationship. 
Hypothesis Ten: 
HlO. When both the disputant parties have gained 
understanding of the mediator through a previous 
relationship, mediation will be more successful than 
if only one party has this understanding, or neither 
has. 
Stressing the importance of an equal relationship between the 
mediator and each of the parties should not be extended too far, 
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lest it be wrongly perceived. Traditional wisdom in mediation 
research has argued that it is important for the mediator to be 
completely impartial, and to have an equal preference for all the 
protagonists. This, it is argued, is necessary for the parties 
to trust the mediator, and hence to facilitate successful 
mediation. 
For example, Fisher considers that a successful mediator will be 
a "eunuch from Mars," a totally unbiased and powerless 
individual, completely incapable of threatening either of the 
protagonists (1981:74). Similarly, Brouillet {1988:170), Holsti 
{1972:465), Moore {1986:15), and Ott {1972:599) all argue that 
to be successful the mediator must be impartial in handling both 
the parties, and the issues in dispute. Young concludes that: 
In most situations the existence of a meaningful role 
for a third party will depend on the party being 
perceived as an impartial participant (in the sense of 
having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist 
and in the sense of being able to control any feelings 
of favouritism) in the eyes of the protagonists (1967:81). 
Intuitively this makes sense; we would not expect that both 
parties would accept a mediator who has an obvious preference for 
a certain party or solution. 
However, the problem with this argument is that it is based on 
a tenuous understanding of the dynamic of the mediation process. 
As has already been stated in this study, mediation is an 
extension of bilateral negotiation; the mediator is a party in 
the negotiations, and thus bargains with the protagonists to 
achieve a settlement {Touval 1982: 16). By using his or her 
ability to side against a particularly strong or intransigent 
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party, the mediator can precipitate an otherwise unobtainable 
settlement. Bercovitch writes: 
Intervention effectiveness is derived not from 
impartiality, but from the saliency of a third party, 
its standing and prestige, the resources it could 
bring to bear, and its perceived ability to exert some 
influence on the other party (1984:112). 
This does not mean that we should now consider the importance of 
the parties' trust in the mediator irrelevant. Rather the 
opposite applies. The parties trust and accept the mediator to 
the extent they believe that he or she can bring about a 
successful outcome to the mediation. Similarly, the importance 
of the previous relationship between the parties and the 
intermediary is not contradicted by the idea that the mediator 
need not be impartial. Where the previous relationship is 
concerned, the emphasis should not be on whether the actors 
enjoyed a positive relationship, but rather on whether there was 
any relationship at all. 2 If a party understands the mediator, 
even to the point of knowing that he or she is partial to their 
adversary, they will understand the mediator's motivational 
structure, and will know what to expect. This will not persuade 
against accepting that particular mediator; if a party thinks 
that a mediator, albeit through partial actions can bring about 
an agreement which is still acceptable to all the protagonists, 
they are likely to accept and trust them to be an intermediary. 
The relationship between the partiality/ impartiality of the 
mediator and the success of the mediation is an old question in 
mediation research, and one which it is still very difficult to 
empirically examine. However, we can give further credence to the 
83 
idea that impartiality is not important to the success of 
mediation by turning to consider the significance of the 
mediator's resources to outcome. The question of the mediator's 
resources represents the other side of the coin to the partiality 
question; the proposition being that it is the mediator's ability 
to provide a settl~ment for the parties which is more important 
than his or her impartiality. 
When one or both of the disputant parties desire the resources3 
that the mediator can offer, the mediator has leverage over those 
parties. Success in international mediation often relies upon the 
mediator's ability to persuade the parties to make concessions 
or to accept a settlement. The more leverage mediators have, the 
more likely they will be able to influence the parties, and the 
better chance a successful outcome will be achieved. Zartman and 
Touval argue: 
Leverage is the ticket to mediation- third parties are 
only accepted as mediators if they are likely to 
produce an agreement or help the parties out of a 
predicament, and for this they usually need leverage 
(1985a:40). 
As a consequence, parties will value the mediator's resources and 
ability to bring about a settlement, above their impartiality. 
In order to employ leverage, the mediator needs certain 
characteristics. Obviously he or she needs the resources to 
either reward the parties (so called "carrots") or to threaten 
them ("sticks"). The parties must see that the mediator is in a 
"mediatory position" and able to meet their needs (Edmead 
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1971:47). Further to this, Young has written at some length about 
the desirable representational qualities a mediator should have. 
Young writes that a mediator should have prestige and repute in 
the eyes of the parties, in terms of being a respected and 
authoritative figure. Secondly, the mediator should be an 
established actor in international politics, and one who 
"displays a certain continuity." It is desirable that the 
mediator be present in the future, should a resurgence in the 
dispute occur. The third desirable characteristic for a mediator 
is the ability to provide and control the right physical 
resources. The mediator needs to provide a site for the 
mediation, communication facilities, equipment and personnel, 
transportation, and any necessary information. There is also a 
response consideration; a potential mediator should be flexible, 
mobile and have initiative, so as to be able to act quickly and 
authoritatively, should the need for intermediation arise. 
Finally, to be successful a mediator should be an actor which is 
internally stable and viable, and immune to manipulation from 
outside sources (Young 1967:85-99). 
All of these desirable assets constitute a demanding list for any 
mediator to fulfil. Which actors in the international system will 
be able to best meet these requirements? Conventional wisdom 
amongst theorists who have specialised in studying the role of 
international organisations in conflict management argue that 
these actors make ideal mediators. Pechota, writing on the role 
of the United Nations as a mediator argues that this organisation 
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meets the three essential conditions for reasonably successful 
intervention: (1) a locus standi which cannot be ignored, which 
recognises legitimacy of concern, ( 2) methods and procedures 
known and agreed upon generally, and (3) certain resources which 
can be turned into positive mediatory values (1971:6). Zartman 
and Touval write that it is because of this that international 
organisations: 
..• were "born to mediate,"for it is a raison d'etre 
enshrined in their charters (1985a:34). 
Other theorists support this position. cot {1968) argues that 
behaviour exhibited by international organisations will always 
be rationalised, because it is recognised they are acting for a 
supreme cause. Similarly, Zacher (1970) argues that because 
international organisations pose little threat to parties' 
sovereignty, they will be a desirable choice for a mediator 
(cited in Frei 1976:78). 
However, these arguments are founded in the mentality which 
places the acceptability of a mediator as a function of their 
impartiality and powerlessness, rather than as a function of 
their ability to provide settlement. The major failing of 
international organisations as mediators is their inability to 
provide the resources necessary to obtain leverage over the 
parties, and hence to maximise the opportunity for successful 
mediation. Touval states that international organisations: 
suffer from the disabilities of being both 
distrusted and weak. Representatives of international 
organisations are frequently suspected of promoting 
the interests of the nation of which they are citizens 
or of a coalition within the organisation. And as 
their resources are limited, they are seldom effective 
in influencing states through bargaining {1982:18). 
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Touval goes on to argue that it is states, rather than 
international organisations, that have the necessary resources, 
and thus make the best mediators. This argument refers to the 
question of mediator power, which concerns the importance of the 
mediator's influence in the international system. 4 Supporting the 
assertion that states rather than international organisations 
make successful mediators, Bercovitch writes: 
government leaders or representatives of 
governments possessing rank and prestige and having 
both leverage and institutional assistance stand a 
much better chance of success than other mediators 
(1986: 164). 
This assertion is supported by Frei's empirical findings which 
demonstrate that mediators representing states will more often 
succeed than fail when mediating, while international 
organisations are more likely to fail than to succeed (1976:78) •5 
Hypothesis Eleven relates this question of mediator identity to 
the incidence of successful outcomes. 
Hypothesis Eleven: 
Hll. States will be more successful than 
international organisations at mediating conflicts. 
Consideration of how the identity of the mediator influences 
ou1;:come should not end with the assumption that it is an 
either/or relationship between states and international 
organisations. Within the international system there is a vast 
assortment of different states who may act as mediators. State 
size6 can be measured through indicators such as military 
prowess, population, Gross National Product (GNP), and territory. 
As we saw when discussing Hypothesis Eleven, in general states 
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will have more power than international organisations. Beyond 
this, it is obvious that the size of states will vary enormously. 
Very large, strong and rich nations will have more resources to 
offer the parties, more leverage to produce a settlement, and 
more influence in the international system. Because of this they 
can be expected to be more successful mediators than weaker 
states. This argument is supported by Frei's empirical findings 
which show that when a conflict is mediated by a superpower, the 
effort will more often lead to-success than failure, something 
which does not follow when the mediator is only a small or medium 
power (1976:78). Discussing the mediation by the United States 
of the Egypt/ Israel conflict between 1973 and 1979, Stein argues 
that: 
a major contributing factor to the effectiveness of 
the mediator in both instances was the extraordinarily 
high value each of the belligerents attached to its 
ongoing relationship to the United States. Both Egypt 
and Israel attached paramount importance to their 
relationship with the mediator and shared an interest 
in maintaining the efficacy of the United States as a 
third party {1985:345). 
Hypothesis Twelve examines the relationship between state size 
and mediation success. 
Hypothesis Twelve: 
H12. The greater the size of a state, the more 
successful they will be at mediating disputes. 
Finally, we need to consider the question of the mediator's 
motivation. Different actors may have various reasons for 
becoming involved in conflict management; an altruistic desire 
for peace, the need for glory and prestige, a wish to gain 
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influence over the disputant parties, or a wish to stop a 
possible threat to themselves accruing from the conflict. 
Sometimes an actor may choose to mediate simply to avoid having 
to take sides in the dispute (Zartman and Touval 1985a:34), or 
conversely may feel "condemned" to play the role because there 
is no pne else who can do so. 
The question is, does it matter to the outcome of mediation 
whether the mediator makes the initial offer to play his or her 
role, or conversely, is enticed or invited to mediate? Will this 
impact on the outcome of the mediation? There is a paucity of 
literature on this subject, and certainly no propositions as to 
how, if at all, the initiation of mediation will affect outcome. 
Logic would suggest that when the parties themselves request 
mediation they will be more committed to the process, and a 
solution reached, than if mediation is offered by an actor who 
is external to the dispute. If the parties in the conflict 
realize they need help to settle their problem they are more 
likely to compromise, and through this to reach settlement. 
However, if only one party seeks a mediator and the other does 
not, then the situation will be unequal, with the parties seeking 
different things. This situation is likely to undermine any 
chance of the mediation being a success. Hypothesis Thirteen 
examines these relationships. 
Hypothesis Thirteen: 
H13. A. Mediation initiated by the mediator will 
have less chance of being successful than if it is 
initiated by all the parties in the dispute. 
Hl3. B. Mediation initiated by the mediator will 
have a better chance of success than if it is 
instigated by one party. 
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Conclusion: the Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator 
Amongst theorists of international mediation there is some 
disagreement as to the overall importance of mediator identity 
and characteristics as a determinant of outcome. In his 1967 
study Young argued that the identity and characteristics of a 
third party in a mediation role were of "gr.eat importance" to the 
termination of the conflict. However Ott relegates the 
characteristics of the mediator to being of only "marginal" 
importance to the outcome (1972:597). 
This is an interesting contradiction in views. Intuitively it is 
difficult to see the mediator's identity and characteristics as 
marginally relevant. Indeed from the outside it would appear the 
mediator should be of central importance to mediation. 
Nevertheless, we should remember that mediation is a voluntary, 
flexible, and at times ad hoc process which occurs after a 
dispute has begun with the issues and protagonists in position. 
These parties and issues existed before the mediator was known, 
and will continue to do so should the mediation fail. It is the 
parties' conflict, and the settlement of it is something they 
will have to live with. While there are aspects of mediator 
identity which should not be dismissed, an appreciation of the 




The variable of mediation strategy refers largely to the 
behaviour of the mediator. In any mediation case, the mediator, 
ascertaining the nature of the conflict and the identity of the 
parties, will choose to play certain roles designed to facilitate 
a successful outcome to the mediation. These roles will influence 
the manner in which the mediation proceeds. Thus mediation 
strategy is a process variable which dictates the nature of the 
negotiations that ensue, and will affect the behaviour of all the 
actors involved. 
The first part of this section will discuss the different 
strategies a mediator can use, and how employing each of the 
strategies will influence the mediation outcome. Beyond this 
discussion there is one final aspect of mediation strategy that 
is not completely contingent on mediator behaviour. This factor 
is the environment of the mediation. 
Classifying Strategies 
When classifying strategies, the initial distinction is between 
those strategies which are low in their level of intervention in 
the conflict relationship, and those which are high (Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille 1991:15). In reality, these points are at 
either ends of a continuum rather than an either/or distinction. 
Different theorists have adopted their own terminology to 
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describe different points on this continuum; however in truth 
there is little substantive difference beyond names. 
For example, when referring to a low level of intervention, 
Zartman and Touval describe the mediator acting as a communicator 
{1985a:38), Kressei and Pruitt discuss reflexive interventions 
{ 1985: 188) , and Bercovi tch, Anagnos on and Wille refer to a 
conciliation/facilitation strategy {1991:15). With this level of 
strategy the emphasis is on the mediator playing a passive role, 
becoming familiar with the conflict, building ties with the 
parties, initiating or enhancing communication, and acting as a 
go-between. Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille write: 
• . • the mediator in this role exhibits very little 
control over the interactions between the adversaries 
beyond what may be achieved through the direction and 
{often unconscious) reinterpretation of communications 
{1991: 16). 
The second type of strategy involves a moderate level of 
intervention by the mediator where he or she becomes more 
substantially involved in the process of the mediation. Zartman 
and Touval describe this as a formulation strategy where the 
mediator may redefine the issues in the conflict, and use 
creativity and invention to discover the parties real interests, 
and a solution that will meet these {1985a:38). At this level, 
the mediator may also control the agenda and environment of the 
mediation, identifying the procedures for discussion, and trying 
to discover a naturally integrative solution. Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille ref er to this as procedural strategy 
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{1991:16), while in the terminology of Kressel and Pruitt, this 
is contextual intervention by the mediator. 
At the higher-end of the intervention continuum are strategies 
which require a high level of mediator input. It is at these 
levels that the phenomenon of leverage in mediation occurs, with 
the mediator dealing directly with the issues in dispute, making 
suggestions to the parties, and attempting to persuade and 
influence them to accept them. Kressel and Pruitt refer to this 
as a substantive strategy {1985:192), while Zartman and Touval 
adopt stronger language, describing the mediator's behaviour as 
manipulation. They explain that in this role mediators utilize: 
••. their positions and other resources to move the 
parties into agreement ... this is a structural role, 
since it directly involves power and relations, and as 
such is a role of power politics. In this role, 
mediators transform the bargaining structure from a 
dyad into a triangle, and become actors with interests 
or "full participants"- not just neutral 
intermediaries {1985a:39). 
The tactics that the mediator may use with this strategy can 
include the making of threats and promises, ("sticks" and 
"carrots"), to either pressure or entice the parties into 
accepting a settlement. 
Talking about strategies involving high mediator involvement, 
Bercovitch, Anagnos on and Wille discuss two different 
classifications; namely directive strategies and substantive 
strategies. The difference between these classifications is 
simply one of degree; directive strategies rely on strong 
suggestions and influence to obtain settlement, while substantive 
strategies entail open manipulation of the parties' wants and 
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needs (1991:16). In reality these two categories. can be treated 
as one type of strategy, something which Bercovitch, Anagnoson 
and Wille eventually do when they talk of success rates accruing 
from the different strategies (1991:17) . 7 
While the different typologies discussed by the theorists are 
largely congruent, the terminology employed by Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille will be adopted for this study. Their three-
fold classification of behaviour allows a useful and 
comprehensive coverage of the different mediation strategies. For 
the purposes of this analysis, we can talk of a mediator strategy 
being, on a scale of involvement from low to high; 
conciliation/facilitation, procedural, and directive. 
Which one of these strategies, and the different tactics employed 
under each, will be the most likely to result in successful 
mediation? The literature abounds with notions linking different 
mediator actions to successful outcomes. 
Where strategies of low mediator intervention are concerned, 
there is general agreement among theorists that these alone will 
do little to provoke the reaching of a settlement. Carnevale, Lim 
and McLaughlin write: 
this is not surprising when we consider that 
reflexive tactics tend to be used early in mediation 
and thus are less 1 ikely to be directly related to 
mediation outcomes (1989:234). 
Kressel and Pruitt write of the importance of the mediator 
building rapport and being accepted by the disputants before they 
can be effective in their role (1985:190). Similarly, Carnevale, 
Lim and McLaughlin conclude that tactics designed to build trust 
between the parties were more: 
positively associated with an improvement in the 
parties relationship than with settlement (1989:234). 
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Thus while the use of communication/facilitation strategies 
cannot often be said to result in successful outcomes, they may 
be an important initial step in the impetus'to settlement. 8 
Moving into the mid to upper range of mediation intervention 
levels it is difficult to find any real trend amongst theorists 
as to which will be most effective. Talking of procedural 
strategies, Carnevale, Lim and McLaughlin write that their 
research shows tactics involving the setting of an agenda can be 
"positively associated with general settlement in every case" 
(1989:235). Zartman and Touval state that procedural or 
formulative intervention is "pure" mediation, in which the 
mediator has: 
no preference among solutions (except for a 
solution that satisfies the parties), exercise no 
power (except the power of persuasion to change 
people's minds), and have no weight (except the weight 
of the arguments required to get the parties attention 
and confidence) (1985a:38-39). 
They argue that such a strategy may be the key to a mediator's 
success in persuading the protagonists that it is better for them 
to take a conciliatory approach, and hence to accept a peaceful 
outcome (1985:35). Similarly, Brouillet argues that the use of 
process control is imperative for successful mediation 
(1988:172), while Stein writes that persuasion is the key for a 
mediator who wishes to be successful (1985:345). 
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However, we should not suppose that because procedural strategies 
are successful in mediation, directive or substantive strategies 
will be any less so. In fact several theorists argue strongly 
that high intervention strategies will be significantly more 
successful than medium level ones. For example, while Young 
writes that selective or manipulative use of information is one 
way in which the mediator may enhance the prospect of settlement 
(1972:57), other theorists go a step further. As was discussed 
earlier, Zartman and Touval write that strategies which use 
leverage are the "ticket" to successful mediation, while 
Bercovitch argues that the mediator's ability to promise new 
resources, or to threaten parties with the withdrawal of 
resources, is the "most persuasive and effective form of third-
party influence ... " ( 1984: 106) . Fogg describes that in the Soviet 
Union's mediation between India and Pakistan over the 1966 
Kashmir conflict, Soviet Foreign Minister Kosygin achieved 
success through using the threat that his government would 
isolate either nation if they did not comply with the terms of 
the Soviet's settlement proposal (1985:335-336). This anecdotal 
evidence is supported by the recent empirical findings of 
Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille who found that: 
Clearly, the more effective strategies in 
international mediation are the more active 
strategies. Mediators employing directive or 
substantive strategies are successful, on average, 41% 
of the time (as opposed to 20% for procedural, and 19% 
for conciliation/facilitation] (1991:16). 
These authors conclude that possessing resources, and using them 
in an active strategy are "the basis for a successful 
mediation. 119 Hypothesis Fourteen links mediator strategy to 
mediation success. 
Hypothesis Fourteen: 
H14. Strategies involving a high level of mediator 
intervention will be more likely to produce a 
successful outcome than those of a low intervention 
level. 
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Beyond this simple linkage between type of strategy and outcome 
we move into largely uncharted territory. The question of how a 
mediator chooses the strategy he or she will use is not central 
to this discussion of mediation outcome, but is a field where 
progress is being achieved (for example, see Carnevale and 
Pegnetter 1985; Carnevale 1986; Kolb 1983). 
However, it is interesting to discuss the relevance of timing, 
or the application of different strategies at different times. 
Realistically, any mediation case will involve the use of a 
combination of tactics and strategies. Kressel and Pruitt suggest 
that: 
it is clear that strategies and tactics are not 
used separately but are "bundled" together in 
strategic thrusts. Skilful mediators know how to 
construct such bundles (1985:196). 
Unfortunately, we are not at the stage where we can 
systematically address this concept at the level of international 
mediation beyond some simple conjecture, or listening to the 
testimony of isolated practitioners. Writing on labour /management 
mediation, Hiltrop concludes that "timing is crucial to 
effectiveness" (1985:97). He writes that mediators should begin 
with strategies of low intervention, and move toward being more 
directive and substantive as the pressure for settlement builds. 
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This idea of tailoring the strategy to meet the timing or phase 
of the mediation is further discussed by Jones, who established 
that successful mediators vary their strategy as the mediation 
progresses {1988:492). The evolution of these notions to the 
stage where they can be tested systematically and empirically 
represents a fascinating challenge for the future research into 
how mediation strategy affects the nature of outcome. 
Finally, we consider how the location of the mediation affects 
the outcome. One principle which stands out in the literature is 
that to be effective, mediation should be carried out under 
"closed-site" conditions {Pruitt and Rubin 1986:171). Harbottle 
writes that: 
•.• more progress can be made through low profile and 
less publicised third party initiatives simply because 
they are conducted beyond the glare of world or even 
national publicity (1980:126). 
There are two points behind this reasoning. The first is that the 
parties need to be able to concentrate solely on the task at hand 
and do not need the distraction of observation. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the disputants and mediator need latitude to 
talk frankly and explore options if the mediation is to be 
successful. If their every move is watched and reported to their 
constituency, or a wider audience, these actors may become 
entrapped into positions in order to appear strong and maintain 
face. 10 
The exception to the need for closed site conditions may be 
called for when the mediator is engaged in a directive or 
substantive strategy. Through threatening to publicise the 
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intransigence, or general lack of cooperation of a particular 
party, the mediator can use international opinion to gain 
leverage and hence move that party toward settlement (Forsythe 
1976: 620). 
A second question concerning us when discussing the mediation 
location is the impartiality of the environment. Fisher argues 
that the setting of any mediation should not be the "homebase of 
either party, or biased in some less conspicuous manner" 
(1981:74). The parties should not feel as though they are 
entering an environment which is threatening to them, a 
perception which would be hard to avoid if the mediation takes 
place in the territory of their enemy, or their enemy's allies. 
Rather the environment should be a site which is innocuous to all 
the parties involved, and is under the control of the mediator. 
Hypothesis Fifteen examines the relationship between the 
mediation environment and outcome. 
Hypothesis Fifteen: 
Hl5. Mediation which takes place in a neutral 
environment will be more likely to succeed than if it 
takes place in an environment which is biased against 
any of the disputant parties. 
Conclusion: Mediation Strategy 
Discussing the most productive manner in which mediators can 
promote the settlement of disputes, Harbottle writes that there 
is a need for: 
flexibility, whereby changing conflict situations 
can be matched by changing remedies {1980:129). 
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This is the key consideration where mediation strategy is 
concerned, and its impact on the outcome of any mediation depends 
to a large degree on the skill with which it is used. Overall it 
may not be as important as the conflict variables to the nature 
of the outcome, but through being at the interface between the 
behaviour of the mediator and the conflict, it deserves careful 
attention. 
Conclusion 
Discussing the mediation variables completes our picture of 
bi variate analysis of the determinants of mediation outcome. 
Ott' s opinion that "the characteristics and tactics of the 
mediator are a marginal factor ... " (1972:597) is not an excuse 
to ignore the impact these variables have on the outcome of 
mediation. The mediator, in conjunction with his or her skill, 
experience and motivation, views a conflict and the disputant 
parties, and applies a mediation strategy designed to produce 
settlement. Thus the mediation variables, however much their 
importance is questioned, do fill two links in the chain to 
outcome. Indeed this discussion has produced a number of 
hypotheses that suggest that these links are integral parts to 
the make-up of what that outcome will be. 
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Endnotes 
1. Individuals mediating international conflict without any 
constituency are extremely rare. Even those individuals who may 
mediate representing no nation or organisation are likely to be 
treated by implication as having a constituency through 
nationality or past association. 
2. For example Frei found that even when there were tensions 
between the mediator and both parties, there was still almost a 
50% chance the mediation would be successful {1976:81). This 
emphasises that it is not crucial for the mediator to have a 
positive relationship with the parties, but rather that they 
understand one another. 
3. These resources can be tangible or intangible rewards for 
the parties. Tangible resources include money and goods, 
intangible may include international support and favour. 
4. The concept of mediator power does not typically refer to 
the personal power and prestige of an individual mediator, but 
rather to that of the organisation or state they represent. {See 
Frei 1976:79). 
5. Frei suggests that this figure can partially be explained 
because international organisations may often mediate the 
"harder" disputes. He writes: 
Individual states probably tend to avoid touchy 
mediation initiatives precisely because they do not 
wish to experience a failure, whereas international 
organisations often act as mediators precisely because 
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no individual state wished to do so, and precisely 
because everybody else is perplexed and helpless (1976:79). 
6. The term "state size" does not simply refer to total 
geographic territory. Rather size and power are congruent terms, 
calculated for a state according to a number of traditional 
indicators: military expenditure, population, territory, G.N.P., 
and G.N.P. per capita. 
7. Further to directive and substantive interventions, 
Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille add a final classification of a 
supervisory action by the mediator. However, because of the 
extreme infrequency of this strategy being employed, (in only one 
instance in the data), we need not dwell on this mediator role. 
8. While we are not concerned here with the so called 
"Problem- Solving Approach" (as discussed in Chapter Two), it is 
worth noting some of the ideas accruing from this body of thought 
on the place of different strategies. For example Burton believes 
that apart from some agenda control, communication/facilitation 
strategies should be the extent of the mediator's repertoire. He 
argues strongly that a mediator should never suggest a solution, 
and certainly never pressure them towards accepting it. This is 
because: 
It is only the parties that can arrive at solutions, 
and the mediator should never prejudice his position 
by suggesting them (1972a:7). 
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9. Because we define mediation success in terms of reaching 
a settlement, we need go no further with this. However, there 
have been doubts expressed as to the longevity of settlements 
reached by the mediator using directive or substantive strategies 
(Carnevale, Lim and McLaughlin 1989: 237; Kressel and Pruitt 
1985:194). Rubin writes: 
... a third party who wishes to facilitate immediate 
(if short term) resolution of conflict should probably 
exercise as much power to impose agreement as 
possible; a third party who wishes to pave the way for 
a more long-lasting agreement should probably make use 
as of little power as is absolutely necessary in order 
to induce the disputants to resolve their conflict (1981:40) 
10. This does not include the need to offer some information 
to the outside world. However, this is at the mediator's 
discretion, who must judge the costs in relation to the benefits 
of keeping public attention informed of the progress of the 
mediation (Brouillet 1988:172). 
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Chapter Five: 
Exploring the Bivariate Model 
Introduction 
The fifteen hypotheses developed in the previous chapters 
represent a review of what the literature suggests are the 
factors and conditions which determine the outcome of 
international mediation. As such, they stand as important and 
useful precepts in their own right. However, through the 
methodology of systematic empirical techniques {as described in 
Chapter One), we can now examine these theoretical notions 
against a comprehensive correlates of mediation, drawn from 
incidences of this form of conflict management. 
The purpose of Chapter Five is to examine the results of the 
empirical tests on both the conflict and mediation variables of 
the bivariate model. However, rather than structure the 
discussion around these four variables, this chapter will look 
in turn at each of the fifteen hypotheses developed in the 
previous two chapters, placing the findings back into the model 
at the conclusion of the discussion. 
In the interests of highlighting the individual effects of the 
independent variables on mediation outcome, the outcome value has 
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been collapsed into a simple dichotomy of success and failure. 
Consequently, success in this empirical analysis refers to any 
outcome which provides a ceasefire, a partial settlement, or the 
full settlement of a dispute. Failure remains defined as 
occurring when the end of the mediation sees the resumption or 
escalation of the hostilities. 
An Empirical Analysis of the Factors and Conditions which Determine 
Mediation Outcome 
Hypothesis One 
Hl.A. Security disputes will be most amenable to 
successful mediation, followed by territory, then 
ideology, and finally independence. 
Hl.B. The more issues in a dispute, the less chance 
of mediation being successful. 
Table 5.1: Mediation outcome by Primary Issue 
Security Territory Independence Ideology 
(n=33) (n=164) (n=74) (n=6) 
Success(%) 30 29 20 17 
Failure(%) 70 71 80 83 
X2=2 • 642 I DF=3, p=0.45 
Table 5.1 demonstrates that we are unable to provide 
statistically significant findings to support the premise of 
Hypothesis One. While there is some variation in the level of 
success attained according to the primary issue in a dispute, it 
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is too slight to draw any real conclusions. Even the statement 
that ideological disputes will be the least likely to be mediated 
successfully is tenuous, given the small number of cases in that 
category (n=6). Perhaps the strongest observation we can make 
from this analysis is that there appears to be some difference 
in the success rate between the tangible issues of security and 
territory, compared to the intangible issues of independence and 
ideology. 1 Given the null finding concerning the first part of 
Hypothesis One, it is worthwhile exploring the factor of issues 
further to ascertain how it may impact on outcome. 
Analysing a simple split of the issue spectrum into tangible and 
intangible issues fails to provide a significant result. As Table 
5.2 demonstrates there is some variation between success rates, 
with tangible issues 10% more likely to be successfully mediated. 
However, as the statistics show, this cannot be considered 
significant. 












The preceding analysis fails to find any statistically valid 
support for the assertions by Bercovitch (1986), Butterworth 
(1976), and Frei (1976) that there is a significant variation in 
the success rate when different issues are mediated. While there 
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are indications that differences do exist, the spread is not 
sufficient to make any assumptions or conclusions considering 
their importance. 
Turning away from the type of issue in dispute, the focus shifts 
to the second part of Hypothesis One: how the number of issues, 
or complexity of the dispute, affects mediation outcome. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Mediation Outcome by Complexity 
Three + Issues Two Issues One Issue 
(n=102) (n=161) (n=25) 
Success(%) 16 33 48 
Failure(%) ~~ 67 52 - ? 
X2=14.523, DF=2, p=<0.001 
As Table 5.3 demonstrates, there is certainly a significant 
relationship between the number of issues, or complexity of a 
dispute, and the outcome. In simple conflicts where there was 
only one issue, a high 48% were mediated successfully. However, 
for complex disputes with three or more issues, the chance of 
success fell to a low 16%. Furthermore, as suspected, only 9% of 
the conflicts were single issue disputes, while 36% were highly 
complex with three or more issues. This result emphasises the 
importance of the mediator's job to try and simplify the 
complexity of disputes if he or she wants to promote the chance 
of successful mediation. For example, measures such as dividing 
the issues into individual topics for discussion to be dealt with 
one at a time (perhaps with the tangible issues first to promote 
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encouraging progress), are likely to enhance the chance of 
successful mediation in more complex disputes. 
This finding that the complexity of the dispute has a highly 
significant impact on whether it will be mediated successfully 
is a notable result as it represents analysis p~eviously 
unexplored in empirical mediation research. The experience with 
Hypothesis One suggests that it is the number of issues, rather 
than the type of issues which will have the most significant 
impact on mediation outcome. 
Hypothesis Two 
H2. A. High intensity disputes will attract more 
mediation attempts than those with a low intensity; 
H2. B. Low intensity disputes will be mediated more 
successfully than high intensity disputes. 
Examining the relationship between the intensity of the conflict, 
and either the number of mediation attempts, or the outcome of 
the mediation, provides no statistically significant results. 
However, rather than automatically concluding that such 
contextual details are unimportant to understand mediation 
outcome, it is prudent to return to the basis for the intensity 
measurement. Intensity was developed in Chapter Three as a means 
to combine the elements of conflict fatalities and dispute 
duration, and as such to provide a more sophisticated and 
descriptive measurement of these contextual factors. The 
intensity index was constructed through dividing the number of 
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fatalities by the number of months the conflict was in progress. 
However, it could be that this in itself has distorted any 
relationships that existed between the mediation outcome and the 
traditionally used measurement of fatalities (For example see 
Bercovitch 1986, Klingberg 1966). Table 5.4 represents the 
results of the relationship between fatalities and the number of 
previous mediation attempts, demonstrating that this suspicion 
may be correct. The strong statistical relationship portrays the 
general trend that the larger the number of fatalities, the more 
mediation attempts there will be. 
Table 5. 4: Previous Mediation Attempts by Fatalities 
100-500 501-1000 1001-5000 5000+ 
(n=36) (n=61) (n=58) (n=209) 
Zero(%) 33 25 17 14 
1-2(%) 56 25 26 23 
3-4(%) 11 15 22 20 
5+(%) 35 35 43 
x2=37. 311, DF=9, p<0.0005 
Similarly, the relationship between fatalities and the outcome 
of mediation is a particularly strong one. Table 5. 5 demonstrates 
that conflicts with less than 500 fatalities will have at least 
a 41% better chance of being mediated successfully than conflicts 
with over 500 fatalities. 
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Table 5.5: Mediation Outcome by Fatalities 
Up to 500 501-1000 1001-5000 5000+ 
(n=29) (n=47) (n=45) (n=167) 
success(%) 69 28 24 22 
Failure(%) 31 72 76 78 
x2=27.179, DF=3, p<0.0005 
Although these findings have rejected the more sophisticated 
value of conflict intensity in favour of the simpler fatalities 
measurement, the essence of Hypothesis Two has been confirmed. 
The disagreement between the theorists that characterised the 
theoretical discussion of Hypothesis Two can now be at least 
partially explained by the fact that while more lethal (or 
"intense") conflicts certainly do have more mediation attempts, 
it is unlikely that these attempts will be successful. 
Hypothesis Three 
H3. Mediation will be unlikely to succeed if 
initiated too early in the conflict, (defined as up to 
24 months), or even prior to the advent of physical 
force. However, it is also unlikely that conflicts 
that have been in progress for a protracted period 
will be successfully mediated (for example, over 36 months). 
Table 5.6: Mediation Outcome by Timing of Intervention 
Success(%) 
Failure(%) 














As Table 5. 6 reveals, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the timing of the mediation in the conflict 
history, and the outcome of that mediation. There is some 
variation in the success rate according to the timing of the 
mediation which on face value supports the hypothesis, however 
given the unconvincing statistics it is tenuous to over-emphasise 
this. 
While all the theorists agree that mediation should take place 
at a "propitious moment" (Touval 1982:8-9) it seems that we are 
still some distance from being able to satisfactorily confirm 
when that moment will be. Indeed on the basis of these results 
here, some strength is given to .the argument that there is no 
universal rule as to the time when mediation will be most 
successful. Further research into the construction of a more 
sophisticated measurement of the right moment for mediation to 
be initiated may reveal a predicative relationship between timing 
and successful outcome, but for this study the conclusion must 
be that there is no significant support for Hypothesis Three. 
Hypothesis Four 
H4. Disputes between parties that experience little 
internal opposition, will be more amenable to 
successful mediation than those with strong internal 
opposition. 
In order to measure the internal division of the parties, a 
homogeneity scale which measured each party along the lines of 
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religion, language and race was devised (see Appendix One). As 
demonstrated by Table 5.7, there is clearly a significant 
relationship between the internal homogeneity of 
protagonists, and the outcome of mediation. 

















Interestingly the major cleavage is between the situation when 
both parties are homogeneous, and the situation when one or 
neither is. It takes both parties to reach a successful outcome, 
and when one of the parties is faced with internal opposition, 
or does not have the freedom to make a decision on behalf of all 
constituents, the result in outcome terms is almost as 
unsuccessful as if neither party is homogeneous. 
Hypot:hesis Five 
HS. The more powerful the disputant parties, the 
less likely it is the dispute will be successfully 
mediated. 
Hypothesis Five is a means of assessing the relationship between 
the total power present in the mediation relationship, and how 
this affects the mediation outcome. The power of the disputant 
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parties was quantified according to a scale which measured each 
party's GNP, GNP per capita, military spending, territorial size, 
and population (see Appendix One). Based on a scale developed by 
Cox and Jacobson (1973), the power index score for a party is 
calculated by adding its scores from each of the five measures. 
For the purposes of Hypothesis Five, the measurements for the 
disputants were then cumulatively added. 
Unfortunately, as Table 5.8 demonstrates, an empirical analysis 
of this hypothesis provides no significant relationship between 
a powerful mediation and mediation failure. 
Table 5.8: Mediation Outcome by Total Power of Disputants 
Weak Med. Moderate Med. Strong Med. 
(n=56) (n=116} (n=ll6) 
Success(%) 31 31 23 
Failure(%) 69 69 77 
x2=2.230, DF=2, p=0.32 
There is little variation in the success rate whether the parties 
total power is large, medium or small. The conclusion must be 
that it is more likely that power is important as a factor when 
measured in ways other than simply the overall power in existence 
at the mediation table. The results of Hypotheses Seven, Eleven, 
and Twelve, where we examine the power disparity between the 
parties, and the power of the mediator, should be examined 
bearing in mind the conclusions accruing from this result. 
Hypothesis Six 
H6. Multilateral conflicts will be less successfully 
mediated than bilateral conflicts. 
Table 5.9: Mediation Outcome by Number of Parties 
Success{%) 
Failure{%) 




x2=0.788, DF=l, p=0.38 





Despite the theoretical support for this notion, the results of 
the empirical analysis, portrayed in Table 5. 9, revealed no 
statistically significant difference in the outcome achieved if 
there were two, or multiple protagonists in the dispute. This 
suggests that even though a multilateral conflict will have more 
actors, and hence more dimensions which need to be assessed, this 
in itself has no direct bearing on whether or not the mediation 
will be a success. 
Hypothesis Seven 
H7. The more unequal in power the disputant parties, 
the less likely mediation will be successful. 
As Table 5 .10 demonstrates, there is a clear relationship between 
a nil power disparity between the parties, and mediation success. 
This significant result reflects the widespread agreement in the 
literature that a high power disparity is a serious impediment 
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to effective mediation (For example see Frei (1976:76], Moore 
(1986:34], Ott (1972:599]}. 
















With regard to the experience of Hypothesis Five, it is clear 
that power, as a dimension of the characteristics of the parties, 
is relevant not as a total concept, but rather as a relative 
concept. In addition to enhancing the role of the mediator, power 
parity will convince the parties they have no real reason to 
expect to win the conflict outright should the mediation fail and 
hostilities recommence. With regard to the mediator's role, this 
has important repercussions. Through the use of resources and 
sanctions, the mediator can work to build power parity when it 
may not originally exist, and hence facilitate the chances of 
successful mediation. This idea connects with the questions of 
mediator identity and power, which will be specifically discussed 
in Hypotheses Ten and Eleven. 
Hypothesis Eight 
H8. Disputes involving parties with a positive 
previous relationship will be more likely to be 
successfully mediated than disputes involving parties 
with a negative previous relationship. 
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Theoretically, the relationship between a positive previous 
relationship and mediation success is a particularly strong one. 
We would expect that parties that had a common history of 
friendship and interdependence would be willing to talk, explore 
options, and compromise in order to preserve a relationship they 
valued. Similarly trust, which Young reminds us is _crucial to the 
implementation of settlement (1972:58), will be much more in 
evidence when the parties have had positive previous experiences 
with each other. 




















The empirical results strongly support this theoretical 
hypothesis. As portrayed by Table 5.11, there is a very large 
difference in the rate of success achieved between those 
conflicts when the protagonists have had positive previous 
relationships, and when they have had negative previous 
relationships. It should be noted that there are very few cases 
in which parties with previously friendly relations become 
involved in a conflict {n=8) . This is commonsense; typically 
friends will manage a dispute peacefully before it escalates to 
the stage of armed force. Similarly, we can expect that if the 
dispute does degenerate into overt conflict, the parties will be 
likely to accept a mediation case, and to make considerable 
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effort to return to a positive relationship. Consequently, 
conflicts between parties with previously friendly relations 
should be viewed as something of a special case, where we can 
expect there will be an excellent chance that a mediation in this 
situation will succeed. 
Beyond this, it is interesting to note that there is little 
variation in success rate accruing from what level of negative 
relationship had existed. Previous antagonism is just as likely 
to result in unsuccessful mediation as previous overt conflict. 
The repercussions of this are significant, for it suggests that 
once a precedence for even a mildly negative relationship has 
been established, it is unlikely that mediation will be 
successful at any time in the future. Given the strong 
statistical significance of this relationship, and the fact that 
most international conflicts are between parties with negative 
previous relationships (97% of the n) this conclusion is a 
sobering one. 
Hypot;hesis Nine 
H9. An experienced mediator will be more successful 
than an inexperienced mediator in settling disputes. 
The only index available to test this hypothesis is one which 
examines how many times a specific mediator has previously 
mediated a specific conflict. Consequently, experience in a more 
general sense is replaced with how the mediator's knowledge and 
experience of a particular dispute affects his or her ability to 
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mediate it successfully. This is not entirely satisfactory, 
al though the essence of the hypothesised connection between 
experience and success certainly remains. In any event, the 
results in Table 5 .12 indicate a statistically insignificant 
relationship between this factor and outcome. 





















While there is some evidence to suggest that mediation may be 
more successful if the mediator has been previously engaged on 
one or two occasions, there is certainly no support for the 
premise of the hypothesis. on the strength of this, we can 
conclude that it makes little difference to the success rate of 
the mediation whether the mediator has had no previous attempts 
at mediating the conflict, or many. 
A second conclusion is to note the usefulness of building an 
index which can more comprehensively test the question of 
mediator experience and skill in a systematic and empirical 
manner. While some of this measurement may have to be somewhat 
subjective in nature, it remains an area rich in theoretical 
literature, but with no substantive systematic empirical 
evidence. 
Hypothesis Ten 
HlO. When both the disputant parties have gained 
understanding of the mediator through a positive 
previous relationship, mediation will be more 
successful than if only one party has this 
understanding, or neither has. 
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This hypothesis represents the mediator dimension to the previous 
relationship question. With Hypothesis Eight the findings 
confirmed the importance of a positive previous relationship 
between the parties for successful mediation, now the concern 
shifts to the relationship that existed prior to the mediation 
between the parties and the mediator. These findings are 
represented in Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13: Mediation Outcome by the Parties' Previous 
Relationship with the Mediator 
No Different Same Bloc Same Bloc 
Previous Bloc as One as Both 
(n=121) (n=2 l) (n=88) (n=49) 
Success(%) 24 29 22 45 
Failure(%) 76 71 78 55 





To examine Hypothesis Ten, the data was coded according to five 
different categories. No previous relations is self explanatory, 
and in practice typically ref erred to obscure mediators from 
regional and international organisations. The categories of blocs 
were taken from the situation which emerged in the international 
system following the Second World War, with The Western Alliance, 
The Soviet Bloc, and the Unaligned Movement. The Mixed category 
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refers to more specialized situations within other categories, 
for example a conflict fought between, and mediated by, 
exclusively Arab or African states. 
The results indicate a number of conclusions which can be made 
pertaining to the previous relationship between the mediator and 
the parties. Perhaps the strongest finding is the clear 
distinction in success rate between the situation when there are 
mixed relationships or both parties are in the same bloc as the 
mediator, and the other alternatives. This supports the 
hypothesis that it is important for the parties to have knowledge 
of the mediator, for the mediation to be successful. When the 
diametrically opposed situation to this exists and there has been 
no previous relationship, the chance of success is drastically 
reduced. 
Frei's (1976:80-81) finding that mediation is unlikely to succeed 
when the previous relationship is unequal (with only one party 
having previous knowledge of the mediator) also receives some 
support from these results, with this situation representing the 
least likely previous relationship to lead to a successful 
mediation. However, this should not be over-stated, given that 
there is only a slight difference between this figure and the 
level of success achieved when there is no previous relationship 
between the parties and the mediator. 
It should be remembered that the situation where the previous 
relationship between the mediator and the parties is unbalanced 
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does not constitute the same situation as mediator bias. The 
mediator may have a preference for either a particular settlement 
option or a particular party, whether all the actors are in the 
same bloc, have no previous relationship, or are in different 
blocs~ The problem is that mediator bias is virtually impossible 
to objectively quantify, and as such the theoretical argument 
that it will not undermine the path to successful mediation must 
stand (For example see Bercovitch (1984:112]; Touval [1982:16]). 
Hypothesis Eleven 
Hll. States will be more successful than 
international organisations at mediating conflicts. 












Figure 5 .14 shows that although there is a considerable variation 
in the mediation success rate achieved by international 
organisations compared to states, unfortunately the results 
narrowly fall short of statistical significance. Perhaps the most 
interesting observation is the very low level of success achieved 
by international organisations. This result can be understood 
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if we remember Frei's contention that the low success rate of 
international organisations can be attributed in part to the type 
of disputes they mediate. He argues that while states may often 
have the luxury of choosing whether or not to mediate, 
international organisations may feel duty bound to mediate 
particularly complex disputes no one else will consider 
{1976:79). 
Hypothesis Twelve 
H12. The greater the size of a state, the more 
successful they will be at mediating disputes. 
The question of mediator size or power was calculated according 
to the same list of scales used to determine party power, and was 
then divided into a simple dichotomy of small or large state 
mediators. The results of this measurement crosstabulated with 
outcome is shown in Table 5.15. 












Clearly, there is no significant relationship between the size 
of a state, and mediation outcome. Interestingly, what variation 
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there is in success rate is contradictory to the premise of 
Hypothesis Twelve, al though there is no reason to emphasise this, 
given the weak statistics. The conclusion must be that the size 
of a state acting as a mediator does not influence the incidence 
of successful mediation. 
Given this null result concerning Hypothesis Twelve, it is worth 
considering whether there is another dimension along which a 
state mediator's influence on outcome can be understood. 
Hypothesis Twelve only takes into account the power of the state 
which the mediator represents. Staying with the concept of 
mediator power, but turning to the position of the individual 
mediator, rather than the state they represent, we explore the 
concept of mediator rank. Theoretically, we would imagine that 
the greater the status, authority and power the mediator has from 
his or her own constituency, then the more successful they will 
be. A mediator possessing high rank would receive more respect 
from the parties, and would be more authoritative in using 
different tactics and strategies. This connection between high 
rank and mediation success is confirmed by the analysis portrayed 
in Table 5.16. 








X2=4.346, DF=l, p=0.037 
state 
leader 




The question of how mediator power influences outcome is best 
understood, it seems, in terms of the rank of an individual 
mediator, rather than the size of the state they represent. Table 
5. 16 demonstrates that when the mediator is the leader of a 
state, they have a 21% better chance of producing a successful 
outcome than when the mediator is simply the represe.ntative of 
a state. This implies that it is the authoritative individuals 
who lead states of any size who should be seen as ideal mediators 
in the international system. Mediator power is important, but 
should be measured on the basis of individual rank, rather than 
on the grounds of representation. 
Hypothesis Thirteen 
H13. A. Mediation initiated by the mediator will 
have less chance of success than if it is initiated by 
the parties in the dispute. 
H13. B. Mediation initiated by the mediator will 
have a better chance of success than if it is 
initiated by one party. 
















As Table 5.17 demonstrates, examining the relationship between 
mediation initiation and mediation outcome reveals little 
empirical support for Hypothesis Thirteen. It is clear that it 
makes negligible difference whether the mediation is initiated 
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by one or all of the parties, or if it is initiated by the 
mediator. Although the hypothesis was contradicted, this ~esult 
is satisfactory because it establishes a precedent in an area 
where the mediation literature had little to say. It also 
suggests that once the mediation is established and in progress, 
details such as who initiated the event become insignificant to 
the nature of the outcome. We can suppose that if the identity 
of the initiator was a hurdle to successful mediation it would 
operate to quash the mediation before it even began, rather than 
causing the unsuccessful conclusion to a progressing mediation. 
Hypothesis Fourteen 
H14. Strategies involving a high level of mediator 
intervention are more likely to produce a successful 
outcome than those of a low intervention level. 
There is a significant relationship between the strategy employed 
by the mediator and the level of success achieved. As suggested 
by the theoretical literature, low intervention mediation 
strategies are the least successful {18% of cases mediated using 
communicative or facilitative strategies are successful), and 
high intervention the most successful {in 36% of cases where 
directive strategies were used). The full range of results is 
presented in Table 5.18. 

















This finding should be viewed in the light of the results of 
Hypotheses Eleven and Twelve. The more successful directive 
strategies need a mediator who has power, both in terms of 
resources and prestige, in order to be implemented. We begin to 
get a picture of successful mediation as a scenario of· power 
politics, with power being used as a commodity to persuade, 
influence and balance the parties in dispute. The conclusion 
which stems from this analysis is that if we want the success 
rate of international mediation enhanced, then mediators must use 
more directive strategies, which in turn may entail more 
involvement by powerful actors in the mediatory role, and more 
resources to be used as incentives for parties to settle. 
Hypothesis Fifteen 
H15. Mediation which takes place in a neutral 
environment will be more likely to succeed than if it 
takes place in an environment which is biased against 
any of the disputant parties. 
The venue at which the mediation occurs represents the final 
factor to be tested in the bivariate analysis. The results of 
this analysis are represented in Table 5.19. 
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Tabie 5.19: Mediation outcome by Environment 
Party A/Party B Mediator's Neutral Composite 
Territory 
(n=44} (n=33} (n=76} (n=123} 
Success(%} 18 52 41 20 
Failure(%} 82 48 59 80 
X2=21.140 I DF=3, p<0.0005 
There is a particularly significant relationship between the 
nature of the environment in which the mediation occurs and the 
outcome of that mediation. As the results demonstrate, mediation 
which takes place in a biased or composite (a combination of the 
different parties, and possibly other actors' territories} 
location has a considerably less chance of being mediated 
successfully than if it takes place in a neutral, or mediator 
controlled environment. 2 
This suggests that mediators should make every effort to base the 
mediation away from the territory controlled by the protagonists, 
and find either a completely unbiased environment, or preferably, 
facilitate the mediation taking place in territory under his or 
her control. Unfortunately, it seems that a large proportion of 
mediation cases take place in either biased or composite arenas 
(64% of n}, a fact which will obviously seriously compromise the 
chances for a successful mediation episode. 
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Conclusion 
Having tested the fifteen hypotheses, we have now progressed to 
the stage where some meaningful conclusions can be drawn as to 
what the most important direct determinants of mediation outcome 
are. The word direct is used to signify that these results only 
reflect bivariate observations, and refer to the singular and 
asymmetric influence that each of the examined factors have on 
outcome. 
Within the variable of the nature of the dispute, the factors 
which have a direct influence on outcome are the complexity of 
the dispute, and the level of fatalities that have occurred in 
the conflict. With regard to the identity and characteristics of 
the parties, these factors are the homogeneity of the parties, 
the power disparity that exists between them, and the nature of 
their previous relations. 
Examining the mediation variables, we find that where the 
identity and characteristics of the mediator are concerned, the 
important factors are the rank of the mediator, and the previous 
relationship between the mediator and the parties. Finally, 
within the mediation strategy variable, both the factors of 
mediation strategy and mediation environment had a significant 
direct influence on the outcome of mediation. These results are 
schematically summarised in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: A Hodel of the Determinants of Mediation outcome. 
1. Nature of the 
Dispute 
2. Identity and 
Characteristics of 
the Parties 







- Party Homogeneity 
- Power Disparity 
- Previous Relations 
- Mediator Rank 
-Previous 
Relationship 




We have now progressed some distance from ·the discussion of 
Chapters One and Two which sought to install some theoretical 
structure on the complexity of the mediation relationship. As 
well as being able to divide the different factors under four 
variable headings, we can now see which of those factors are 
influential in determining the nature of the outcome. This has 
also produced a degree of predictive ability to our understanding 
of mediation. 
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Mediation is most likely to produce a successful outcome when the 
following conditions are meet: (a) When the conflict is not 
complex (for example one rather than multiple issues); (b) When 
there have been less than 500 fatalities in the dispute; (c) When 
both the protagonists are homogeneous in nature; (d) When there 
is no power disparity between the partie~; (e) When the parties 
have enjoyed friendly previous relations; (f) When the mediator 
is the leader of a state; (g) When the parties and the mediator 
have had previous relations; (h) When the mediator uses high 
intervention level strategies (for example directive strategies); 
and (i) When the mediation is sited at a venue which is either 
neutral, or is completely under the mediator's control. 
Naturally we would not expect any mediation relationship to 
completely fulfil all these conditions. In conjunction they 
represent the ultimate in terms of likelihood of mediation 
success. In reality it would be expected that a particular 
mediation situation will meet some of these criteria in full, 
some in part, and some not at all. This leads to the 
consideration of which variables will be most important in 
determining the nature of the outcome, a question which the 
bivariate analysis is unable to answer. Furthermore, there is the 
consideration of how the above variables, and indeed those 
variables which do not have a direct influence on outcome, 
interact. We have seen that some factors have direct significance 
to outcome, and some do not. Now it is time to discover the way 
different factors influence each other in the creation of an 
outcome, and which are the principal players in this interaction. 
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Endnotes 
1. Separating the issues into tangible or intangible 
classifications is consistent with the approach of Moore who 
makes the distinction between "Consensual or Interest-Based 
Conflict," and "Dissensual or Value-Based Conflict" (1986:174). 
2. Because the environment of the mediation is a factor which 
is one of the last variables to be decided before a mediation 
outcome is produced, we should be aware of the problems of 
causality associated with it. For example it may be that a 
conflict which meets many of the other conditions associated with 
success from the nature of the dispute and identity and 
characteristics of the parties variables, will be far more likely 
to choose a neutral environment for their mediation. In this case 
the success of the mediation is associated to a much greater 
extent with these earlier factors rather than the factor of 
mediation environment, which was only a small part of determining 
success. This problem of causality is indicative of the nature 
of bivariate analysis, which by definition looks exclusively at 
the relationship of only two variables, excluding all other 
influences. It is this fact which gives the imperative to the 
more complex multivariate analysis of Chapter Six. 
Introduction 
Chapter Six: 
A Multivariate Understanding 
of Mediation Outcome 
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Bivariate analysis has its limitations. Although it is crucial 
to determine the individual impact of a factor on the outcome of 
a mediation, there is a degree of artificiality in such 
isolation. In reality, the mediation scenario is a series of 
interwoven relationships, with many of the factors isolated for 
the sake of bivariate analysis actually relating to each other, 
in the process of contributing to the nature of the outcome. 
we need to discover a means by which to represent, and 
empirically examine, the interactive effects which represent the 





as in the 
notable only 
mediation literature 
for its virtual non-
existence. Nevertheless, several authors have mentioned the need 
for this advance to be made. Wall (1981:171-2) describes the need 
for researchers to test the combination of different factors 
within the particular variable of mediation strategy. On a more 
general level, the undertaking to examine the relationship 
between different variables in the mediation scenario, and the 
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consequent impact on outcome, can be seen as a response to Frei's 
admission that the results of his empirical study: 
••• refer to bivariate observations only; no doubt a 
multivariate approach might considerably refine these 
findings (1976:82). 
Therefore, the task is clear; to build and to examine empirically 
a model which represents the interactive relationship between the 
central determinants of mediation outcome, and the outcome 
itself. 
This model will be built through a two-phase process. The first 
step is to examine the interactive effect amongst the factors of 
each of the individual four variables which order our 
understanding of the mediation relationship. This intra-variable 
analysis will discover how the different factors which describe 
for example, the nature of the dispute, interact to determine the 
effect that particular variable has on the mediation outcome. 
Within this analysis, there are two particular effects which 
influence mediation outcome. The first are direct effects which 
refer to a single link between a particular factor and outcome. 
These are similar to the bivariate links, except that with 
multivariate analysis, all the other factors are simultaneously 
being taken into account. The second effect is an indirect 
effect, which is when a factor contributes to the nature of 
another factor, which in turn has a direct relationship with the 
mediation outcome. Thus there are two or more steps between the 
factor and mediation outcome. 
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It is important to note here that this analysis will include all 
the factors which were derived as being theoretically important 
in Chapters Three and Four. Al though not all of these were 
significant in the bivariate analysis, it could be that they have 
important indirect effects by operating through other factors to 
contribu:te to the form of the mediation outcome. The crosstabular 
exercises which constituted the bivariate analysis simply 
determine the relationship between the independent variable and 
the dependent variable, to the exclusion of everything else. With 
the empirical techniques of multi variate analysis, the 
significance of all the factors are simultaneously included in 
every relationship, a fact which alters the picture considerably. 
Some variables which were significant to outcome when isolated 
in bivariate analysis may become less important with a 
multivariate calculation, while others which were previously 
insignificant may be included in important indirect relationships 
with outcome. 
The second phase of multivariate analysis is to determine the 
interaction between all the four different variables. This can 
be described as inter-variable analysis. This step seeks to draw 
out the most significant interactions in the mediation 
relationship, demonstrating how the key factors from across the 
entire mediation scenario interact to determine the mediation 
outcome. However, before this two-step process can begin, it is 
important to understand the statistical procedure which will be 
employed in this analysis. 
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Methodology of Multivariate Analysis 
The statistical technique necessary for multivariate analysis is 
one which will allow us to examine the relationship between a 
dependent variable (mediation outcome} and independent variables, 
when the data employed is nominal or ordinal in nature. Because 
the mediation correlates which form the empirical base for this 
research are a mixture of nominal and ordinal data, traditional 
methods of multivariate analysis such as multiple linear 
regression (which requires at least some of the data to be 
interval, or rank ordered with numerical precision} are 
inappropriate for use (Reynolds 1977:57). 
The statistical technique which will allow categorical data 
analysis of nominal and ordinal level variables is a method known 
as log-linear modelling. While it is inappropriate here to enter 
into an in depth discussion of the numerical and statistical 
theory which underpins this method• 1 a basic understanding of how 
it operates is useful. 
In the simplest terms, log-linear analysis examines the 
relationship between a specified number of factors (called the 
parameters}, and calculates which of these factors, and 
combination of these factors, have the most significant influence 
in determining the distribution of cases within the data. Each 
parameter (or factor in our terminology) has specified categories 
or values which form the alternatives into which the data can 
fall. When log-linear analysis is employed, it calculates the 
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likelihood ratio of any case falling into a given combination of 
the categories. 
Within the general technique of log-linear analysis, this study 
will employ two specific methods in order to discover the intra-
variable and inter-variable relationships in the mediation 
scenario. The first of these is hiloglinear analysis, which is 
a model building technique to discover the most parsimonious 
description of the interaction between the specified factors. 
Initially a simple association test is run, to measure the 
significance of every full and partial association between the 
factors. From those associations that are statistically valid, 
a model is constructed. From this stipulated model the 
hiloglinear technique will calculate the likelihood ratio of any 
particular mediation case from the data-set falling into the 
combination of the categories entailed in the stipulated model. 
The "goodness of fit" of the model is calculated by hiloglinear 
comparing how the observed distribution of all the cases matches 
the distribution predicted by the model. It should be noted that 
there is no directionality in the hiloglinear model, it simply 
measures the associations between the parameters, with none 
specified as either dependent or independent. 
The second method to be employed is legit analysis, which builds 
on the hiloglinear model, but develops it by making one of the 
parameters a dependent variable to which the other parameters 
contribute. In the case of this study the specified dependent 
variable is mediation outcome, and the consequential logit 
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analysis will test the ability of different models to predict the 
likelihood of successful mediation. The logit model is different 
to the hiloglinear model in that it eliminates factors or 
combinations of factors which do not include the dependent 
parameter. 
For both the hiloglinear and logit models, there are two 
statistical measurements worth noting. The first of these is the 
goodness-of-fit {G2 ) , measured by the likelihood ratio chi-
square, which should converge toward zero {Agresti 19 9 O : 4 3 4) . The 
second measurement is the overall significance {p) of the model, 
which tends towards 1. 
The use of categorical data techniques for building models is a 
process of combining deductive and inductive research in 
sequence. From our theoretical understanding of mediation, it is 
possible to deduce relationships between different factors and 
conditions in the mediation relationship, and to build these into 
a theoretically valid multivariate model. The log-log-linear 
method will then examine this model, and provide statistics 
concerning its goodness-of-fit and significance. To find the most 
parsimonious model, different combinations of the parameters may 
be experimented with, with the best possible model being adopted 
at the conclusion of the analysis. This expression can then be 
interpreted theoretically and schematically as the multivariate 
model of the relationship between the parameters. 
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The format of the remainder of this chapter is a discussion on 
empirical analysis of each of the four variables: (a) nature of 
the dispute, (b) identity and characteristics of the parties, (c) 
identity and characteristics of the mediator, and (d) mediation 
strategy. The aim is to develop a legit model for each (which, 
by implication, entails prior hiloglinear analys,is) • As the 
conclusion to this, a legit model will be developed which draws 
from the legit models from each of the four variables, and as 
such represents the interaction of the most significant 
determinants of mediation outcome. 
Intra-Variable Multivariate Analysis 
Due to the complexity of the log-linear method, and the extremely 
large quantity of data which accrues from the employment of these 
techniques, it is impossible to include all this material in 
text. Provided here are the schematic interpretations of the 
hiloglinear and legit models generated, and their G2 and p 
values. Further details of how these models were derived are 
summarised in Appendices Two through Six. 
The Nature of the Dispute 
The parameters for the variable of dispute nature are: the 
outcome of the mediation, the nature of the issues in the 
dispute, the level of fatalities, the timing of the mediation, 
and the complexity of the conflict (see Appendix Two). The most 
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parsimonious model generated by the hiloglinear process is 
represented in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Interactive Effects of the Nature of the Dispute 
Timing 
Issue Complexity Outcome 
Fatalities. 
This interactive effects model has a slightly high goodness of 
fit (G2=32.097), but an excellent significance reading of 
p=0.952. Interpreting this model theoretically, we can see that 
it has considerable descriptive power. The complexity of a 
conflict plays a central role in the nature of the dispute 
variable, being important to when the mediation takes place, the 
number of fatalities, and is obviously connected to what the 
nature of the primary issue is. We can also theorise that the 
timing of the mediation will have an effect on the complexity of 
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the dispute as mediation initiated early would give little time 
for the issue base to widen. With regard to relationships with 
outcome, the fatalities and complexities factors have direct 
relationships, and can be expected to feature prominently in the 
legit model of the nature of the dispute variable. 




The statistics for this model show an excellent goodness of fit 
score (G2=9.210) and a reasonable significance value of p=0.677. 
Figure 6.2 represents the important influences on outcome from 
the nature of the dispute, and confirms some of our hypotheses. 
Fatalities and complexity do have a direct effect on outcome, but 
they are also joined by timing of the intervention. This 
demonstrates the importance of running log-linear analysis on the 
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determinants of outcome, as timing did not show as a significant 
factor in either the initial bivariate tests, or the interactive 
effects. The significant indirect effect of duration on 
complexity confirms that the number of issues will be affected 
by how early or late the mediation takes place. For example, a 
territorial conflict which has been fought for a protracted 
period is likely to have moved on from being a single issue 
dispute over territory, and will have developed an ideological 
slant as the parties begin to polarise into close-knit groups and 
stereotype their opponents. The empirical finding leads to the 
conclusion that mediation success, which is enhanced when the 
dispute is simple, will obviously be enhanced further when 
mediation is initiated at a certain point in the dispute when 
complexity will be minimised. Although the bivariate analysis 
failed to provide significant statistics on this, there was some 
indication that some period after 24 months of the dispute would 
be optimum. 
The Identity and Characteristics of the Parties 
The parameters of the analysis on the identity and 
characteristics of the parties are: the homogeneity of the 
parties, the total mediation power, the number of parties, the 
power disparity between the parties, the previous relations 
between the parties, and mediation outcome (see Appendix Three). 
Figure 6.3: Interactive Effects of the Identity and 
Characteristics of the Parties 








The goodness-of-fit (G2=40.254) shows this is a rather poor 
fitting hiloglinear model, however the significance (p=0.836) is 
very good. We can confirm that both the party homogeneity and 
previous relations factors maintain their strong direct ties to 
outcome discovered in the bivariate analysis, although power 
disparity now only links indirectly through homogeneity. The 
homogeneity of a party will affect its power; a state divided 
against itself will not be able to concentrate all its resources 
to an external conflict, and hence the difference in homogeneity 
will have a resultant impact on the relative power of the 
protagonists. 
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Explaining the model further, there is a relationship between the 
total number of parties and the power disparity which arises from 
the fact that one side may have allies while the other does not, 
invoking a "two-against-one" type scenario. Finally we can 
hypothesise that the previous relations of the parties will 
affect the total number o~ parties. If the previous relations 
have been positive, it is more likely the protagonists will limit 
the conflict purely to themselves. However, if there has been a 
history of negative relations between the parties, it is possible 
that blocs of parties will have formed, which are subsequently 
drawn into the dispute. 
It is interesting to note that the relationships in which the 
variables of homogeneity and previous relations are involved 
(apart from their impact on outcome) theoretically supposes them 
to act as independent variables, meaning that when we test f.or 
impact on outcome, it is to be expected that these relationships 
will not be involved. This is confirmed in Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4: The Identity and Characteristics of the Parties 






The most parsimonious model of how the identity and 
characteristics of the parties influences the outcome of 
mediation is simple in nature, with two direct effects on outcome 
from the homogeneity of the parties, and their previous 
relationship. Statistically this relationship has an excellent 
goodness of fit (G2=0.678) but a poor significance of p=0.410. 
The Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator 
In addition to mediation outcome, the parameters for the variable 
of the identity and characteristics of the mediator are: the 
mediator's previous experience in this particular dispute, the 
previous relationship between the parties and the mediator, the 
mediator's rank, and the mediation initiation (or identity of the 
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initiator) (see Appendix Four). In the bivariate analysis the 
experience was that only the variables of mediator rank and the 
parties' previous relations with the mediator had significant 
relationships with the mediation outcome, and even these 
relationships were not particularly strong. 
This experience is reinforced by the results of the hiloglinear 
test. As Figure 6. 5 depicts, there is no interactive relationship 
between the factors from this variable and mediation outcome. 
Figure 6.5: Interactive Effects of the Identity and 








While the statistical strength of this model is disappointing 
(G2=39.854, p=0.388), the wider theoretical suggestions of this 
finding are substantial. It is indicated that the mediator's rank 
will affect the previous relationship between the parties and the 
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mediator, and that the previous relationship will affect which 
actor initiates mediation. 
Both of these relationships make theoretical sense; a highly 
ranked mediator is likely to be widely recognised and known in 
the international system. Similarly, when the parties and the 
mediator have had previous relations, it is more likely the 
mediator will offer his or her services as an intermediary. 
However, none of this will directly influence the success rate 
of the mediation. Obviously this finding precludes the need to 
run a legit examination on this variable, and leads to the 
conclusion that the contribution of the mediator to the mediation 
outcome will only be through his or her impact on the variables 
which pertain to the dispute, the parties, and the mediation 
strategy. This observation helps to clear the disagreement 
discovered in Chapter Four between the views of Ott (1972) and 
Young (1967), over the direct importance of the identity and 
characteristics of the mediator to mediation outcome. While 
statistically weak, the findings do at least indicate that Ott 
is correct in his assertion that this variable will only be of 
"marginal" importance to outcome (1972:597). 
Mediation Strategy 
In addition to mediation outcome there are only two parameters 
for log-linear analysis of the variable of mediation strategy: 
the actual strategy, and the environment of the mediation (see 
Appendix Five). Because both of these parameters have 
demonstrated strong relationships with outcome in the bivariate 
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analysis, we can expect a model which emphasises these direct 
links. It is also possible to theoretically suggest a 
relationship between the environment of the mediation and the 
strategy used by the mediator. When the mediator has complete 
controi over the environment, for example when it takes place in 
his or her territory, it would be more likely to be able to 
employ, and have accepted, the more directive strategies. 




As Figure 6.6 demonstrates, our expectations are confirmed with 
regard to both the mediation strategy factors having an 
interactive relationship with outcome. However, it is interesting 
to note that there is no relationship at all between the 
environment of the mediation and mediation strategy. It seems 
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that the mediator's behaviour is dictated by factors other than 
the location of the conflict management attempt. 
The statistics of this model show a particularly poor 
significance value (p=0.233), although a satisfactory goodness 
of fit reading (G2=10.480). We would expect that the legit model 
would be considerably more parsimonious than this as the 
interactive relationship strongly implies the separate, and 
direct causal relationship between these two factors and 
mediation outcome. 




The goodness of fit for this model is substantially improved 
(G2=3.521) while the significance score, while still low, is a 
more satisfactory p=0.475. Although the statistical significance 
precludes strong conclusions, the implication from the analysis 
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of the mediation strategy variable is that while both of its 
factors are involved in determining mediation outcome, their 
influence is felt purely through direct effects. 
Inter-variable Multivariate Analysis: Theory and Practice 
Introduction 
Now that we have discovered the interactive effects which lead 
to outcome in the four variable areas of nature of the dispute, 
identity and characteristics of the parties, identity and 
characteristics of the mediator and mediation strategy, it is 
time to put the different components together. The resultant 
model will represent the interaction of the central determinants 
of mediation outcome. However, before this empirical process can 
be performed, it is important to understand the theoretical basis 
for such a move. 
Toward a Theory of Mediation 
A theoretical understanding of the manner in which the different 
factors and variables in the mediation relationship interact to 
determine outcome does not exist. Any isolated suggestions made 
in the mediation literature have no empirical basis to support 
them. What this section will do is to draw together some of these 
ideas, incorporating their common threads to determine how the 
interactive effects of the mediation relationship may operate to 
determine outcome. 
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Beginning with an observation which receives unanimous support 
in the literature, we determine that mediation is a dynamic 
process (Jones 1988:470). Also important is that all mediation 
cases must have an outcome, be it a failure, or some different 
level of success. Finally, we have four distinct variables which 
categorise the various factors wpich create the mediation 
relationship. Thus there are inputs, a dynamic and interactive 
process, and an output in the form of a mediation outcome. It is 
on this framework that all multivariate analyses are built. 
One form this analyses has taken is the phase theory, or phase 
structure approach. This body of thought seeks to explain a 
mediation (or originally negotiation) outcome as the result of 
a series of phases that the parties move through with the 
assistance of the mediator. For example, discussing divorce 
mediation, Jones writes that agreement mediation: 
•.• may involve at least three phases: (a) an agenda-
building and information-exchange phase, (b) a phase 
in which a negotiation range is identified and the 
presentation and evaluation of potential solutions 
ensue, and (c) a resolution phase involving the 
formation of a final agreement and a discussion of its 
implications (1988:474). 
Jones's summary is based largely on the developmental model of 
negotiation constructed by Gulliver (1979), which identified up 
to seven stages through which a negotiation passes over time. 
Indeed it is Gulliver who goes on to explain how the mediator 
enters the negotiation and through his or her behaviour: 
•.. throughout or in certain phases, acts in some way 
to assist in the endeavour to reach an agreed outcome 
(1979:209). 
Gulliver explains the interactive effects of the mediation (or 
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negotiation) relationship as a series of phases through which the 
parties move, assisted by the mediator, towards the goal of an 
outcome. Each phase is reached through a unique combination of 
different interactions between the parties, the mediator, the 
nature of the conflict, and the process of the mediation. Perhaps 
the most appropriate analogy of this theory is that of a journey, 
which begins at one location and progresses through different 
environments before eventually arriving at the ultimate 
destination. 
A second approach to multivariate analysis is the contingency 
approach developed by Bercovitch (1991). In this model, mediation 
outcome is contingent upon the dyadic interaction between 
contextual and process variable clusters. The original contextual 
variables describing the dispute, the parties and the mediator 
are modified by the mediator's behaviour in a cause-effect 
relationship ·which ultimately determines the nature of the 
outcome. This interaction is schematically represented in Figure 
6.8 below. 
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Figura 6.8: The Contingency Approach to Mediation outcome 





The contingency approach implies that the mediator's behaviour 
(or mediation strategy variable as used in this study) is the 
catalytic force which will interact with factors and conditions 
existing prior to mediation occurring (for example, the dispute 
issues or the number of parties involved) and through this 
relationship initiate a process which will ultimately result in 
mediation outcome. Rather than a journey from one location to 
another, a contingency approach implies a reciprocal influence 
relationship which continues until either the relationship breaks 
down, or the necessary conditions for a successful conclusion are 
developed. 
Is mediation a journey through phases, or is it a cause-effect 
relationship between contextual and process variables? Indeed, 
these are not the only options; it may be that the bivariate 
model which was developed in earlier stages of this study, and 
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was seen as a intermediate stage on the way to a multivariate 
understanding of mediation, is in fact the most satisfactory 
portrayal of the determination of mediation outcome. It may be 
that mediation is simply a melting pot of variables and factors 
which, cast together, interact at random in a manner too complex 
to be simplified by multivariate analysis. Simkin argues that the 
variables which describe the interactive process of mediation: 
are so many that it would be an exercise in 
futility to attempt to describe typical mediator 
behaviour with respect to sequence, timing, or the use 
or non-use of the various functions theoretically 
available {1971:118). 
Faced with these choices, it is inappropriate to deduce specific 
hypotheses from what little theory exists on interactive models 
of mediation. Consistent with the approach of Jones (1988), the 
emphasis shifts to a more exploratory stance, whereby the data 
is examined in order to provide answers rather than to confirm 
or deny hypotheses. In the next section we move to determining 
the exact nature of the interactive effects in the mediation 
relationship which are the principal determinants of the outcome. 
The Multivariate Model 
The original bivariate model of mediation developed in Chapters 
Three and Four, included 15 factors which theoretically influence 
mediation outcome. 2 Through the logi t analysis of the four 
variables described above, this has been reduced to 7 factors 
which have important direct and indirect relationships with 
mediation outcome. These influences are: the timing of the 
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mediation, the complexity of the dispute, the number of 
fatalities, the homogeneity of the parties, the previous 
relations of the parties, the mediation strategy, and the 
mediation environment (see Appendix Six). Because all of these 
factors, with the exception of mediation timing, were 
individually significant in their crosstabulation with mediation 
outcome in bivariate analysis, we can hypothesise that whatever 
final model is achieved, it will include a high number of direct 
effects between the individual parameters and outcome. 
Figure 6.9 represents the optimal model of the key determinants 
of mediation outcome. It is this combination of parameters which 
represents the most parsimonious predicator of mediation outcome. 
The statistics are dramatically good, with the goodness of fit 
being very low (G2=0.255), and the significance value 
particularly high (p=0.993). 







We can see that the suspicion of a high number of direct effects 
is confirmed, with each of the parameters of complexity, 
environment, and the parties' previous relations having 
significant direct relationships with mediation outcome. 
Confirmed by the bivariate analysis, mediation has the most 
chance of succeeding when mediation occurs in a simple dispute, 
at a neutral environment, between parties who have previously 
enjoyed positive relations. 
In terms of the indirect effects, we can see the importance of 
dispute complexity to the model. Looking exclusively at the 
relationship between previous relations and complexity, 93% of 
disputes between parties with negative previous relations are 
moderately or highly complex in nature. However, if the previous 
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relationship was positive, this figure is only 43%. We can 
suggest that positive previous relations will be likely to 
simplify the number of issues contemplated at the mediation, and 
hence enhance the probability of successful mediation. Previously 
friendly disputants will have less tendency to broaden the issue 
base, for example developing intangible issues such as 
ideological conflict through a dispute over territory. 
With regard to the second indirect effect between complexity and 
environment, there is a strong relationship between complex 
disputes being mediated at a non-neutral venue, and simple 
disputes at a neutral one. 70% of all complex disputes are 
mediated in non-neutral environments, however if the dispute is 
simple, this figure falls to 44%. In conflicts where there are 
both tangible and intangible issues, the parties will be 
completely absorbed in the dispute, and will typically have 
highly hostile perceptions of their opponents. Because of this, 
it is likely they will be less willing to make the effort to 
initiate or attend a mediation in a neutral environment. However, 
these problems will be minimised if the dispute is being fought 
over a single issue. 
A Theory of Mediation Revisited 
considering the best theoretical representation of how the 
mediation relationship proceeds, and how an outcome is produced, 
the above model sheds some interesting light. The two indirect 
effects of parties' previous relations on complexity, and 
complexity on environment, as well as the fact that all these 
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parameters have significant direct effects on mediation outcome, 
tend to discount the idea of mediation being a series of phases. 
The emphasis is more on a simultaneous interaction of the 
independent variables on each other and on the dependent outcome, 
than on a series of steps from an initial starting point to a 
finishing point. 
However, the representation of the contingency model is also 
somewhat unsatisfactory. The implication that the process 
component of the model is something of a secondary catalyst, with 
outcome stemming from its interaction with the contextual 
variables, is not reinforced by the model. This is demonstrated 
through the direct effects of two contextual variables 
(complexity and the parties' previous relations) on outcome. 
Mediation, it seems, is better represented as an interaction 
between the contextual and process variables whose impact on 
mediation outcome should be measured both as the result of the 
entire interaction, and as a result of the individual impact of 
certain variables. 
We should remember that not all the contextual variables have a 
direct impact on outcome. As the preceding discussion has 
demonstrated, the identity and characteristics of the mediator 
have no direct impact on outcome when considered in multivariate 
analysis. We must assume that this variable simply has 
interactive effects with the other variables in the mediation 
relationship, rather than any direct influence on outcome. 
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To summarise, mediation outcome is best described as being the 
result of two effects. The first of these is the direct influence 
of three individual variables: the nature of the dispute, the 
identity and characteristics of the parties, and mediation 
strategy. These relationships were demonstrated in Figure 6.9 by 
the direct effect on outcome from complexity (a nature pf the 
dispute factor), the parties' previous relations (an identity and 
characteristics of the parties factor), and environment (a 
mediation strategy factor) . The second effect is from the 
interaction of these variables, with each other, and with the 
variable of the mediator's identity and characteristics. This was 
demonstrated by the indirect effects of the model in Figure 6.9, 
and by the fact that the mediator will obviously influence the 
mediation relationship through deciding both when and how to 
intervene. Mediation outcome can still be described in terms of 
being contingent upon the impact of certain variables, however 
as Figure 6.10 demonstrates, the model has been considerably 
modified and expanded. 
Figure 6.10: The Modified Contingency Model of Mediation 
A. First Effect 
The Nature of the Dispute 
Mediation Strategy 




9.°////////. W/////////< :!'////~'/////////~ 
~ Identity and ~ ~ Identity and ~ 
~ Characteristics ~ ~ Characteristics ~ 1-------11.,. 
::; of the Mediator % . ~ of the Parties % 
~/////////.~jl"////////2 ~/////////.I.: jl"///////h 
::r////////. :)"//////////,<! 
r. ::; 
% Mediation ~ 






It is interesting to note that in essence this model is a 
combination of aspects of both the original bivariate theory, and 
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the interactive relationships derived through multivariate 
analysis. 
Conclusion 
The lessons from multivariate analysis are substantial, and refer 
not only to the actual findings and their contribution to our 
understanding of mediation, but also to the methods used. Log-
linear methods of multivariate analysis, with their ability to 
operate with nominal and ordinal data, represent something of a 
breakthrough for the social science researcher employing 
systematic empirical techniques. This study has demonstrated the 
considerable potential that exists to broaden our understanding 
of social phenomena such as mediation, through marrying 
categorical data analysis with empirically based research. 
This said, it would be wrong to look upon multivariate analysis 
as the be-all and end-all of mediation research. The findings of 
categorical data analysis are only as good as the data used, and 
the theoretical understanding which precedes it. Chapter Six has 
adopted an explorative and somewhat adventurous stance, 
incorporating the relatively new technique of log-linear analysis 
into the field of empirically based mediation research. 
Nevertheless, several very important findings have accrued from 
this study which deserve to be emphasised. The derivation of a 
model of the central determinants of mediation outcome represents 
the empirical cumulation of this study, and is an exciting 
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precedent. We can now say with some certainty that the success 
or failure of mediation is principally dependent on the 
interaction of three key factors: the parties previous 
relationship, the complexity of the dispute, and the environment 
of the mediation. 
Finally, the implications of these findings for a theoretical 
depiction of the mediation relationship represent the ultimate 
aim of empirical research; to place the findings back into the 
theoretical paradigm. The conclusion here is that the path to 
mediation outcome is most accurately described in both 
multivariate and bivariate terms, with contributions by both an 
interactive process between the four variables which describe the 
mediation relationship, and the direct effect of the nature of 
the dispute, the identity and characteristics of the parties, and 
the mediation strategy. This progression from the content of 
Figure 6.9 to that of Figure 6.10 is a significant and satisfying 
one. Figure 6. 9 represents the cumulation of the empirical 
analysis of this study, and makes considerable progress beyond 
previous understanding of the mediation relationship. That this 
advance can be readily incorporated into the refined contingency 
model of Figure 6.10, and build on the (admittedly few) previous 
attempts to model how an outcome is produced through the 
mediation relationship, reflects both the validity and usefulness 
of these findings. 
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Endnotes 
1. For an explanation of the log-linear method see Agresti 
(1990); Hildebrand, Laing and Rosenthal (1977); Knoke and Burke 
(1980); Reynolds (1977). 
2. It is impossible to test all 15 factors using log-linear 
techniques as the system only allows for up to ten variables to 
be stipulated. Because of this there is a significant hurdle in 
the way of modelling the entire mediation relationship, rather 
than just concentrating on the specific task of the determinants 
of outcome. Even if all the factors could be included, the 
complex interaction of numerous factors and variables which 
characterise the mediation relationship would quickly produce so 
many significant associations that such empiricism would serve 
only to confuse rather than enlighten. For example, examining the 
interactive effects among 6 of the parameters from the nature of 
the dispute, and the identity and characteristics of the parties, 
12 significant interactive effects with a p value of <0.050 were 
discovered. Obviously, mediation is characterised by the 





The aim of this study has been to discover, through combining the 
resources of theory with empirical methods, the factors and 
conditions which determine mediation outcome. These influences 
have now been identified, and form a significant conclusion to 
the research. However, the very path of analysis used to discover 
these factors has illuminated other observations and conclusions 
on the subject of mediation, its existence as a field of academic 
study, and its place in international conflict management. 
This study has followed a logical path; starting with the general 
question of mediation in the international system, discussing the 
field of mediation research, understanding mediation outcomes and 
how to classify them, moving to the area of determinants of 
outcome on a theoretical level, and then finally testing and 
expanding this theory using empirical resources. Through this 
progression it has been possible to achieve an overview of many 
of the questions and issues facing mediation research today. Each 
of these areas serve as themes for mediation research; the 
question of the role of mediation, its effectiveness, how it 
should be understood and evaluated, and perhaps most importantly, 
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how it could be improved as a practical means of conflict 
management. 
This concluding chapter will examine these different themes, 
drawing on the lessons learnt from the preceding analysis. 
Accordingly, the approach Will be two-pronged in nature, (a} to 
review what has been accomplished in this study, and (b) to 
discuss prescriptively the implications of this both to the field 
of mediation research, and also to the wider concern of 
international conflict management. 
Mediation Research: Building a Better Understanding 
Mediation is a complex and dynamic social process. The task of 
mediation research is to unlock the secrets of how it operates; 
to build understanding as to how mediation proceeds, and to learn 
why it succeeds or fails. Through the establishment of this 
knowledge, and its dissemination into the world of the mediation 
practitioner, we can ultimately hope that the ability of 
mediators to manage disputes peacefully and successfully will be 
enhanced. 
Consequently, there is a need to approach mediation research 
methods critically: any particular method adopted for a study in 
this field is only as good as its contribution to our 
understanding of mediation. The more analysis a research exercise 
permits, and the more certain and applicable its findings, then 
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the greater its usefulness. Extending this further, the research 
method adopted must be able to use existing theory as its 
foundation, and must be able to produce results which can be 
readily reincorporated into the wider body of knowledge in the 
mediation field. It must work to either confirm or deny previous 
propositions in the mediation literature, or it must break new 
ground to widen and deepen the realms of mediation theory. 
The systematic empirical method provides a means through which 
these ideals can be achieved. In Chapter One different research 
methods were discussed and the systematic empirical method was 
championed for having certain advantages: namely, the ability to 
draw conclusions based on statistically significant empirical 
results; the fact that all the data is systematically drawn from 
actual occurrences of international conflict and its management; 
and finally because it represented a research method which while 
being imaginative, rigorous, and powerful, also permitted the 
formation of data in a manner which was relatively economical. 
Now that the conclusion stage has been reached, having come full-
circle with this technique, there are other advantages of this 
method which have been demonstrated by the research here. The 
first of these is the enormous potential that exists when the 
data supplied by the systematic empirical approach is married 
with computer-based statistical techniques. The bivariate 
analysis of Chapter Five, and especially the multivariate 
analysis of Chapter Six demonstrate this. Through ongoing 
refinement of methods, and the exciting possibilities provided 
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by computer technology, the usefulness of empirical techniques 
in the field of mediation research can only be enhanced. 
A second strength of the systematic empirical approach 
demonstrated by this study is the way in which the data provided 
can.be operationalised according to the large field. of theory 
which exists concerning mediation. For example, the mediation 
literature suggests numerous linkages between certain factors in 
the mediation relationship and a successful or failed outcome. 
These premises can be readily examined using an empirically based 
method when the factors, and the outcome, are stringently coded 
values. These findings can be subsequently re-positioned into the 
literature as basic evidence for the reliability or otherwise of 
theoretical suggestions. 
The results of Chapters Five and Six represent the final evidence 
concerning the usefulness of the systematic empirical technique. 
Because the data upon which the empiricism is based is from 
factual conflict and mediation situations, conclusions can be 
made with the certainty that they are backed with statistically 
significant relationships. 
The Mediation Relationship: Findings and Conclusions 
In the following section the findings of this study will be 
reviewed regarding not only the results of the theoretical and 
empirical analysis of Chapters Three to Six, but also the 
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conclusions reached in Chapter Two concerning the evaluation and 
classification of mediation outcomes. 
The Mediation Outcome 
One of the hindrances to the building of a sophisticated and 
universal literature of mediation ha.s been the definitional 
anomalies that have existed amongst various theorists. There is 
certainly a case to argue for a common set of parameters to be 
established so as to provide some basis which future research 
can share, and hence avoid wasting effort on the creation of 
unique definitions for each individual study. 
Nowhere is this diversity of parameters more evident than in the 
definition of mediation outcome. As arguably the most difficult, 
but certainly the most important definitional task, it is an area 
which has been approached by numerous theorists, from almost 
every perspective. Chapter Two addressed this question of 
defining and classifying mediation outcome with the argument that 
all the various approaches can be simplified into two camps, 
those which favour a subjective approach, and those which use an 
objective criteria. The conclusion of this review was that while 
subjective evaluations provided potentially more sophisticated 
and revealing measurements of outcome, their usage was frqught 
with complications. Because of these difficulties, and because 
of certain attractions of an objective measurement of outcome, 
it was a form of behaviourial measurement which was chosen for 
the subsequent research. As well as being able to overcome the 
inherent problems associated with subjectivity, an objective 
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approach is able to provide simple and available classifications 
of outcome in a manner which is versatile and readily 
operationalisable for the empirical researcher. Generally 
speaking these arguments have been sustained by the experiences 
of this study, and the objective scale employed has provided a 
useful yardstick for both theoretical and empirical measurement. 
Nevertheless, we should not consider the search for an ultimate 
outcome definition has ended. It remains an area where there is 
a clear necessity for future research. 
one area which in particular demands attention is the question 
of longitudinal studies of outcome. Kressel and Pruitt discuss 
the need for such studies to address the question of how certain 
conditions in the mediation relationship (and in particular 
mediator behaviour) affect the durability of an outcome over time 
(1989:420). Such studies would be likely to require some 
integration of objective criteria with subjective elements of 
party perception and changing opinion over time, and could lead 
to the development of an enhanced definition of mediation 
outcome. 
Stemming from this is the need to resolve the problem of when to 
assess an outcome from any perspective. This study has taken the 
approach of making the classification at the conclusion of the 
mediation. However, partial settlement in the form of a ceasefire 
may be broken soon afterwards, and even full settlement may only 
represent an end to violent behaviour, not a resolution of 
underlying animosity which may continue and eventually lead to 
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further overt conflict. Conversely, what appears at first.to only 
be a temporary ceasefire may within time grow into a peace 
settlement with no return to violent behaviour. Clearly there is 
a need for future research to investigate methods whereby an 
outcome is monitored over a period of time to modify, if 
necessary, a .classification and evaluation made immediately 
following the mediation case. 
Finally, there is the consideration of the classification of 
success and failure within an objective perspective. This study 
adopted the nomenclature which included four points: failure, two 
levels of partial success (ceasefire and agreement to continue 
efforts to manage the dispute) , and success, defined as a 
settlement or agreement between the parties. 
What needs to be considered is whether this taxonomy is either 
too stringent, or too lax. For example Frei suggests the 
definition that a successful mediation occurs when 
••. both parties to a conflict formally or informally 
accept a mediator and a mediative attempt within five 
days after the first attempt (1976:64). 
This is certainly a more relaxed definition than the one adopted 
for this study, being more inclusive and accommodating than even 
the partial settlement measurement . of ceasefire. While it 
certainly has the appearance of being unrealistically 
accommodating, Frei's definition is interesting for the contrast 
it provides to the definitions used in this study. Moreover, its 
dichotomous nature (rather than a four part continuum) raises 
further questions, especially considering it was desirable for 
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the empirical research of Chapters Five and Six to collapse the 
different degrees of success down into one variable so as to 
highlight the contribution of the independent factors. The over-
all conclusion must be that while the behaviourial orientated 
objective measurement adopted for this study has certainly proven 
satisfactory, the entire question of outcome. perspective, 
definition and classification deserves future sustained and 
detailed research. 
Factors and Conditions Influencing Mediation outcome 
Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses included in this 
study provide answers as to the factors and conditions 
determining mediation outcome. While the bivariate tests simply 
suggest certain single factors which would cont:r:ibute to a 
particular outcome, the multivariate examination enlightens us 
to the manner in which a number of these factors interact in a 
relationship which is the central influence as to whether the 
mediation succeeds or fails. All these results are summarised 
below. 
The bivariate analysis concluded that the chance of a successful 
mediation was maximised: (a) when the conflict was non-complex, 
(b) when there have been less than 500 fatalities, (c) when both 
parties are homogenous, (d) when there is no power disparity, (e) 
when the parties have positive previous relations, (f) when the 
mediator has a high rank, (g) when the parties and mediator have 
had previous relations, (h) when the mediator uses directive 
strategies, and finally, (i) when the mediation takes place in 
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a neutral environment. out of the original fifteen hypotheses 
developed in Chapters Three and Four, it is found that seven can 
be confirmed outright, while the empirical examination replaced 
the intensity measurement with the simpler fatalities count, and 
introduced mediator rank, rather than power, as a more 
sophisticated measurement of the identity and influence of the 
mediator. 
While many of the fifteen hypotheses developed in Chapters Three 
and Four were supported by the bivariate analysis, there were 
some which despite theoretical support, had empirically 
insignificant relationships with the mediation outcome. Allowing 
for the possibility of the data being insensitive in measuring 
these factors, these negative findings are still important 
reasons for reflection on the theory which claims a relationship 
does exist. The fact that there is no statistically valid 
bivariate relationship between mediation outcome and the nature 
of the issue, the intensity of the conflict, the timing of the 
mediation, total party power, the number of parties in conflict, 
mediator experience with the conflict, the power of the mediator, 
and whether the mediator is a state or an international 
organisation, demonstrate that in these instances there is a need 
to re-evaluate the relevance of some of the propositions in the 
mediation literature. 1 The conclusion that some of the 
propositions in the existing mediation literature may be invalid 
was originally highlighted by the experience of exploring 
theoretical notions in Chapters Three and Four, which produced 
numerous contradictions between the various theorists. 
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Progressing on from bivariate analysis, the multivariate analysis 
of Chapter Six represents a step closer to the goal of a 
mediation theory. The final multivariate model demonstrated that 
the interrelationship between the factors of dispute complexity, 
previous relationship between the parties, and the mediation 
environment is the central determinant of mediation outcome. 
Through analysing the direct and indirect effects, we can for the 
first time begin to understand how a particular outcome is 
produced through the simultaneous influence of several different 
factors in the mediation relationship. 
The direct effects of the final multivariate model underscore the 
bivariate experience, emphasising the significance of positive 
inter-party relations, choosing a neutral or non-threatening 
environment, and working to simplify the complexity of the 
dispute. In terms of the indirect effects of the model, it is 
demonstrated that the previous relations between the parties will 
affect the number of issues which are confronted at the 
mediation, while the complexity of the dispute will affect the 
environment the mediation takes place in. 
Perhaps the single most significant result of the empirical 
analysis is the discovery of the centrality of dispute complexity 
as a determinant of mediation outcome. This factor, which has 
received scant recognition in the theoretical literature, and 
even less in empirical studies, shows not only a strong bivariate 
relationship with mediation outcome, but it also plays a central 
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role in the model of the central determinants of mediation 
outcome. 
All these results suggest a causal relationship between certain 
factors and conditions in the scenario of a mediation, and the 
success or failure of that mediation. Consequently, t~ese 
results, in addition to having individual significance, are also 
important for the light they shed on the path towards a composite 
theory of mediation. 
Predicting Success and Failure: Toward a Theory of Mediation 
The central question in mediation research is why mediation 
succeeds or fails. A true theory of mediation will only exist 
when it can establish a causal relationship between a set of 
variables which represent the mediation relationship, and a 
particular outcome. However, given that mediation is a social 
process, representing the interaction of human perceptions and 
actions as well as numerous external stimuli, it is impossible 
that absolute laws will ever exist to explain both how and why 
mediation works. Nevertheless, steps towards a theory of 
mediation can certainly be made. The most important determinants 
of mediation outcome can be recognised, and their "if-then" 
relationships with outcome nature established. These two steps, 
which represent the principal objectives of this study, and 
constitute intermediate steps towards the building of a mediation 
theory, have been achieved. Through the wealth of information 
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provided by the empirical analysis of Chapters Five and six, as 
summarised above, we can now predict with statistical evidence 
whether certain conditions and modes of behaviour will be likely 
to produce a successful or failed mediation. 
The final step in the production and assessment of these results, 
and the one which confirms their worth in the field of mediation 
research, is to reintegrate them into the mediation theory from 
which they were derived. 
The worth of the bivariate analysis is demonstrated through the 
fact that it can be used simply to confirm or deny propositions 
in the mediation literature. Almost without exception, the 
preceding theoretical and empirical mediation research has been 
structured in a bi variate manner, with theorists linking a 
particular factor to its likely impact on the outcome of a 
mediation. The data used in this study can be used as a gauge to 
measure the worth of many of these propositions which fill the 
current mediation literature. 
With regard to the more explorative multivariate research in 
Chapter Six, the theoretical value of this analysis was 
demonstrated by the formation of the enhanced contingency model 
of mediation, which represents an advance in our perception of 
how mediation proceeds from a set of input factors into a 
particular outcome. While this model is simple in orientation, 
it does represent a substantial refinement of earlier attempts 
to construct a theory of how a mediation outcome is produced. 
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Based on a sound theoretical foundation with statistical support, 
it represents the full circle for the research embodied in this 
study. It is through this process of deriving, testing, 
interpreting, and finally reintegrating that we move toward a 
deeper understanding of mediation; of how it works, and of why 
it succeeds and fails. 
From Theory to Practice: Mediation as a Means of Managing 
International Disputes 
While this study has adopted a highly theoretical approach to 
examining mediation, and has drawn its resources almost 
exclusively from the theoretical literature, it is important not 
to lose sight of the fact that international mediation is an 
event which is continually occurring in different disputes 
throughout the world. Mediation, as a form of social interaction, 
is a skill, and we accept that the more skilfully and 
knowledgably it is performed, the more successful it will be. 
While altruistic desire and a moral concern to work for peace may 
be important, it is certainly no substitute for understanding and 
wisdom as to how mediation proceeds. Ultimately, mediation 
research is only useful if its results can be transplanted into 
the practice of real-world conflict management, and can enhance 
its ability to peacefully manage disputes. 
175 
There are certain things we cannot hope to change about 
international disputes purely through increasing our knowledge 
of mediation. Mediation is, after all, a reactive measure to an 
already existing conflict. What is needed is an understanding of 
how and when to mediate a given conflict, in order to have the 
greatest chance of success. The findings of this study suggest 
several measures pertaining to the different variables which were 
used to describe the mediation relationship, namely: the nature 
of the dispute, the identity and characteristics of the parties 
and of the mediator, and mediation strategy. 
The Nature of the Dispute 
Where issues are concerned," the one conclusion that stands out 
is that the more complex the dispute in terms of number of 
issues, the less likely it will be mediated successfully. While 
the mediator can do little to actually simplify the conflict 
itself, he or she should attempt to decrease the number of issues 
in the parties' perceptions. The mediator can do this in two 
ways. The first is to approach the issues in a conflict 
separately, in an attempt to simplify the discussions, forcing 
the parties to concentrate on one point, and not dwell on the 
entire spectrum of contention. The second measure is more 
difficult, but given the importance of complexity to outcome, 
should be attempted. Often in a conflict, a simple dispute over 
security or territory may develop an ideological element as the 
conflict progresses and hostile and stereotyped negative images 
of an opponent are constructed. If the mediator can engender 
positive relations at the mediation table, and in so doing break 
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down these negative stereotypes the parties may hold of each 
other, the conflict may be simplified. 
These points about fractionalising the issues and engendering 
friendly relations to promote simplicity are especially 
important, g~ven that dispute complexity was identified by the 
multivariate analysis to be one of the central determinants of 
outcome. 
The finding that low fatality conflicts are more successfully 
mediated than high fatality conflicts suggests that mediation 
should be attempted earlier, rather than later, in a conflict 
situation. However, research on the timing of intervention, while 
failing to be statistically significant, did suggest that 
mediation attempted early in the conflict (up to 24 months on 
average) would be likely to fail. This suggests the mediator may 
be confronted with some sort of trade-off situation whereby a 
balancing act will have to be performed between becoming involved 
too early, and allowing the fatalities to rise. If a decision 
must be taken either way, the statistical results linking low 
fatalities to successful mediation were very strong, in contrast 
to those concerning timing of intervention. 
The Identity and Characteristics of the Parties 
A mediator should always attempt to ensure that the 
representatives of a party at the mediation table are indeed 
fully representative of their constituency. The results of this 
study show that the more homogeneous the parties, the more likely 
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they will be to come to a settlement. While the mediator cannot 
modify the intrinsic nature of a party, the heterogeneity of the 
parties will be minimised if the negotiators are fully 
representative of the factions within their constituency. 
The conclusion that success will be enhanced when the parties 
have enjoyed positive previous relations suggests that while the 
mediator cannot recreate history, he or she should endeavour to 
emphasise the positive aspects of the parties previous 
relationship, and to de-emphasise the past if these relations 
have been strained or hostile. The apparent difficulty of this 
task must be overcome, as the multivariate model identified the 
parties' previous relations as one of the factors most important 
in determining success or failure. 
A final measure the mediator could employ by being aware of the 
identity and characteristics of the parties, is to balance out 
any power disparity between the protagonists. The data suggests 
that success will be far more likely when there is power parity 
between the parties. This measure is accommodated by another 
significant finding of this study, namely that mediation 
strategies involving a high level of mediator intervention will 
be more successful than those with low intervention strategies. 
Through either tacitly or overtly siding with the weaker party 
in order to achieve power parity, the mediator will promote the 
path to a balanced mediation settlement. 
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The Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator 
With regard to choosing the identity of the mediator, two 
recommendations emerge from the findings. The first is that it 
is the leaders of states who will be the most likely to mediate 
successfully. Much of the theoretical literature emphasises that 
state size is the important factor when understanding which 
mediators will be successful. However, the analysis of how 
mediator characteristics influence outcome shows that the status 
of the mediator within his 
important than the size or 
recommendation that stems 
or her own constituency is more 
power of that constituency. The 
from this is simply that these 
individuals should become more frequently involved in playing the 
mediating role. If certain state leaders from every geographical 
region in the world publicised their willingness to act as 
mediators should a conflict arise, it would considerably 
streamline the process of suitable mediators being found when 
their services are needed. This would ensure that mediation was 
predominantly undertaken by the most successful group of the 
potential mediators in the international system, and would help 
to overcome the seemingly random way in which actors currently 
come forward to mediate international disputes. 
The second recommendation is that the parties should be familiar 
with the mediator, and should understand the motivational 
structure behind the mediator's involvement. This suggests that 
a mediator from an organisation of which both parties are members 




Because mediation strategy as a variable is largely represented 
by the mediator's behaviour, this is the one variable over which 
he or she can have complete control, and hence maximise the 
chance of a successful outcome. Two suggestions stand out. 
The first is that mediation should, wherever possible, take place 
in a neutral environment of some kind, be it the mediator's 
territory, or some other actor's who is not directly connected 
to either of the protagonists. Conversely, territory controlled 
by one of the disputing parties should be strongly avoided; it 
is highly unlikely that success will follow from a mediation 
taking place in an environment threatening to either party. This 
suggestion is underscored by the multivariate analysis, which 
placed the environment of the mediation as one of the central 
determinants of mediation outcome. 
The second suggestion in this area is that it is directive 
strategies, involving high levels of mediator intervention, in 
terms of suggestions, resources, and even manipulation, which are 
likely to produce successful outcomes. When a mediator does not 
have these abilities or resources, or is not willing to use them, 
it is advisable they reassess their role in the conflict. It is 
also important to emphasise that these power politics require the 
mediator to be skilful and perceptive so as to avoid alienation 
from the protagonists who may become distrusting or upset if they 
feel they are being openly coerced. 
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Conclusion 
Mediation will not settle all international disputes, and it is 
quite possible that despite the wealth of ongoing research in the 
field, it may still fail to settle many international conflicts. 
This should not be a discouragement. International conflict is 
a destructive force which demands a positive reaction. It seems 
obvious that currently mediation is not operating to its full 
potential, and as Burton states: 
Mediation is a learned technique, and performance is 
measured by success and failure (1972a:6). 
It is only through both continued academic research and practical 
experience that we will see the ability of mediation to settle 
disputes enhanced. Through its review of the mediation paradigm, 
its theoretical discussion of the issues surrounding mediation, 
and its discovery of the central determinants of mediation 
outcome, this study makes a significant contribution to this 
process of enhancement. 
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Endnotes 
1. The impact of the identity of the initiator of the 
mediation is not included in this list as there was no direct 
theoretical support for this notion. Hypothesis Thirteen was 
·constructed as a research question through informed opinion, in 
order to build some substantial findings in an area where no 
previous analysis had been attempted. 
2. However this does not necessarily include The United 
Nations Organisation, which statistically shows a low rate of 
mediation success. It is likely that common membership of the 
U.N. is simply not a significant enough relationship between 
actors. 
182 
Appendix One: Data-set Code book 
DATA FORMAT 
The data is set up in a standard SPSSx data file (Intmedl .dat). 
There is one record per case (mediation event), and 46 columns per 
record. The position of the data within the records is shown below. 
Variable Lab le Column 
Dis12J.H~ Variabl~s 
Vl Dispute Number 1-3 
V2 Duration s 
V3 Fatalities 6 
V4 Dispute Intensity 7 
vs System Period 8 
V6 Geographic Region 9 
V7 Primary Issue 10 
vs Secondary Issue 11 
V9 Peripheral Issue 12 
VlO Final Outcome 13 
Party Variables 
Vll Dispute Initiator 14-16 
V12 Time in ISA 17 
Vl3 Time in IS B 18 
V14 Alignment 19 
VIS Power A 20 
V16 PowerB 21 
V17 Prev Relation 22 
V18 Pol System A 23 
V19 Pol SystemB 24 
V20 No. Parties A 2S 
V21 No. Parties B 26 
V22 Homogeneity A 27 
V23 Homogeneity B 28 
M~diation V ariable:i 
V24 No. of Mediations 30-31 
V2S Mediation Type 33 
V26 Mediator Identity 34-36 
V27 Mediator Rank 37-38 
V28 Strategies 39 
V29 Prev Relationship 40 
V30 Prev Attempts 41 
V31 Prev Att this Med 42 
V32 Timing 43 
V33 Initiated by 44 
V34 Med Environment 4S 
V3S Med Outcome 46 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
The following is a list of all the variables in the Intmedl dataset. 
Included are the variable names and variable labels that can be found in 
the original SPSSx command file, along with the value labels and codes 
for each variable's characteristics. Where necessary a brief description 
c 
of the variable is given. Calulation criteria and codes for the more 
complex variables can be f ouncf on the fallowing pages . 
Vl DISPUTE NUMBER 
Each dispute has an individual code number. 
V2 DURATION 
Total duration of the dispute in months. 















V4 DISPUTE INTENSITY 












V6 GEOGRAPHIC REGION 
( 1) North America 
(2) Central and South America 
(3) Africa 
( 4) South West Asia 
(5) East Asia and the Pacific 
( 6) Middle East 
(7) Europe 




( 4) Independence 
(5) Resources 
(6) Other 
VS SECONDARY ISSUE 
Coding as for V7. 
V9 PERIPHERAL ISSUE 
Coding as for V7. 
VlO FINAL OUTCOME 
The eventual outcome of the dispute. 
(1) Ongoing 
(2) Lapse 
(3) One party victory 
(4) Abated 
(5) Partial settlement 
( 6) Full settlement 
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Vl l DISPUTE INITIATOR 
Code number of the initiating party. 
PARTY CHARACTERISTICS 
V12 TIME IN IS A 
Length of time in the international system (IS), party A. 
(0) Not applicable 





V13 TIME IN IS B 
Length of time in the international system (IS), party B. 
Coding as for V12. 
V14 ALIGNMENT 
The political alignment of the disputing parties. 
V15 POWERA 
( 1) Members of opposing blocs 
(2) Members of the same bloc 
(3) Bloc member vs. unaligned 
( 4) Both unaligned 
Power score for party A. 
V16 POWERB 







Power score for party B. 
Coding as for V15. 
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V17 PREY. RELATION 
The nature of the parties' relationship prior to the dispute. 
(1) Friendly 
(2) No previous relationship 
(3) Antagonism, but no conflict 
( 4) Previous conflict 
(5) 1 Previous dispute 
(6) More than 1 previous dispute 
V18 POL SYSTEM A 
Nature of the political system in party A. 
( 1) Monarchy 
(2) Multi-party 
(3) One party 
(4) Military regime/junta 
(5) Other 
V19 POL SYSTEM B 
Nature of the political system in party B. 
Coding as for V18. 
V20 NO. PARTIES A 
Number of additional parties associated with party A. 
(1) No other party involved 
(2) Additional 1-2 parties involved 
(3) Additional 3-5 parties involved 
( 4) More than 5 parties involved 
V21 NO. PARTIES B 
Number of additional parties associated with party B. 
Coding as for V20. 
V22 HOMOGENEITY A 
Index of internal homogeneity for party A. 
V23 HOMOGENEITY B 
Index of internal homogeneity for party B. 
MEDIATION CHARACTERISTICS 
V24 NUMBER OF MEDIA TIO NS 
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This is the key ('occurs') variable in the repeating data 
format. 
V25 MEDIATION TYPE 
(0) No mediation 
( 1) Mediation 
(2) Investigation 
(3) Good offices 
( 4) Conciliation 
V26 MEDIA TOR IDENTITY 
Mediator code number. 
V27 MEDIATOR RANK 
(0) No mediation 
(1) Private Individual 
(2) Leader of a national organisation 
(3) Representative of a regional organisation 
( 4) Leader of a regional organisation 
(5) Representative of an international organisation 
( 6) Leader of an international organisation 
(7) Representative of a small government 
(8) Representative of a large government 
(9) Leader of a small government 
(10) Leader of a large government 
V28 STRATEGIES 
The primary strategy employed by the mediator. 
(0) No mediation 
(1) Mediation offered only 
(2) Communication/Facilitation 
(3) Procedural 
( 4) Directive 
(5) Supervisory 
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( 6) Unspecified 
V29 PREV. RELATIONSHIP 
The previous relationship of the mediator with the parties. 
(0) No mediation 
(1) No previous relationship 
(2) Different bloc 
(3) Same bloc as one- party 
( 4) Same bloc as both parties 
(5) Mixed relationship 
V30 PREV. ATTEMPTS 








(9) No mediation 
V31 PREV. ATT. THIS MED. 







(5) . 5 
(6) 5+ 
(9) No mediation 
The timing of the mediation attempt. 







(9) No mediation 
V33 INITIATED BY 
Request for mediation initiated by 
(0) No mediation 
(1) One party 
(2) Both parties 
(3) Mediator 
( 4) Regional organisation 
(5) International organisation 
(6) Unspecified 
V34 MED ENVIRONMENT 
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The physical environment in which the mediation takes 
place. 
( 1) Party A's territory 
(2) Party B's territory 
(3) Mediators territory 
( 4) Neutral site 
(5) Composite 
(6) Offered only 
(7) Unspecified 
(9) No mediation 
V35 MED OUTCOME 
The outcome of the mediation attempt. 
(0) No mediation 
(1) Offered only 
(2) Unsuccessful 
(3) Ceasefire 
( 4) Partial settlement 
( 5) Full settlement 
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
From the original 35 coded variables, 5 additional dummy 
variables were derived for the purposes of this analysis. These were: 
V37 NEW HOMOGENEITY 
The comparative homogeneity of the parties. 
( 1) Both homogeneous 
(2) One homogeneous 
(3) Neither homogeneous 
V38 TOTAL POWER 
The cumulative power of the parties involved 
in the mediation. 
( 1) Weak mediation 
(2) Moderate mediation 
(3) Strong mediation 
V39 TOTAL PARTY 
The number of parties in the dispute. 
( 1) Two parties 
(3) More than two parties 
V 40 POWER DISPARITY 
The difference in the power between the two parties. 
( 1) No disparity 
(2) Low/Mid disparity 
(3) High disparity 
V41 COMPLEXITY 
The number of issues in the dispute. 
(1) One issue 
(2) Two issues 




























































Chinese Civil War 
Britain - India 
Netherlands - Indonesia 
France - Indochina 
Soviet Union - Iran 
France - Madagascar 
India - Pakistan 
Israel - Egypt 
Burma - Taiwan (KMT) 
India - Hyderabad 
Pakistan - Afghanistan 
China - Taiwan (Formosa Straits) 
Korean War 
China - Tibet 
Egypt- UK (Suez Canal Zone) 
Kenya 
France - Tunisia 
Oman - Saudi Arabia 
France - Algeria 
UK- Cyprus 
Sudan Civil War 
China - Tibet 
USSR - Hungary 
Suez War 
Cuban Civil War 
Honduras - N~gragua 
Spain - Morocco 
France - Tunisia 
China - Tibet 
Sth. Vietnam- Nth. Vietnam 
Coligo Conflict 
Pakistan - Afghanistan 
Cuba- US 
France - Tunisia 
India - Portugal 
Netherlands - Indonesia 
Algeria - Morocco 
India - China 
Indonesia - Malaysia 
Egypt - Yemen 
China- USSR 
African Territories - Portugal 
Aden- UK 
Cyprus - UK 
Somalia - Ethiopia 
Somalia - Kenya 
Nth. Vietnam - US 
India - Pakistan 
India - Pakistan 
Namibeanindependence 
Israel - Egypt 
USSR - Czechoslovakia 
Nigeria - Biafra 
Zimbabwean Independence 













































Dec.1963-N ov .1967 
1962-Mar.1964 
Late 1962-Sep.1967 
Mid 1964-May 1975 
1965-1970 
Aug.1965-Sep.1965 
1966-Mar. l 990 
Jun.1967 
Aug.1968 




056 Honduras - El Salvador Jul.1969 
057 US - Cambodia Jan.1970-Apr.1975 
058 India - Pakistan Mar.1971-Feb.1974 
059 Iran - Iraq 1971 
060 Uganda - Tanzania 1971-0ct.1972 
061 Nth. Yemen - S th. Yemen May 1972-0ct.1972 
062 Oman - S th. Yemen 1972-Aug.1974 
063 Israel - Egypt Mid 1973 
064 Israel - Syria Oct.1973-Dec.1974 
065 Ethiopia - Eritrea 1962-1990 
066 Turkey - Cyprus Jan.1974-Jun.1978 
\!!_6T0 Nth. Vietnam- Sth. Vietnam , "Dec-.196b- ) 
068 Indonesia - East Timor 
1 
Oct.1975-1989 
069 Western Sahara Jan1975-1990 
070 Honduras - El Salvador Jul.1976-0ct.1980 
071 Ethiopia - Somalia 1962 - 1985 
072 Israel - Lebanon 
073 El Salvador Conflict J an.1977-1990 
074 Zaire - Angola (Shaba Invasion) Mar.1977-May 1977 
075 Second Invasion of Shaba May 1978 
076 Uganda - Tanzania 
077 China - Vietnam 
078 Afghanistan - USSR 
079 Vietnam - Kampuchea Jan.1979-1990 
080 Angola - Sth. Africa 
081 Thailand - Vietnam 1979-1990 
082 Iran - Iraq Feb.1980-1989 
083 Mozambique - Sth. Africa 
084 Honduras - Nicaragua J an.1980-1990 
085 Ecuador - Peru Jan.1981-Feb.1981 
086 Ugandan Civil War Dec.1981-1990 
087 Libya-Chad Mid 1982-0ct.1988 
088 UK - Argentina Apr.1982-Jun.1982 
089 Israel - Lebanon Early 1982-Mid 1983 
090 Lauka - Tamil Conflict Jul.1982-1990 
091 Chad - Nigeria 
092 Burkina - Mali 
093 Laos - Thailand Jun.1984-Dec.1988 
094 India - Pakistan 
095 Iraq - Kuwait Aug.1990 
096 Panama- US Dec.1989 





001 Aden 057 Germany, East 
002 Afghanistan 058 Germany, West 
003 Albania 059 Germany, United 
004 Algeria 060 Ghana 
005 Angola 061 Greece 
006 Antigua & Barbuda 062 Grenada 
007 Argentina 063 Guatemala 
008 Australia 064 Guinea 
009 Austria 065 Guinea-Bissau 
010 Bahamas 066 Guyana 
011 Bahrain 067 Haiti 
012 Bangladesh 068 Honduras 
013 Barbados 069 Hungary 
014 Belgium 070 Iceland 
015 Belize 071 India 
016 Benin 072 Indonesia 
017 Bhutan 073 Iran 
018 Bolivia 074 Iraq 
019 Botswana 075 Ireland 
020 Brazil 076 Israel 
021 Bumei Darussalam 077 Italy 
022 Bulgaria 078 Ivory Coast 
023 Burkina 079 Jamaica 
024 Burma 080 Japan 
025 Burundi 081 Jordan 
026 Cambodia/Democratic 082 Kenya 
Kampuchea 083 Korea, North 
027 Cameroon 084 Korea, South 
028 Canada 085 Kuwait 
029 Cape Verde 086 Laos (Lao People's 
030 Central African Republic Democratic Republic) 
031 Chad 087 Lebanon 
032 Chile 088 Lesotho 
033 China 089 Liberia 
034 Colombia 090 Lybia (Lybian Arab 
035 Comoros Jamahiriya) 
036 Congo 091 Luxembourg 
037 Costa Rica 092 Madagascar 
038 Cuba 093 Malawi 
039 Cyprus 094 Malaysia 
040 Czechoslovakia 095 Maldives 
041 Denmark 096 Mali 
042 Djibouti 097 Malta 
043 Dominica 098 Mauritania 
044 Dominican Republic 099 Mauritius 
045 Ecuador 100 Mexico 
046 Egypt 101 Mongolia 
047 El Salvador 102 Morocco 
048 Equatorial Guinea 103 Mozambique 
049 Ethiopia 104 Namibia 
050 Fiji 105 Nepal 
051 Finland 106 Netherlands 
052 France 107 New Zealand 
055 Gabon 108 Nicaragua 
056 Gambia 109 Niger 
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110 Nigeria 168 Yemen, North 
111 Norway 169 Yemen, South 
112 Oman 170 Yugoslavia 
113 Pakistan 171 Zaire 
114 Panama 172 Zambia 
115 Papua New Guinea 173 Zimbabwe 
116 Paraguay 
117 Pem OTHER 
118 Philippines Code Name 
119 Poland 174 African Territories 
120 Portugal 175 EastTimor 
121 Qatar 176 Eritrea 
122 Rumania 177 Hyderabad 
123 Rwanda 178 Indochina 
124 Saint C~stopher and 179 Belgian Congo 
Nevus 180 Biafra 
125 Saint Lucia 181 Sri Lankan Tamils 
126 Saint Vincent and the 182 Katanga Rebels 
Grenadines 183 Ugandan Rebels 
127 Samoa 184 El Salvador Rebels 
128 Sao Tome and Principe 185 Communists - China 
129 Saudi Arabia 186 Communists - Greece 
130 Senegal 
131 Seychelles 
132 Sierra Leone 
133 Singapore 
134 Solomon Islands 
135 Somalia 
136 South Africa 
137 Spain 
















154 Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) 
155 United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) 
156 United Kingdom (UK) 
157 United States of America 
(USA) 





163 Vietnam, North 
164 Vietnam, South 
165 Western Samoa 
167 Yemen 
POWER 
This measure of the power of a disputing party is a modified 
version of the Cox-Jacobson Scale.1 
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The power index score for a nation is calculated by adding its 
scores on the following measures. 
All currency-based measures are in US dollars at current prices. 
Since the purpose of the modified scale was to compare states at a 
particular point in time, it was felt unnecessary to convert figures to 
constant prices, as was done in the original. 
GNP MILITARY SPENDING 
Score $Billion Score $Million 
1 0-.9 1 0-9 
2 1-3 2 10-50 
3 4-6 3 51-100 
4 7-9 4 101-250 
5 10-19 5 251-500 
6 20-29 6 501-750 
7 30-39 7 751-1,000 
8 40-59 8 1,001-5,000 
9 60-99 9 5,001-10,000 
10 100-199 10 10,001-25,000 
11 200-499 11 25,001-50,000 
12 500+ 12 50,001+ 
GNP per CAPITA TERRITORY 
Score $ Score Km2 
1 0-199 0 0-50,000 
2 200-599 1 50,001-200,000 
3 600-999 2 200,001-500,000 
4 1000-4999 3 . 500,001-900,000 
5 5000-10000 4 900,001-2,500,000 









1 Cox, R., & H. Jacobson, 1973, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in 
International Organisations, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
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HOMOGENEITY 
The internal homogeneity of each each of the disputing parties was 
measured on the basis of religion, language, and race, with the index of 
homogenity an average of the three scores. Each measure was coded 








Homogeneous - No single significant majority (10% or 
more of the population) or significant combination of 
smaller minorities (15% or more of the population). 
Having a single significant minority (10-25% of the 
population) or a signficant combination of smaller 
minorities (15-25% of the population). 
Having a majority population (51 % or more) but also 
having a large single minority or group of minorities 
(26-49% of the population) 
No majority group, but only one very large 
minority/plurality population (>30% of population and 
>10% more of population than any other single group). 
Greater fragmentation - More than one very large 
minority or several smaller minorities, but no majority 
or plurality population 
MEDIA TIOR IDENTITY 
ALPHABETICAL LIST 
Ccxle Mediator 
Aakrah - see OA U Advisory Mission 
Abdelghani, - see Eyadema 
016 Abdullah, Shaik. Leader of the Kashmir Moslem Conference 
050 Acheson, Dean. (US) Secretary of State 
Ahidijo- see OAU Advisory Mission 
Ahidijo - see OAU Fact Finding Mission 
201 Ahtisaari, Martti. UN Special Representative 
Aka, M. - see UN Mission 
085 al Y afi, Dr. Salim. Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League 
& Reps of Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Lybia,Syria 
175 Alatas, Ali. (Indonesia) Foreign Minister 
037 Algeria/Morocco Arbitration commision 
100 Amin, Idi. (Uganda) President 
043 Amir of Kuwait 
142 ANAD, North American Defence Agreement countries 
202 Angola/UN (unspecified) 
086 Arab League (unspecified) 
033 Arab League Commission of Mediation/Conciliation 
088 Arab League, Conference of the Foreign Ministers of 
Arap Moi, D. - see Moi, D. 
Aref, A. - see Bella B. 
123 Argentina, Brazil, Chile & US 
116 ASEAN Conference 
096 Atherton Jr., Alfred. (US) Assistant Secretary of State, Near East 
220 Avarez, Luis Alberto Monge. (Costa Rica) President 
Baba, D. - see UN Mission 
Balafrej, M. - see Hassan 
039 Bandaranaike, Mrs. (Ceylon) Prime Minister 
083 Bareh, Siyad. (Somalia) President 
Barr, B. - see Niilus, L. 
170 Barroso, Joes Durao. (Portugal) Secretary of State 
Bearogvi, - see Eyadema 
237 Beck-Pris, Baron Johan. (Sweden) Retired Diplomat 
Beeley, H. - see Murphy, Robert. 
239 Bella, Ben. (Algeria) President 
& Aref, Abdul Salam. (Iraq) President 
075 Bergus, Donald. US Rep in Egypt 
& Steiner, Michael. Head of Egyptian Section of US State Dept. 
017 Bernadotte, Count. UN Mediator in Palestine 
014 Black, Eugene. World Bank President 
Bomboko, J. - see OA U Mission 
154 Botha, Pik. (South Africia) Foreign Minister 
004 Britain (unspecified) 
234 Britain/US (unspecified) 
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-v32=timing of intervention 
-v41=complexity (number of issues) 
A saturated test was run on these parameters to discover all 
associations between them. The partial associations with a 
significance value of p<0.05 are as follows: 
Association Chi?: p 
V35*V41*V32 11.540 0.021 
V35*V3 15.232 0.000 
V35*V41 6.202 0.045 
v7*v41 12.281 0.002 
v3*v41 12.281 0.002 
These significant associations were used as the design for a 
specified model. A backwards regression was subsequently 
performed on this model in order that the least significant 
effects should be systematically removed until the most 
parsimonious model of the interactive effects of the nature of 
the dispute variable was produced. The result of the backwards 
regression test was the following model (with the Chi 2 and p 
values for each part of the model included): 
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The Model Design Chi?: p 
V35*V41*V32 14.537 0.006 
V35*V3 15.496 0.000 
V7*V41 59.450 0.000 
v3*v41 22.013 0.000 
The overall goodness-of-fit of this model was G2=32.097, while 
the significance was p=O. 952. This model was schematically 
interpreted as Figure 6.1 on page 138. 
For the logit test, the above model was re-specified with outcome 
(v35} placed as the dependent variable. Investigation of 
different combinations of the above model produced the following 
interactions as the most parsimonious description of the nature 
of the dispute variable's influence on outcome. 
The Logit Model 
V35 
v35 by v3 
v35 by v32 
V35 by v41 
v35 by v41 by V32 
The goodness-of-fit of this model was G2=2.397, while the 
significance was p=0.792. This model was schematically presented 
as Figure 6.2 on page 139. 
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Appendix Three: 
Log-linear Analysis on The Identity and Characteristics of the Parties 
Variable 
Paramet;ers -v35=outcome 
-v17=previous relations of the parties 
-v37=homogeneity 
-v38=total power 
-v39=number of parties 
-v40=power disparity 
A saturated test was run on these parameters to discover all 
associations between them. The partial associations with a 
significance value of p<0.05 are as follows: 
Associat;ion Chi~ p 
v35*v39*v40 16.614 0.002 
v35*v37 9.169 0.010 
V37*V39 24.035 o.ooo 
V37*V40 55.444 0.000 
v39*v40 10.309 0.006 
v35*v17 6.657 0.010 
v37*v17 8.318 0.016 
V39*V17 7.499 0.006 
These significant associations were used as the design for a 
specified model. A backwards regression was subsequently 
performed on this model in order that the least significant 
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effects should be systematically removed until the most 
parsimonious model of the interactive effects of the identity and 
characteristics of the parties variable was produced. The result 
of the backwards regression test was the following model (with 
the Chi2 and p values for each part of the model included): 
The Model Design Chi?: p 
V35*V37 10.943 0.002 
V37*V39 22.529 0.000 
v37*v40 57.873 0.000 
v39*V40 9.098 0.011 
v35*vl7 5.409 0.020 
V37*Vl7 8.088 0.018 
v39*vl7 5.213 0.022 
The overall goodness-of-fit of this model was G2=40.254, while 
the significance was p=O. 83 6. This model was schematically 
interpreted as Figure 6.3 on page 141. 
For the logit test, the above model was re-specified with outcome 
(v35) placed as the dependent variable. Investigation of 
different combinations of the above model produced the following 
interactions as the most parsimonious description of the identity 
and characteristics of the parties variable's influence on 
outcome. 
The Logit Model 
v35 
v35 by v17 
V35 by V37 
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The goodness-of-fit of this model was G2=0.678, while the 
significance was p=0.410. This model was schematically presented 
as Figure 6.4 on page 143. 
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Appendix Four: 




-v29=previous relationship with parties 
-v31=mediator experience 
-v33=mediation initiation 
A saturated test was run on these parameters to discover all 
associations between them. The partial associations with a 










These significant associations were used as the design for a 
specified model. A backwards regression was subsequently 
performed on this model in order that the least significant 
effects should be systematically removed until the most 
parsimonious model of the interactive effects of the identity and 
characteristics of the mediator variable was produced. The result 
of the backwards regression test was the following model (with 
the Chi2 and p values for each part of the model included): 










The overall goodness-of-fit of this model was G2=39.854, while 
the ·significance was p=O. 388. This model was schematically 
interpreted as Figure 6.5 on page 144. 
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A saturated test was run on these parameters to discover all 
associations between them. The partial associations with a 










These significant associations were used as the design for a 
specified model. A backwards regression was subsequently 
performed on this model in order that the least significant 
effects should be systematically removed until the most 
parsimonious model of the interactive effects of the mediation 
strategy variable are produced. The result of the backwards 
regression test was the following model (with the Chi2 and p 
values for each part of the model included) : 










The overall goodness-of-fit of this model was G2=10.480, while 
the significance was p=0.233. This model was schematically 
interpreted as Figure 6.6 on page 146. 
For the legit test, the above model was re-specified with outcome 
(v35) placed as the dependent variable. Investigation of 
different combinations of the above model produced the following 
interactions as the most parsimonious description of the 
mediation strategy variable's influence on outcome. 
The Logit Model 
v35 
v35 by v34 
v35 by v28 
The goodness-of-fit of this model was G2=3.521, while the 
significance was p=0.475. This model was schematically presented 
as Figure 6.7 on page 147. 
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Appendix Six: 




-v17=previous relations of the parties 
-v28=strategy 
-v32=timing of intervention 
-v34=environment 
-v37=homogeneity 
-v41=complexity (number of issues) 
Because it has already been determined that these parameters have 
a relationship with outcome through the intra-variable analysis, 
outcome was made dependent in the model, and different models 
were analysed for goodness-of-fit and significance. The most 
parsimonious model is described below. 
The Logit Model 
v35 
V35 by v17 
V35 by v34 
V35 by v41 
V35 by v34 by v41 
V35 by v41 by v17 
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The goodness-of-fit for this model was G2=0.255, while the 
significance was p=0.993. This model, of the central determinants 
of mediation outcome was schematically represented as Figure 6.9 
on page 154. 
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